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NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING  
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de relatie tussen overheid en middenveld. In de academische 
literatuur wordt beweerd dat fundamentele veranderingen in de samenleving (verval van 
traditionele structuren en toegenomen functionele differentiatie) hebben geleid tot 
verschuivingen in de aard en positie van zowel de overheid als het maatschappelijk 
middenveld. Dit heeft bijgedragen tot het groeiende belang van alternatieve governance 
paradigma's (new public management, nieuwe governance theorieën) die de traditionele 
institutionele uitwisseling tussen overheid en middenveldorganisaties (MVO’s) zouden kunnen 
destabiliseren. We presenteren empirisch onderzoek naar deze stelling door de relatie tussen 
overheid en civiele maatschappij in beeld te brengen in Vlaanderen, dat we beschouwen als 
een regio met een lange geschiedenis van neocorporatistische institutionele uitwisseling. 
 
Dit proefschrift draagt bij tot de literatuur over governance en destabiliserend neocorporatisme 
door hoognodig empirisch onderzoek te leveren. We presenteren vier empirische 
hoofdstukken waarin we verschillende onderzoeksmethoden combineren die samen een 
uitgebreide studie vormen van het huidige institutionele landschap in Vlaanderen. Onze vier 
onderzoeksvragen zijn: (1) In welke mate is de neocorporatistische relatie tussen de centrale 
overheid en middenveldorganisaties beïnvloed door NPM-achtige hervormingen in 
Vlaanderen? (2) Welke organisatorische strategieën gebruiken middenveldorganisaties om te 
navigeren doorheen NPM-achtige hervormingen in de neocorporatistische sector van 
maatwerkbedrijven (WISE's) in Vlaanderen? (3) In welke mate is de relatie tussen lokale 
overheden en lokale middenveldorganisaties in Vlaamse steden beïnvloed door de evolutie 
van lokale governance? (4) Hoe pakken netwerken van lokaal bestuur 'wicked' problemen aan 
in Europese neocorporatistische steden en wat is de impact daarvan op lokale 
maatschappelijke organisaties en overheden? 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 is een literatuurstudie die uit twee delen bestaat. In het eerste deel betogen we 
dat we overheid en middenveld niet als monolithische entiteiten moeten zien, maar dat we in 
plaats daarvan hun interne complexiteit moeten ontwarren. Er is dus geen sprake van een 
wisselwerking tussen het maatschappelijk middenveld en de overheid; in plaats daarvan is 
deze wisselwerking gebaseerd op een diverse realiteit van wederzijds versterkende of 
conflicterende relaties met verschillende actoren in zowel het middenveld als de overheid. In 
het tweede deel gaan we kritisch in op de literatuur over ‘governance’. Zoals we in dit 
hoofdstuk zullen bespreken, is deze literatuur gebaseerd op achterliggende theorieën over de 
functionele differentiatie van de samenleving en het verval van traditionele structuren. De 
13 
governance literatuur stelt namelijk dat er in de moderne wereld geen centrale positie, 
instelling of systeem is van waaruit de sociale en politieke orde kan worden gecontroleerd. 
Deze stelling wordt meestal afgezet tegen de structuur van de vroegmoderne samenleving, 
waarin de overheid nog een positie innam van waaruit de samenleving kon aangestuurd 
worden. In de evolutie van governance, zo beweert deze literatuur, is hiërarchie (en de haar 
bijhorende bureaucratische staat) verdrongen door markten en netwerken. Wij formuleren een 
conceptuele, historische en normatieve kritiek op deze literatuur. 
 
Hoofdstuk 3 presenteert de bevindingen van ons survey-onderzoek in drie sectoren van het 
middenveld in Vlaanderen (socioculturele verenigingen, gezondheid en welzijn, en de sociale 
economie). De onderzoeksvraag luidt: in welke mate is de neocorporatistische relatie tussen 
overheid en middenveldorganisaties beïnvloed door NPM-achtige hervormingen? 
Samenvattend vinden we in dit hoofdstuk geen destabilisatie van de neocorporatistische 
instellingen, hier opgevat als de gestabiliseerde uitwisseling tussen overheid en 
middenveldorganisaties. Wij stellen dat onze bevindingen aantonen dat NPM het 
neocorporatistische kader binnenkomt via institutionele gelaagdheid, waarbij enkele 'nieuwe' 
elementen aan het bestaande institutionele kader worden toegevoegd. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 bouwt voort op de bevindingen van het vorige hoofdstuk, en presenteert een 
casestudy over maatwerkbedrijven. Van de drie sectoren in ons survey-onderzoek is dit de 
meest waarschijnlijke sector om de impact van Nieuw Publiek Management te vinden. 
Maatwerkbedrijven zijn hybride organisaties die, in vergelijking met de andere twee sectoren 
in ons onderzoek, met meer marktachtige kenmerken opereren. De onderzoeksvraag in dit 
hoofdstuk is: welke organisatorische strategieën worden door maatwerkbedrijven gebruikt om 
te gaan met NPM-achtige hervormingen in de Vlaamse neocorporatistische context? 
Daarnaast hebben we gekeken hoe het huidige wetgevende kader tot stand is gekomen 
doorheen de uitwisseling tussen overheid en maatwerkbedrijven. In het algemeen illustreert 
dit hoofdstuk de institutionele gelaagdheid die aan het werk is via een hybride koppeling van 
beleidsprocessen, strategische interorganisatorische netwerken, administratief toezicht, 
markt-achtig management en markt-gebaseerde competitieve coping strategieën. Wat minder 
duidelijk is, is of dit betekent dat er een kwalitatieve verschuiving heeft plaatsgevonden in het 
markttype bestuur (d.w.z. een verschuiving naar 'meer' markt). 
 
Hoofdstuk 5 richt zich op middenveldorganisaties in 14 steden en gemeenten in Vlaanderen, 
waarbij gebruik wordt gemaakt van een combinatie van kwantitatieve gegevens en 
focusgroepen. Het doel is hier de institutionele relaties tussen lokale middenveldorganisaties 
en hun lokale overheden empirisch te beschrijven en na te gaan in hoeverre nieuwe vormen 
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van middenveldorganisaties actief kunnen zijn in kleinere, niet-metropolitaanse gemeenten. 
Hoewel dit hoofdstuk niet representatief is voor heel Vlaanderen, identificeert het toch 
belangrijke tendensen en verschillen die van belang zijn voor de discussie over het lokale 
middenveld en lokale governance binnen ons steekproefkader. Over het algemeen vonden 
we weinig aanwijzingen voor een actieve politieke uitwisseling tussen lokale 
middenveldorganisaties en lokale overheden. 
 
In hoofdstuk 6, dat een aanvulling vormt op het vorige hoofdstuk over lokale governance, 
wordt de vraag gesteld: als er in Vlaamse steden sprake is van zogenaamde governance 
netwerken, hoe functioneren die dan en wat is hun impact op de maatschappelijke 
organisaties en de lokale overheid? Het presenteert een casestudy van drie lokale governance 
netwerken in drie steden, die opvang- en integratiediensten bieden aan asielzoekers en 
vluchtelingen in het licht van de zogenaamde vluchtelingencrisis van 2015-2016. Onze 
casestudy laat zien hoe lokale netwerken functioneren als extra lagen bovenop de bestaande 
activiteiten van de lokale overheid en het maatschappelijk middenveld. De netwerken in onze 
casussen bouwen allemaal voort op bestaande interacties tussen lokale overheden en het 
maatschappelijk middenveld. 
 
Hoofdstuk 7 geeft een kort overzicht van de empirische bevindingen, waarna we ingaan op 
enkele implicaties van ons onderzoek voor onderzoek naar governance.  
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SUMMARY IN ENGLISH 
This dissertation examines the relationship between government and civil society. In academic 
literature it is claimed that fundamental changes in society (decline of traditional structures 
and increased functional differentiation) have led to shifts in the nature and position of both 
government and civil society. This has contributed to the growing importance of alternative 
governance paradigms (new public management, new governance theories) which might be 
destabilising the traditional institutional exchange between government and civil society 
organisations (CSOs). This dissertation provides empirical research into this claim by 
examining the relationship between government and civil society in Flanders, which we 
consider a region that has a long history of neocorporatist institutional exchange. 
 
This dissertation contributes to the literature on governance and destabilising neocorporatism 
by providing much-needed empirical research. We present four empirical chapters in which 
we combine different research methods that together form an extensive study of the current 
institutional landscape in Belgium (Flanders). Our four research questions are: (1) To what 
extent has the neocorporatist relationship between the central government and CSOs been 
impacted by NPM-style reforms in Belgium (Flanders)? (2) What organisational strategies are 
used by CSOs to navigate NPM-style reforms in the neocorporatist sector of Work Integration 
Social Enterprises (WISEs) in Belgium (Flanders)? (3) To what extent has the relationship 
between local governments and local CSOs in Flemish towns been impacted by the evolution 
of local governance? (4) How do local governance networks take on ‘wicked’ problems in 
European neocorporatist cities and how does this impact local CSOs and governments? 
 
In chapter 2 we provide a literature review of that consists of two parts. In the first part, we 
argue that in order to understand the relationship between civil society and government, we 
must not look at them as monolithic entities but instead disentangle their internal 
differentiation. The civil society is thus not interacting with the government; instead, this 
interaction is built on a diverse reality of mutually enforcing or conflicting relations with different 
actors across both civil society and government. In the second part, we engage critically with 
the literature on public governance. As we will discuss in this chapter, theories on the 
functional differentiation of society and the decline of traditional structures underlie much of 
the contemporary literature on governance. The governance literature states that in the 
modern world there is no central position, institution or system from which the social and 
political order can be controlled. This is usually stated in contrast to earlier modern society 
wherein government still assumed a central position as the command-and-control centre of 
16 
society. In the evolution of governance, this literature claims, hierarchy (the bureaucratic state) 
has been displaced by markets and networks. We formulate a conceptual, historical and 
normative critique of this literature. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the findings of our survey research in three sectors of civil society in 
Flanders (sociocultural associations, health and wellbeing, and the social economy). Here our 
main focus was to empirically explore to what extent the neocorporatist relationship between 
government and CSOs has been impacted by NPM-style reforms. In sum, this chapter does 
not find a destabilization of the neocorporatist institutions, understood here as the stabilised 
exchange between government and CSOs. We argue that our findings show that NPM enters 
the neocorporatist framework through institutional layering, in which some ‘new’ elements are 
added to the institutional framework. 
 
Chapter 4 builds on the findings of the previous chapter, and presents a case study on WISEs, 
a sector with the most likely case of New Public Management. WISEs are hybrid organisations 
that operate with more market-like characteristics compared to the other two sectors in our 
research. The research question in this chapter is: what organizational strategies are used by 
WISEs to navigate NPM-style reforms in the Flemish neo-corporatist context? Additionally, we 
looked at how the current legislative framework was formed through the exchange between 
government and peak associations. Overall, this chapter illustrates the institutional layering at 
work through a hybrid coupling of policy processes, strategic interorganisational networks,  
administrative oversight and market-type management and market-based competitive coping 
strategies. What is less clear, is whether this means that there has been a qualitative shift in 
market-type governance (i.e. a shift towards ‘more’ market). 
 
Chapter 5 turns to CSOs across 14 cities and municipalities in Flanders, using a combination 
of quantitative data and focus groups. The goal here is to empirically describe the institutional 
relationships between local CSOs and their local governments, as well as explore to what 
extent new forms of CSOs might be active in smaller, non-metropolitan municipalities. While 
not representative for the whole of Flanders, this chapter identifies key trends and differences 
that are important to the discussion on local civil society and local governance within our 
sample framework. Overall, we found little evidence of active political exchange between local 
CSOs and local governments. 
 
Chapter 6 complements the previous chapter on local governance by asking the question: if 
governance networks occur in Flemish cities, how do they function and what is their impact 
on CSOs and local government? It presents a case study of three local governance networks 
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in three cities, providing shelter and integration services for asylum seekers and refugees in 
light of the so-called refugee crisis of 2015-2016. Our case study shows how local networks 
function as additional layers on top of the existing operations of local government and civil 
society. The networks in our cases were all initiated by building on existing interactions 
between local government and civil society. 
 
Chapter 7 presents a brief overview of the empirical findings, after which we discuss some of 




1 Setting the scene  
Research design: problem statement, research question and 
methods 
1.1 Problem statement 
Understanding how civil society and government are related requires an understanding of 
society; in other words, a social theory. It is with the start of the ‘modernisation’ of society 
(usually situated around the end of the eighteenth century) that the fundamental issues of a 
social theory were developed (Wagner, 2001). Much has happened in social theories since 
then, certainly concerning the way in which government and civil society have been 
conceptualised and understood. Contemporary literature on government and civil society 
captures much of the dynamic between these two entities under the notion of ‘governance’. 
This is at once a very distinct and very vague concept. It is vague because, in the enormous 
body of literature on governance, it sometimes seems that it means everything and thus 
suffers from concept-stretching beyond usability (6, 2015a). However, while some of these 
critiques concerning overly broad interpretations have some merit, the concept still has its own 
distinct contours because it is constructed on specific theoretical assumptions concerning the 
evolution of the modern world. The main assumptions are that in the modern world there is no 
central position, institution or system from which the social and political order can be 
controlled. As we will discuss in chapter 2, various social theories speak of a qualitative 
change in modernisation that has led to this situation. This change entails a complex issue: if 
society has no distinct centre, how then is a social and political change to be achieved? Is 
change then only possible in a haphazard way, emerging from the clashing of events scattered 
through society? Or can there still be some form of coordination in society through which social 
change can be achieved? Governance literature is a collection of theoretical attempts to 
analyse societal efforts at social and political order (Ansell & Torfing, 2016). Not all authors 
agree on the extent of coordination possible, ranging from very minimal interaction (e.g., 
Luhmann, 1997) to the coordination efforts of an engaged state that brings together multiple 
interacting self-organising networks and systems (e.g., Jessop, 2016) and those emphasising 
the new yet still strong governing capacities of states (e.g., Bell & Hindmoor, 2009). This very 
brief discussion shows how we will frame our analysis: given their societal position, how can 
we understand the relationship between government and civil society? If modernisation has 
indeed resulted in a decentred society, ‘governance’ implies that new methods of coordination 
between government and civil society are required in order to be able to achieve collective 
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social goals. Yet, before we make the jump towards the need for new institutions, there is still 
the matter of empirical reality.  
 
The postwar history of the relationship between government and civil society has been viewed 
in public administration literature as a cumulative evolution from ‘government’ towards 
‘governance’, usually divided into three phases or paradigms (Cepiku, 2008; Osborne, 2010; 
Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017; Salamon & Toepler, 2015): Public Administration (the age of 
bureaucracy), New Public Management (NPM) (the age of markets), and New Public 
Governance (NPG) or new governance theories (the age of networks). Both NPM and NPG 
are in their own way a critique on the inert, compartmentalised and generally inefficient way 
that public services have been managed through bureaucracies. While NPM sees the cure for 
this illness in the healing qualities of efficient and effective markets, NPG emphasises how 
working in networks and partnerships can improve public services compared to both 
bureaucracies and markets. However, in many European welfare states, the idea of networks 
as innovative forms of governance does not fit with their history (Evers & Laville, 2005). 
Especially for those states with a neocorporatist tradition (e.g., Belgium, France, Germany, 
Austria, Sweden, ...) it is more accurate to speak of welfare partnerships (Salamon & Toepler, 
2015) that are characterised by the institutionalised exchange between government, civil 
society organisations (CSOs) and other social actors. In this context, CSOs do not only deliver 
services with the support of the government but are also, through a myriad of peak 
associations, actively involved in the policy design of these services in close partnership with 
the government (Evers & Laville, 2005).  
 
This does not mean, however, that the reforms that have been introduced through NPM have 
no meaning in this context of welfare partnerships. Some argue that NPM-style reforms have 
had a considerable impact on these European partnerships (Aiken & Bode, 2009; Ascoli & 
Ranci, 2002; Bode, 2011; Klenk & Pavolini, 2015; Zimmer, 1999). This research suggests that 
NPM-style reforms have been added on top of the existing institutions, resulting in a complex 
and hybrid arrangement of governance institutions. Indeed, it adds to the evidence that the 
relationship between government and CSOs consists of situationally bound mixed forms of 
governance, whereby elements of different paradigms are combined (Osborne, 2006; Pollitt & 
Bouckaert, 2017). Competitive performance, hierarchical monitoring and coordinated policies 
can all coexist in increasingly 'nervous patterns of governance' (Bode, 2011: 137). Several 
authors have argued that institutional reforms in this regard almost always include some form 
of institutional layering as new elements are gradually added on top of or alongside existing 
institutions without dismantling them (Koreh, Mandelkern, & Shpaizman, 2019; Mahoney & 
Thelen, 2010; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). This institutional layering is not a neutral evolution; as 
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new institutional elements are introduced, support for the original institutions tapers off and 
internal coherence can be reduced (Koreh et al., 2019). 
 
Both governance theories and the neocorporatist model are expressions of the functional 
differentiation of society (Esmark, 2009; Luhmann, 1997) which states that society consists of 
different function systems, and no single function system (e.g., politics, economy, religion) 
holds the societal centre from which an ultimate source of power emanates over all other 
systems. Following on from this position, the governance of public services becomes a matter 
of intermediary institutions (Kjaer, 2016) which connect function systems and through which 
resources, power, authority and accountability are distributed. Neocorporatism is a model in 
which peak associations functioned as stable connections to coordinate between government, 
civil society and the economic system (Kjaer, 2016). While government holds an important 
central position in this arrangement, other social spheres do not lose their functional 
autonomy. However, neocorporatism was confronted by the so-called crisis of the welfare 
state in the 1970s, during which the unfulfilled promise of full employment and endless 
economic growth became apparent as demographic evolutions put the pension system under 
pressure and economic crises disrupted the political balance (Judt, 2006; Kazepov, 2005). A 
dual movement took place regarding the position of government: it became regarded as the 
root cause of societal problems (considered to be overly sluggish, dysfunctional and inflexible) 
while simultaneously being redeployed as an active instrument for the implementation of the 
new liberal strategies (Dardot & Laval, 2013; Wacquant, 2012). The relationship between 
government and the rest of society shifted from a focus on collective mechanisms of solidarity 
and welfare to regulation by competition and contracting (Kazepov, 2005; Kjaer, 2016). Thus, 
even though NPM attacked government for its flaws, it is itself mostly a top-down strategy 
(Fattore, Dubois, & Lapenta, 2012). Others have argued that this crisis enhanced the 
functional differentiation of society, making it necessary to place government in ‘horizontal’ 
and ‘flexible’ networks. Davies and Spicer (2015) argue that underlying the network paradigm 
is the assumption that networks are well suited for these sociological conditions: “(…) networks 
are purported to be beneficial because they provide a better ‘fit’ with macro environmental 
changes such as globalization, the restructuring of the state, individualization, and knowledge 
capitalism” (2015: 223). Yet, critics have pointed out that many of these networks can be 
considered especially suited for the further advancement of the aforementioned competitive 
liberal strategies (Davies, 2011a; Swyngedouw, 2005).  
 
Thus, the problem enfolds as follows: fundamental changes in society (decline of traditional 
structures and increased functional differentiation) have led to shifts in the nature and position 
of both government and civil society. This has contributed to the growing importance of 
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alternative governance paradigms (NPM, NPG) which might be destabilising the 
neocorporatist institutional exchange between government and CSOs. This dissertation 
provides empirical research into this claim of destabilising neocorporatism. 
1.2 Research question 
This dissertation contributes to the literature on governance and destabilising neocorporatism 
by providing much-needed empirical research (Baldwin, Chen, & Cole, 2019; Brandsen, 
Trommel, & Verschuere, 2015). The leading research question of this dissertation is: to what 
extent have evolutions in governance impacted (or destabilised) the traditional institutional 
exchange between government and civil society organisations? We present four empirical 
chapters in which we combine different research methods that together form an extensive 
study of the current institutional landscape in Belgium (Flanders). This lead to four empirical 
research questions are:  
1. To what extent has the neocorporatist relationship between the central government 
and CSOs been impacted by NPM-style reforms in Belgium (Flanders)?  
2. What organisational strategies are used by CSOs to navigate NPM-style reforms in 
the neocorporatist sector of Work Integration Social Enterprises (WISEs) in Belgium 
(Flanders)?  
3. To what extent has the relationship between local governments and local CSOs in 
Flemish towns been impacted by the evolution of local governance? 
4. How do local governance networks take on ‘wicked’ problems in European 
neocorporatist cities and how does this impact local CSOs and governments? 
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1.3 The pertinence of Belgium (Flanders) as context 
Belgium matches all the criteria of a neocorporatist regime, with high degrees of formalised 
exchange between government and CSOs (e.g., Bloodgood & Tremblay-Boire, 2017; Jahn, 
2016). A clear illustration of this is the presence of the strategic advisory boards in which the 
Flemish government engages with representative umbrella organisations concerning a wide 
range of policy issues (economic, social, cultural, environmental, ...). Belgium also has one of 
the largest nonprofit sectors globally (Salamon & Sokolowski, 1999), with 12.3% of the total 
workforce active in nonprofits (in 2014) (Rigo, Biernaux, & Volon, 2018). In turn, the nonprofit 
sector in Flanders, the northern region of Belgium, has the highest proportion of paid nonprofit 
professionals in Belgium (59.5% of all paid nonprofit professionals in Belgium work for a 
Flemish nonprofit) (Rigo et al., 2018).  
 
In Belgium, this neocorporatist structure has historically intersected with a strong 
consociational legacy, the so-called pillarisation (Fraussen & Beyers, 2016; Van Den Bulck, 
1992; Wayenberg, De Rynck, Steyvers, & Pilet, 2010)—tight coupling between CSOs, political 
parties and government representatives that is constructed around shared values or interests 
(Billiet, 2004; Witte, Craeybeckx, & Meynen, 2009). The Belgian state evolved around the 
evolution of three societal ‘fault lines’:  religious-ideological (clerical vs. anticlerical), socio-
economic (labour vs. capital) and ethno-linguistic (Flemish vs. Walloon) (Devos, 2016; 
Dewachter, 2001; Huyse, 2003; Witte et al., 2009). Around these fault lines, networks of 
organisations have evolved, ranging from organised labour and employers’ organisations to 
cultural organisations, schools and universities, media (especially newspapers) and banks  
(Devos, 2016). Pillarisation is then a vertical integration of these organisations along certain 
societal fault lines, leading to a compartmentalised society, whereby individual members’ lives 
are taken up from “the cradle to the grave” (Hellemans, 1990: 26): “Pillars spanned the whole 
person. One was born in this ‘world’ (e.g. in a catholic maternity) and a large part of life took 
place within the confines of the same pillars: school, youth movement, hospital, mutuality, 
sports association, cultural association, labour union, library, healthcare at home, elderly 
associations, political parties, … were organised on a philosophical-religious ground. Contact 
with dissentients was minimal” (Huyse, 2003: 41). The power dynamic between different social 
groups resulted in a state system that was particularly adapted to containing social conflicts 
in these pillars, more than solving the specific policy issues at hand (Van Den Bulck, 1992). 
The crucial issue is not that conflict did not occur (in or between pillars) but how it was 
managed by a state system that could selectively deal with social issues, never confronting all 
three fault lines at once, resulting in balancing and stabilising state hegemony.  
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Although pillarisation reached its peak in the 1960s, some argue that networks between 
political parties and CSOs can still be of significant impact on public policymaking (Huyse, 
2003: 41; van Haute, Amjahad, Borriello, Close, & Sandri, 2013), especially in domains such 
as health, social security and labour market (Fraussen & Beyers, 2016). According to Huyse, 
the primary characteristics of the pillars that were constructed around philosophical 
differences and social closure disappeared (Huyse, 2003). These gave way to the dominance 
of their, until then, secondary characteristics, of which the most notable was the central 
position of pillars in the state (Huyse, 2003: 375). Pillars became political concerns (Huyse, 
2003) or neo-pillars (Hellemans, 1990): integrated professional networks of organisations 
occupying key positions in the institutions of the state. As such the Belgian state became 
characterised by a highly professionalised civil society through the yearlong structural support 
of the government, and a government that is tightly connected to CSOs (Hellemans, 1990). 
 
Starting in the 1960s new social movements (Hellemans, 1990) organised around social 
issues that in their view were being ignored by the traditional pillarised CSOs: women's rights, 
environmental concerns, pacifist causes and international solidarity (Develtere, 2004; Hooghe, 
2004; Stouthuysen, 2004). Many of these new movements evolved into successful 
organisations and developed umbrella organisations outside of the pillarised structures, with 
some considerable impact on the political and social agenda (Hooghe, 2004) and themselves 
becoming part of the institutionalised consultation system. In the 1990s, as society became 
further depillarised (with citizens no longer living their lives under the cloak of the pillars), the 
political position of pillarised CSOs was increasingly contested (Huyse, 2003). Instead, the 
role of CSOs in generating social capital became increasingly valued, especially with the rise 
of extreme-right politics in the early 1990s. As one researcher put it, the societal discourse 
concerning the role of CSOs at the end of the 1990s seemed to shift from reprehensible pillars 
(i.e., political) to praised civil society (i.e., community, social capital) (Billiet, 2004).  
 
Meanwhile, the Flemish Region developed its own substantial powers with the further 
federalisation of the Belgian state. Importantly, the Flemish Region has mostly copied the 
same corporatist traditions from the federal level (Wayenberg et al., 2010), although NPM-
style reforms were introduced by both the federal and Flemish governments at the start of the 
2000s. These reforms fit a broader continental European approach as modernisers, in which 
administrative reform is built on the core elements of the traditional system with modernising 
elements, such as an increased focus on performance and results (instead of adherence to 
bureaucratic rules) and more citizen-oriented design of services (citizens as ‘customers’ of 
public services) (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017). During the same period, however, extreme-right 
politics in Flanders was on the rise, and in academic literature, part of the problem was 
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identified as a lack of social capital. In Flanders, this led to a reframing of the role of civil 
society: no longer as ‘political concerns’ occupying state power, but as praised social actors 
providing society with the necessary means for restoring social capital (Billiet, 2004). Symbolic 
for this reframing of its role was the coining of the term middenveld (midfield) instead of pillars 
for the many networked organisations that were deemed suitable to take up this role. In sum, 
the argument here is that there is a double shift occurring in Flemish civil society: on the one 
hand an evolution towards more service-oriented CSOs; on the other hand, an evolution 
towards more community-oriented CSOs that are primarily focused on producing social 
capital.  
 
Currently, recent policy reforms have introduced new market-type mechanisms in the 
governance of several nonprofit sectors, mainly stimulation through increased competition, 
pressure to gain more market-based income and the introduction of more market-type 
management techniques. In the domain of health and wellbeing, cash-for-care systems have 
been introduced which entail a shift from ‘clients’ to ‘consumers’ along with increased 
competition between service providers (nonprofit, social profit and for-profit organisations). In 
the social economy (here: WISEs), recent regulatory reform has introduced a unification of the 
sector, the centralisation of administrative monitoring and steering mechanisms through the 
central governmental labour agency and is expected to push towards a more market-oriented 
reintegration of WISEs’ target employees. In the sociocultural domain, concerns have risen 
over the affirmation by Flemish policymakers that CSOs need to become less reliant on public 
funding, which resulted in an official white paper on alternative (read: nonpublic) sources for 
funding (Gatz, 2017). 
 
At the local level, the most prominent form of institutionalised exchange between government 
and CSOs are the so-called local advisory councils. Legislation by the Flemish government 
makes the formation of these councils mandatory for specific domains (spatial planning, 
culture, youth work, sports)1, and local governments are free to create others. These advisory 
councils deal with many different domains. Besides the four that have already been 
mentioned, there are also councils on environmental issues, agricultural policies, local trade, 
childcare initiatives, education, international solidarity, senior citizens, and health and 
wellbeing, among others.  
 
                                               
1 Since 2017, a separate advisory council for sports is no longer required. When a local government 
wants to abolish this council, they are required to integrate it into the cultural advisory council (creating 
an advisory council for leisure).  
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Recently, there has been a growing debate on the emergence of so-called new types of CSOs. 
This can be seen from the grey literature in Flanders produced by CSOs and others which 
discusses a range of CSOs that are active as local or urban ‘commons’ (Bauwens & Onzia, 
2017; De Rynck, De Pauw, & Pauly, 2016; Hautekeur, 2017; Holemans, Van de Velde, De 
Moor, & Kint, 2018; Kuhk, Holemans, & Van Den Broeck, 2018; Van Meerbeek, 2018), for 
which different names are used besides ‘commons’, e.g., citizen collectives, citizen initiatives 
or citizen action. CSOs discussed in these publications are mostly active in domains such as 
climate and sustainability, local sharing economy, social inclusion, energy, food production or 
agriculture. While many of these publications succeed in shedding light on local initiatives that 
might otherwise remain unnoticed, we must also critically assess what this means for our 
research. Indeed, while they offer anecdotal evidence of new types of CSOs, there is very little 
systematic analysis across different cities and municipalities. Furthermore, many publications 
focus on larger urban environments but can only offer some indications of non-urban or rural 
environments.  
 
The above illustrates how Belgium (Flanders) constitutes a salient context for the study of 
neocorporatist institutions, both at the central and local level. It illustrates the complexity and 
diversity of its civil society, as well as how the position of CSOs has evolved over the years to 
what some argue is a less political and more service- (Flemish level) or community-oriented 
(local level) focus (Billiet, 2004).   
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1.4 Research methods 
Different research methods have been selected to answer each of the research questions. A 
full discussion of the methodology will be provided in the respective chapters. Table 1 below 
links the different research questions, methods and objects. 
 
For the first two research questions, we will assess the relationship between the Flemish 
government and Flemish regional CSOs, whereby we focus on the impact on NPM reforms in 
Belgium. In order to assess the state of the current neocorporatist institutions (R.Q.1), large-
scale survey research across different sectors in civil society is used to ensure that our findings 
reflect a wide diversity of CSOs. In order to research which organisational strategies are used 
to navigate NPM-style reforms (R.Q.2), we use a case study of a particular sector (WISEs), in 
which we combine semi-structured interviews of the leading managers of these organisations 
with our survey findings for this particular sector. For the next two research questions, we turn 
to the relationship between local governments and CSOs. Here, a second large-scale survey 
is used to assess the current relationship between local government and local CSOs (R.Q.3). 
We are also interested in understanding if and how local governance networks (with 
governments and CSOs) can contribute to dealing with complex social issues (R.Q.4). Here, 
we opted again for a qualitative case study, this time focused on local governance networks 
in three so-called central cities in Flanders (i.e., cities with a central role in their respective 




Table 1: Overview of research methods 
Research 
Question 
Research Method Research Object 
R.Q.1 Survey research 339 CSOs active on the Flemish regional level 
R.Q.2 Multi-method research: survey research + 
qualitative case study 
51 WISEs (Flemish nonprofit sector) 
(work integration social enterprises) 
R.Q.3 Multi-method research: population analysis 
(mapping), survey research + focus groups 
Mapping: 1757 local CSOs 
Survey: 413 local CSOs 
Focus groups: CSOs and government officials 
R.Q.4 Qualitative case study 3 local networks of CSOs and government 
(three Flemish cities) 
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1.5 Overview of the dissertation 
The dissertation will continue as follows. In the second chapter, we present a discussion of 
academic literature, where we will focus on two issues. First, we will clarify how we understand 
civil society and government, both complex concepts in their own right. Second, we will 
engage with the literature on governance, a concept used to describe and analyse the 
relationship between government and civil society. We discuss the theory of society that 
underlies this literature, its evolution and some of the main paradigms. We end by stating three 
critiques and discussing how governance relates to the concept of neocorporatism.  
In the subsequent chapters, we will present our empirical research, each taking on one of our 
four research questions. The third chapter looks at whether neocorporatist institutions in 
Flanders have come under pressure by NPM, using survey research of CSOs in three Flemish 
sectors of civil society. In the fourth chapter, we will look closer at one of these sectors: WISEs. 
We combine survey results with a qualitative case study to look at the organisational strategies 
of CSOs in a context of NPM-style legislative reforms. Next, we turn to the local level. The fifth 
chapter looks at the state of local governance institutions, combining a quantitative analysis 
of CSOs in 14 municipalities (using our population database and survey research) with focus 
group research in five smaller municipalities. In the sixth chapter, we focus on the urban 
context. Here we ask the question, when urban governance networks are at work, how do 
they take on local wicked issues and how does this impact local CSOs and governments? 
Finally, we reflect back on our research in chapter 7.   
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2 Literature review: disentangling the complexity of 
public governance 
2.1 Introduction2 
We started the first chapter by stating that in order to understand the relationship between civil 
society and government, a social theory is required that formulates our understanding of 
society. Are we experiencing drastic changes in the way civil society and government are 
related to each other, and if so, how can we think about these changes and understand their 
impact on the role and function of both civil society and government? These questions lead to 
important topics such as the autonomy of CSOs; the steering capabilities of government; 
marketisation of public services; the impact of formal rules on practices and strategies of 
organisations; the nature of partnerships and networks between government and civil society; 
the internal complexity and interweaving of actors from government and civil society; and 
certainly also the ‘messy’ reality in which politics and public service delivery take place. This 
chapter deals with these questions by engaging with international literature. It has two major 
parts. 
 
In the first part we argue that in order to understand the relationship between civil society and 
government, we must not look at them as monolithic entities but instead disentangle their 
internal differentiation. The civil society is thus not interacting with the government; instead, 
this interaction is built on a diverse reality of mutually enforcing or conflicting relations with 
different actors across both civil society and government.  
 
In the second part of the chapter, we engage critically with the literature on public governance. 
As we will discuss in this chapter, theories on the functional differentiation of society and the 
decline of traditional structures underlie much of the contemporary literature on governance. 
The governance literature states that in the modern world there is no central position, 
institution or system from which the social and political order can be controlled. This is usually 
stated in contrast to earlier modern society wherein government still assumed a central 
                                               
2 A draft of this chapter was presented at EGPA 2016: Pauly, R., De Rynck, F., & Verschuere, B. (2016). 
The relationship between government and civil society: a neo-Gramscian framework for analysis.. 
https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/8065871 
 
Corresponding CSI Flanders Working Paper: Pauly, R., De Rynck, F., & Verschuere, B. (2017). 
Government and Civil Society: A neo-Gramscian framework for disentangling the complexity of 
governance arrangements. http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-8065871  
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position as the command-and-control centre of society. In the evolution of governance, this 
literature claims, hierarchy (the bureaucratic state) has been displaced by markets and 
networks. We formulate a conceptual, historical and normative critique of this literature. We 
answer these critiques when we situate our research in the literature on neocorporatism and 
governance. We end with a discussion of our governance analyses in the next chapters.
2.2 Observing civil society and government 
2.2.1 Civil society 
Civil society has been discussed in a wide array of literature with many insightful contributions 
(Arato, 1994; Bunyan, 2014; Cohen & Arato, 1997; Edwards, 2014; Evers & Laville, 2005). 
The term ‘third sector’ is used often (Taylor, 2010), but concepts such as the nonprofit sector 
(Salamon & Anheier, 1998) or social economy (Evers & Laville, 2005; Moulaert & Ailenei, 
2005) are also used. These different approaches all aim to capture the dynamics of a sector, 
social sphere or domain that is distinct from other social spheres, most notably government 
and markets (Cohen & Arato, 1997). Edwards’ study (Edwards, 2014) on the history and 
development of the concept has led him to distinguish three different approaches, which we 
discuss further in this section. 
a.  Civil society as associations 
The first approach considers civil society as a distinct part of society that consists of those 
associations that are not exclusively tied to the spheres of government, market or family 
(Edwards, 2014: 19–20). This concept of civil society is often dubbed ‘third sector’ and is a 
key concept in literature on public governance (Brandsen, Donk, & Putters, 2005; Evers & 
Laville, 2005; Pestoff, 1992; Taylor, 2010; Van de Donk, 2008). At their core, these 
associations are usually considered to be voluntary private formal nonprofit organisations that 
have a certain public purpose (Salamon & Sokolowski, 2016).  
b.  Civil society as the ‘good’ society 
The second approach to civil society is to regard it as “a shorthand for the kind of society in 
which we want to live” (Edwards, 2014: 44), constructed around shared ideals and norms. 
This vision of civil society is remarkably different from the first perspective. Whereas the first 
perspective is a formal approach to civil society, the second perspective is a normative 
approach. This difference is important since it shows that associational life does not guarantee 
a shared set of norms and values of itself, and the normative integration of civil society is not 
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purely a matter of forming associations (Edwards, 2014). At the same time, normative 
integration does not necessarily mean that the actors in this civil society pursue social change 
in the form of progressive goals (democratic agenda, equity, justice, etc.) or even that they 
are acting according to certain notions of civility (Evers, 2010). As Edwards indicates, religious 
organisations are good examples of the diversity in normative integration, ranging from liberal 
to conservative, inclusionary to exclusionary, openness and prejudice (2014: 53). In a 
discussion of Gramsci’s take on civil society, Buttigieg discusses conservative religious 
movements in the US as an especially salient example of how conservative forces in civil 
society can achieve important social and political impact (Buttigieg, 2005).  
c.  Civil society as the public sphere 
In this approach civil society is regarded as the public sphere: “the arena for argument and 
deliberation as well as for association and institutional collaboration” (Edwards, 2014: 67). 
Where the first perspective was formal and the second normative, the third perspective offers 
a political take on civil society. There is considerable debate on how civil society functions as 
a public sphere. Jürgen Habermas’ contributions have long dominated the debate (Edwards, 
2014; Habermas, 1984, 1987). Habermas argues that actors are able to engage with each 
other in the public sphere through shared assumptions of the world, which Habermas calls the 
lifeworld: they share certain cultural assumptions, they assume that certain societal norms and 
rules will be accepted and followed by all involved, and they assume that each actor expects 
to be held accountable (Habermas, 1987).  
 
This approach has been criticised for being more normative than analytical, a view 
summarised by Flyvbjerg: “This is the fundamental political dilemma in Habermas’s thinking: 
he describes to us the utopia of communicative rationality but not how to get there” (Flyvbjerg, 
1998: 215). Missing from Habermas’ view on civil society is how power relations in society 
operate and how they affect social and political conditions. Antonio Gramsci takes a very 
different approach to civil society, focusing sharply on these power struggles in society 
(Gramsci, 2006). Gramsci's goal is to understand how political power is distributed in society 
through social institutions. Focusing on civil society in this regard gives us the insight that a 
strong civil society (in the first and second meaning) does not in and of itself lead to social 
consensus. On the contrary, an active civil society entails different actors in different positions 
with different interests, which makes consensus even more unlikely. A strong civil society is 
the basis of the public sphere (Edwards, 2014) and because of this, it only guarantees conflict 
(Flyvbjerg, 1998). Some authors even see conflict as a necessary condition of the political 
process (Mouffe, 1999, 2005; Rancière, 1999). Understanding civil society as a public sphere 
thus requires us to understand how conflict and power work. 
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d.  Researching civil society: civil society organisations 
Our research focuses on associations in civil society in a very broad manner, drawing from 
the dimensions discussed above. First, we will focus on associations, as defined as voluntary 
private formal nonprofit organisations that have a certain public purpose (Salamon & 
Sokolowski, 2016). This public purpose is some form of social or collective goals and certainly 
means the organisations discussed in the first approach, but it also includes the normative 
dimension of civil society. In practice, this means that our research will focus on associations 
that have a certain political role (i.e., they pursue some form of social change) or offer some 
form of public service or goods.  
 
These associations have to be initialised by actors from civil society and not from government 
or market actors. Since many associations have developed close connections to 
governmental institutions (through regulations, financing, oversight, etc.), this condition of 
voluntary existence of private initiative offers an empirical argument for demarcation. 
 
It is important to realise that any conceptualisation of civil society entails blurry boundaries 
between government, market and civil society, and that CSOs can and do cross these 
boundaries. A good example of blurring boundaries concerns the social economy in Europe 
(Evers & Laville, 2005; Salamon & Sokolowski, 2016), where the lines between CSOs and 
markets are not always easily drawn. These organisations are active in certain markets in the 
form of cooperatives, social enterprises or mutual-type organisations (providing services and 
goods for customers, e.g., healthcare, second-hand goods, landscaping services, labour 
market integration, …).  
 
The complementary approaches to civil society discussed in this paragraph highlight the 
importance of developing an analytical framework that is able to deal with a high degree of 
complexity as well as conceptual boundaries that are not always perfectly clear in practice. 
Additionally, civil society does not operate in a social vacuum but has many ties with other 
parts of society. Indeed, our research is specifically concerned with how civil society is related 
to government, which is a very complex concept in its own right, as we will discuss below.  
2.2.2 Politics and service delivery 
Our research focuses on CSOs that pursue a political role or that deliver public services. Of 
course, these dimensions are not always easily separated since public services can be crucial 
in the development of social and political goals such as equality, equity, justice, health, 
education, etc. (Osborne, 2010). When we talk about politics and the political, we are referring 
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to the often-used distinction between politics, polity and policy (Jessop, 2016; Kaid & Holtz-
Bacha, 2008; Palonen, 2003; Pennings, Keman, & Kleinnijenhuis, 2006). The narrowest 
conception of politics refers to policy and policymaking: the art of the possible. It concerns the 
specific collective choices to act (or not to act) on specific social issues. Politics is broader 
than policy and refers to the setting of collective goals and is not immediately tied to specific 
policy decisions. Here, politics is tied to how actors in the state (among which governments 
and civil society) construct collective goals. Politics is a confrontation of different social forces 
and different interests concerning the form of the state. This confrontation takes place inside 
the polity: “the institutional matrix that establishes a distinctive terrain, realm, domain, field, or 
region of specifically political actions” (Jessop, 2016: 17). In sum, the role of civil society in 
politics can refer to all these dimensions: organising services to implement policies, the 
influence on the development of policies, political representation and advocacy of specific 
groups, organising (agonistic) conflict or working towards institutional change.  
 
Public service delivery is always part of politics: public services are part of the specific policies 
that decide ‘who gets what and how’ and form an important part of the construction of the 
polity. The fact that organisations are only instruments for service delivery, or on the contrary, 
that they are important partners in policy development says something about the political 
process. The way services are formed or implemented is determined by political choices. The 
key issue here is that public services do not occur in a political vacuum but actively shape the 
political sphere in which they operate.  
2.2.3 Government 
Government must be observed with the same attention for internal complexities as we have 
done for civil society. The point is that we should not only look at the relationship between 
government and civil society from a perspective of undifferentiated social systems or spheres. 
A good point of departure to understand government is offered by Heywood (2013) in his 
handbook on politics, where he distinguishes between three perspectives on ‘government’ 
based on its function, its institutions and its narrower meaning of ‘executive’:  
Government in its broadest sense, refers to any mechanism through which ordered rule is 
maintained, its central features being the ability to make collective decisions and the capacity to 
enforce them. However, the term is more commonly understood to describe the formal and 
institutional processes that operate at the national level to maintain public order and facilitate 
collective action. The core functions of government are, thus, to make law (legislation), implement 
law (execution) and interpret law (adjudication). In some cases, the political executive (…) alone is 
referred to as ‘the government’. (Heywood, 2013: 266) 
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a.  Government as politics: collective decision-making 
In Heywood’s approach to government, we can see the fundamental connection between 
government and politics. Earlier we have argued that politics is to be understood as the setting 
of collective goals. Thus, by arguing that government “in its broadest sense” refers to this 
same function, Heywood almost equates government with politics. The main difference lies in 
the added capacity of government to enforce decisions, which is of course the classical 
understanding of the distinctive monopoly on the violence of government. While politics refers 
to the social construction of collective goals, governments “are authorized to express and 
enforce” collective decisions (Moeller, 2012, ch. 8).  
b.  The many institutions of government 
The second dimension in Heywood’s definition consists of the institutions of government that 
organise the different authorities of decision-making. These institutions are the executive and 
the legislature, as well as police and military (as Heywood points out, ‘government’ is 
sometimes used as a shorthand for just the executive branch). Furthermore, there are also 
the many entities (e.g., departments, agencies) that administer government programmes in 
various policy domains (e.g., energy, infrastructure, health, education, culture, etc.).  
 
The legislature is the institution that most symbolises the democratic character of the state 
(Devos, 2016). Together with the executive, it is characterised by the continuous interplay 
between opposition and majority (Luhmann, 1990). This is a dynamic that gives particular 
importance to political parties who in many Western European countries are very much the 
dominating force in political decision-making. In Belgium, political parties dominate so many 
aspects of government that the political system has been labelled a ‘partitocracy’ (Dewachter, 
2001; van Haute et al., 2013) where parties “can be considered the effective principals in the 
polity, and many actors of the parliamentary chain of delegation, such as MPs, ministers, and 
civil servants have been reduced to mere party agents” (De Winter & Dumont, 2006: 957).  
 
Political parties have been of particular concern in discussions on civil society: are they in or 
out of civil society? This debate has divided scholars, which leaves Edwards to conclude: “The 
only acceptable compromise seems to be that political parties are in civil society when they 
are out of office and out of civil society when they are in” (Edwards, 2014: 26). Jessop (2016) 
instead accepts the dual role of political parties and places them between civil society and 
government, constantly mediating between both: on the one hand, they represent interests of 
social groups and are part of the public sphere; on the other hand, they occupy positions in 
government from where they have considerable power over its institutions.  
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c.  Different spatial scales 
Government, in both its institutional and functional meaning, operates on various spatial scales 
(local, regional, national and international or global). It is, of course, not the same government 
at work on these different scales, as institutions can vary greatly. As a system of decision-
making, multiple forms of government can be at play at the same time (for example, a national 
democratic government that is dealing with an international technocratic government). Thus, 
it is important to consider the relationship between local, regional, national and international 
institutions of governments (as can be seen in the large amount of literature on multi-level 
governance). The practical reality of governing has led to complex relations between 
governments on these scales, creating a variety of agencies and partnerships between them.  
d.  Politics and administration 
An important distinction needs to be made between the political dimension of government and 
the administrative dimension. In a strict interpretation of this distinction, administrators would 
be considered as merely implementing policy under the full authority and responsibility of the 
elected political officials. In reality, room for operational decision-making is built into 
governmental structures through deconcentration via internal and external agencies (De 
Rynck, 2016; Mewes, 2011). Besides collective actors (departments, agencies), individual 
administrators are also worth considering. We know that administrators are not passive 
subordinates of the political executives but that they have considerable discretion in carrying 
out their tasks (Lipsky, 2010) and can even have substantial influence on policymaking and 
on the policies they are intended to implement (Prior & Barnes, 2011).  
e.  Observing government 
So far we have presented various dimensions of government: its function (organising and 
enforcing collective decision-making), its institutions, its different scales of operation and some 
of its most important actors. The result is a high degree of complexity that clearly shows how 
government is anything but a monolithic unidirectional entity. Inside governments, 
contradictions, conflicts or mutual enforcements arise as much as they do in civil society—
between local and national governments, between intra-governmental departments, between 
different agencies, between administrators, between departments and cabinets, etc.  
2.2.4 Focusing on governance 
A complex picture emerges from these insights into the different dimensions of civil society 
and government and the use of typological classifications. In civil society, there are many 
different types of organisations, from local to global initiatives: neighbourhood committees, 
grassroots movements, nonprofits that provide healthcare, education or social services, social 
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enterprises or even a global civil society based on civility (Jordan, in Edwards, 2011, ch. 8). 
All these types of civil society represent different interests, values and ideas; they take on 
different forms and sizes and occupy different positions in the public sphere. On the side of 
government, we find different levels of government with different authorities, agendas and 
resources; different actors inside these governments, on the side of politics as well as 
administration, who can have conflicting interests or outlooks; and different types of relations 
(financial, regulatory, oversight, etc.) that can conflict with or reinforce each other. Civil society 
is thus not merely interacting with government but this interaction is built on a diverse reality 
of mutually enforcing or conflicting relations with different actors of both civil society and 
government. This set of relations between the internally differentiated domains of civil society 
and government constitutes the core of our analysis.  
 
Consequently, the next step we need to take is to show how we can analyse these relations. 
We still need a more general framework for understanding this relationship; in short, we need 
a wider theory of society.  
 
In the following paragraph, we will discuss the literature on governance—a concept used to 
capture the dynamic between government and the rest of society in light of perceived changes 
in contemporary society. As we will discuss below, many authors believe that the 
government's role in society has changed drastically. The central idea is that government is 
dependent on other social actors to be able to fulfil its function of collective decision-making, 
also referred to as ‘steering’. Its relations with the domains of civil society and the market are 
key to this function. Some authors argue that government can no longer occupy a central 
coordination position. Others emphasise the opposite and argue that government remains the 
crucial social arena for societal steering, if not as a central commander than at least as the 




This section explores how the relationship between government and civil society has been 
studied extensively from the perspective of governance. Before we discuss this concept further 
below, we can define it in general as: "the process of steering society and the economy 
through collective action and in accordance with common goals" (Ansell & Torfing, 2016: 4). 
 
The central idea in this definition is that actors in the political system together with actors in 
other societal systems (such as the market and civil society) piece together collectively binding 
decisions, thus involving processes of shared political decision-making and societally 
distributed public service delivery. A similar idea has been expressed by Meuleman: 
“Governance is the totality of interactions, in which government, other public bodies, private 
sector and civil society participate, aiming at solving societal problems or creating societal 
opportunities.” (Meuleman, 2008: 11) 
 
In academic literature, especially Anglo-Saxon literature, this relationship between the political 
system and civil society has been described in terms of a historical shift from government to 
governance, meaning that in the course of the last century, power over politics and public 
services has been transferred from central government to a wider range of public and private 
actors. In this literature, governance appears in two meanings: on the one hand as a view on 
societal steering; on the other hand as a distinct form of societal steering, namely network 
governance. In this dissertation we will argue that to study the first meaning (societal steering), 
theory should not limit itself to the second meaning (network governance). Indeed, the idea of 
a historical shift towards network governance is built on historical, conceptual and normative 
misunderstandings of the concept of governance, especially in the context of European 
neocorporatist institutional exchange between government and civil society. 
 
We will first explore how this idea of a ‘shift’ is based to a great extent on underlying theories 
of modernity. Modernisation, a concept around which most of the early classical sociological 
science developed (Wagner, 2001), refers in general to the transition in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft. This transition is mostly defined in 
terms of one or more processes of individualisation, secularisation, rationalisation, reification, 
cultural fragmentation, role differentiation and commodification (Laermans, 2003). According 
to many authors, these processes have intensified as modernity has entered its second phase, 
starting from the second half of the twentieth century. This new phase has been called 
postmodernity (Lyotard, 2010), liquid modernity (Bauman, 2000), reflexive modernisation 
(Beck, Giddens, & Lash, 1994), risk society (Beck, 1992), or network society (Castells, 2010b). 
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We refer to these theories in general as post-structuralist (Marinetto, 2003b) or post-traditional 
(Lee, 2006) and will show that they have strong conceptual links to the academic literature on 
governance. These post-traditional theories argue that society has become structured without 
a centre, that power has become diffused throughout a wide array of actors and structures 
and that traditional institutions have become unstable and fluid. These claims are central to 
the development of the concept of governance, together with the idea of a large transformation 
in the way government and civil society interact. Key to this idea of transformation is the 
displaced position of government. This is most obvious in the literature on “network 
governance” (e.g., as critiqued by Davies, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b), and while we do not wish to 
dispute the important role that networks play in contemporary society, we do wish to qualify 
their importance and present some important critiques on the idea of governance as 
displacement. Following the general definition we have presented at the start, we want to 
discuss governance as a way of capturing the relationship between government and civil 
society in the sense of constructing collective decisions, which is an inherently political 
relationship. 
2.3.1 Post-traditional theories 
The two central themes that combine these post-traditional theories are the decline of 
traditional structures and, related to this, functional differentiation. We will present some of the 
central ideas of these two themes. The following discussion is not so much meant as an 
affirmation of these theories but as an exploration of the themes that connect these theories 
to the conceptual development of governance. Through these linkages we can ground our 
discussion of governance more firmly in the wider sociological theory, building towards our 
own critical understanding.  
a.  The decline of traditional structures 
In social theory, the notion of society, and the place of the individual in it, has become 
increasingly problematic (Schinkel, 2007). The decline of traditional structures is a recurring 
theme in the debate on the relationship between government and civil society. An important 
theory in this regard is that of ‘reflexive modernisation’ (Beck, Bonss, & Lau, 2003; Beck et al., 
1994; Lee, 2006), which states that society is fundamentally transformed into a second phase 
of modernisation: traditional structures that once seemed fixed have become uncertain and 
fluid (Bauman, 2000), although this does not mean that structures have become entirely 
obsolete (there are still rules, expectations, values, identities, institutions, ...). Several causes 
are identified: globalisation, intensified individualisation, transformed gender roles, flexible 
employment and risk politics (associated closely with the global ecological crisis) (Beck et al., 
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2003). This has important consequences for the role of government and politics in society. In 
a risk society, politics cannot be managed by experts alone but has to rely on other 
mechanisms for dealing with risks: decentralisation, public consultation, public-private 
partnerships, citizen involvement and participation (Hamel, Lustiger-Thaler, & Mayer, 2000).  
 
Already we can see how an underlying view on contemporary society is linked to ways of 
organising the governance of this society. In this strand of social theory, modernity has 
become reflexive in the sense that individuals have the ability to reflect more than before on 
the social order and their place in it (Beck et al., 1994). However, in this view on modernisation, 
society no longer offers clear integrating narratives; instead, it relies on flows of 
communications in fast-working networks, whereby traditional structures no longer offer 
stability of identity or meaning for modern individuals (Lash, 2001). Consequently, this loss of 
traditional structures means that individuals have to constantly build their own life paths 
(Giddens, 1991). Important for our discussion is that ideological, religious or cultural 
identification of individuals with CSOs is no longer self-evident, and new organisations and 
movements can emerge that are not part of the traditional social order. 
 
This loss of stable formal bonds between individuals and organisations does not mean, 
however, that collective action has become impossible. According to Giddens (1991), politics 
also includes life politics wherein individuals connect social issues with their own life project 
of self-actualisation. Bang and Sørensen (1999) added to this idea by describing the everyday 
maker—a typically modern political figure primarily interested in political action, not because 
of an overarching ideology but out of involvement in specific issues in daily life. Again, we can 
see how a described decline of traditional structures is linked to ideas of governance, in this 
case through the linkages between individual life politics and collective political action. 
b.  Functional differentiation 
The second idea that is important for our discussion is that of a decentred society, which is 
related to the above-described decline in traditional structures. In abstract terms, this idea has 
been formulated as functional differentiation, which implies that society is essentially without 
a centre (Esmark, 2009; Luhmann, 1997, 2013). In this view, society consists of function 
systems that operate autonomously from each other. This position reflects two ideas that are 
influential in many post-traditional theories. First, that society cannot be analysed as consisting 
of different parts that are integrated into a whole (Schinkel, 2007). Second, that no function 
system (e.g., politics, economy, religion) holds the societal centre from which an ultimate 
source of power emanates over all other systems. The implication of this theory is that the 
political system can no longer claim to be an integrating function of society. In its most extreme 
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formulation, one could claim that no political system (not even democracy) can include people 
in society because there is no society in which to include them. There is no whole and there 
is no head or heart that holds the societal body together. If one were to take up this theoretical 
position, it would imply a rethinking of how democratic politics functions (e.g., Schinkel, 2012). 
Without claiming an a priori position towards this claim, we wish to emphasise the link between 
these ideas and the discussion in governance literature on the shift from government to 
governance, which we will discuss later.  
 
Another influential strand of social theory takes up this idea of a decentred society and has 
been influential in governance theories. It concerns the concept of networks in which 
individuals, groups, organisations or institutions can become important nodes, whereby the 
relations between the nodes form the core of analysis (Marshall & Staeheli, 2015). This leads 
to thinking about “governing processes that are not fully controlled by governments. 
Policymaking occurs through interactive forms of governing that involve many actors from 
different spheres” (Lewis, 2011: 1222). The idea that networks are the defining characteristic 
of modern society is often attributed to Manuel Castells and his theory of network society 
(Castells, 2010b), in which governments are only one of many possible actors to hold 
significant influence over power. Networks can also be approached very differently, as can be 
seen in the literature on so-called actor-network theory (ANT). ANT as inspiration for 
governance theory seems to be taken up especially by researchers on urban planning and 
urban governance (Farias & Bender, 2010; Rydin & Tate, 2016). ANT focuses on the 
construction of social entities, most notably the so-called nonhuman actants that other theories 
generally disregard. Through the lens of ANT, the city as an object of study “becomes a difficult 
and decentred object, which cannot anymore be taken for granted as a bounded object, 
specific context or delimited site” (Farias & Bender, 2010: Introduction). ANT is a view of 
society that turns the network metaphor inside out: “Society is not the whole ‘in which’ 
everything is embedded, but what travels ‘through’ everything, calibrating connections and 
offering every entity it reaches some possibility of commensurability” (Latour, 2005: 241–242). 
Society, and with it the idea of government and state, becomes deconstructed, decentred and 
finally, as Latour sets out to do, re-assembled.  
 
The last theory we wish to discuss here is the work of Michel Foucault on governmentality, 
which still has a significant impact on the analysis of the relationship between government and 
civil society (Anjaria, 2009; Anwar, 2012; Fyfe, 2005; Jaeger, 2007; Roy, 2009). Foucault 
analyses how historically different forms of power have developed (e.g., disciplinary power 
and biopolitics) and how power is not limited to the institution of government but is at work 
throughout society. The governmentality approach highlights how all kinds of techniques and 
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procedures govern the conduct of actors (Foucault, 2008; Schuilenburg, & Van Tuinen, 2009). 
In a narrow sense, it refers to the forms of knowledge by which a state governs; in a broader 
sense, this approach emphasises the diffusion of certain rationalities of governing throughout 
society. As Dardot and Laval summarise it “[the] term ‘governmentality’ was precisely 
introduced to refer to the multiple forms of the activity whereby human beings, who may or 
may not be members of a ‘government’, seek to conduct the conduct of other human beings 
– that is, govern them” (Dardot & Laval, 2013: Introduction). Some authors have expressed 
the idea that neoliberal governmentality is a dominant force in key domains of our 
contemporary personal and social lives, thus affecting all kinds of institutions, such as 
healthcare, education, labour, family life, etc. (Bang, 2016; Dardot & Laval, 2013; Triantafillou, 
2012). The central idea here is the widespread use and application of all kinds of techniques 
of self-governance. According to Bang, in a neoliberal society, the idea of self-governance can 
only succeed in “institutionally altering, modifying or adjusting individual behaviour and 
conduct so that it becomes more functional for the system and the variety of institutions that 
constitute it” (Bang, 2016: 70). In this regard, governmentality research raises questions on 
whether life politics (see above) can be capable of overcoming the supposed demise of 
traditional collective institutions. Governmentality research leads to insightful explorations of 
how these power dynamics are capable of contradicting or undermining the overarching claim 
of self-governance as an expression of freedom and choice (Dardot & Laval, 2013). 
c.  Neoliberalism? 
Engaging with the literature on governance means that one will soon encounter a large body 
of work in which modern society is described as exceedingly neoliberal, if not in its totality than 
certainly in many areas of politics and social and economic policy (Bang, 2016: 70; Bevir, 
2011; Dardot & Laval, 2013; Davies, 2011a, 2014b; Geddes, 2005, 2006; Ilcan, 2009; Jessop, 
2002; Lang & Rothenberg, 2016; Perkins, 2009; Wacquant, 2012; Williams, Cloke, & Thomas, 
2012). When reading the rich literature on neoliberalism one is faced with the complexity of 
the topic and the multitude of different approaches. As is the case with many theoretical 
concepts, neoliberalism has been defined in different ways and as such has given rise to a 
large debate on what it actually is (Dean, 2014). Here, we do not wish to present this debate, 
but instead, we offer an approach to neoliberalism that is most suited for the analysis of 
governance in this chapter.  
 
It is through the concept of governmentality that research on the link between governance and 
neoliberalism has been most successfully developed. As Bevir notes, governance and 
governmentality both share a common concern: “they disaggregate the state, drawing 
attention to the diffusion of political power and political action, and exploring the porosity of 
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the border between state and civil society” (Bevir, 2011: 457). The concept of governmentality 
has been used to describe a certain set of techniques, practices and knowledge (what 
Foucault called dispositifs) that are so widespread in society that it is possible to speak of 
neoliberal governmentality. Central to these ideas is that neoliberalism constitutes a form of 
self-governance by which competition becomes the norm in all aspects of personal and social 
life, and personal freedom can only be appreciated through an entrepreneurial approach 
towards life (Bang, 2016: 70; Dardot & Laval, 2013). Neoliberal governmentality is considered 
a global rationality: “By this we mean that such a rationality is global in the two senses of the 
term: it is ‘world-wide’ in that it obtains on a world scale; and, far from being confined to the 
economic sphere, it tends to totalize – that is, create a world in its own image through its power 
to integrate all dimensions of human existence” (Dardot & Laval, 2013: 11).  
 
Neoliberalism is thus more than an economic project of laissez-faire or capital accumulation, 
but it is considered a deeply political set of beliefs and strategies that impacts all aspects of 
life: “[The institutional core of neoliberalism] consists of an articulation of state, market, and 
citizenship that harnesses the first to impose the stamp of the second onto the third.” 
(Wacquant, 2012: 71). Neoliberalism should not be equated with the retreat or diminishing of 
government, but rather, it concerns how government is an active mechanism in strengthening 
the reach of neoliberal ideas and strategies. The exact nature of these changes can vary with 
the concerns and focus of the authors. For example, Wacquant (2012) emphasises the 
penalising and disciplining aspects of neoliberalism, Bang (2016) illustrates how sets of 
institutions can empower or nudge individuals into doing what is most suited to the societal 
equilibrium, while Davies (2014b) focuses on how neoliberalism is closely connected to the 
coercive power of the local state. 
2.3.2 Shifting governance? 
It has become commonplace to start an overview of governance literature by stating that 
governance is a complex concept which is developed through a large volume of literature that 
contains many different approaches to it (Cepiku, 2008; Pollitt & Hupe, 2011) and has become 
so complex and maybe even overused that it can be hard to see why it is still useful for guiding 
research (Frederickson, 2007). As Perri 6 has stated, “If governance is everything, maybe it’s 
nothing” (6, 2015a). Despite the many approaches to the concept, the fact remains that it is 
an important concept in the literature on the relationship between government and civil society 
(Ansell & Torfing, 2016; Bevir, 2007, 2012; Phillips & Smith, 2011) and therefore should be 
critically engaged with. Moreover, we find the concept still useful for analysing how 
government and civil society are related vis-à-vis each other concerning the construction of 
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societal collectively binding decisions and goals. In this manner, we wish to begin our 
discussion from a recently renewed effort at formulating a synthetic overview of academic 
literature on governance. In the Handbook on Theories of Governance, Ansell and Torfing 
provide a definition of governance that serves as a useful point of departure for the discussion 
in this chapter. Governance is defined as: 
the interactive processes through which society and the economy are steered towards 
collectively negotiated objectives. The crucial insight is that no single actor has the knowledge, 
resources and capacities to govern alone in our complex and fragmented societies (...). 
Interaction is needed in order to exchange or pool the ideas, resources and competences that 
are required for the production of desirable outcomes." (Ansell & Torfing, 2016: 4) 
 
There are many ideas formulated here, and in the following, we will unpack these through 
engaging with the academic evolution of the concept of governance. In the previous 
paragraphs, we have already outlined how certain theories of society permeate this definition 
of governance, specifically theories that propose the decline of traditional structures and the 
decentring of state and society. Several developments in the literature on governance can be 
identified that take up these ideas. In a review of the use of governance in public administration 
literature, Cepiku (2008) identifies how most literature develops a concept of governance by 
contrasting it with notions related to government and NPM. From a wider perspective, 
governance literature is focused on distinguishing governance as a steering mechanism in 
society that is uniquely different from hierarchies and markets. Governance has become a 
response to certain perceived developments in contemporary society (which we discussed 
earlier). The literature on governance tries to offer a view on politics and public service delivery 
that set outs to be wider and more inclusive than the concept of government (Pollitt & Hupe, 
2011). In this discussion, the leading distinction seems to be that between governance and 
government, which can be seen in how much of governance literature focuses more on the 
process of governing than on the structure of government (Klijn, 2008). Bevir offers a good 
summary of these core ideas of governance:  
Conceptually, governance is less orientated to the state than is government, and it evokes the 
conduct of governing at least as much as it does the institutions of government. Temporally, 
governance captures changes in government since the latter quarter of the twentieth century. 
(Bevir, 2007: xxxvii - our emphasis) 
 
Contrary to Bevir’s statement that governance is less oriented to the state, governance 
literature has in fact at several times shifted its attention given to the role of the state—an 
evolution best described as the development of several conceptual movements: the move 
from government to governance, and the move towards metagovernance and bringing the 
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state back in again (Bevir & Rhodes, 2010). Bevir and Rhodes conclude with a third wave 
towards decentred governance, which chiefly refers to their own proposal for a renewed and 
decentred governance theory.  
 
At the heart of our presentation of governance is the question of whether it is justified to speak 
of a shift from hierarchy to markets and networks (Bevir, 2012). First, we will present the basic 
idea behind the early literature on the shift from government to governance. Second, the notion 
of ‘differentiated polity’ will be discussed by briefly presenting the ideas of the so-called Anglo-
governance school. Third, we will discuss how these ideas are used in a general model in 
public administration, as presented by Stephen Osborne, which speaks of an evolution from 
bureaucracy over NPM towards a so-called NPG (Osborne, 2006, 2010). Fourth, we will briefly 
discuss how the concept of metagovernance attempts at combining network governance with 
the crucial role of government and state in contemporary reflexive modernity. Fifth, we will 
conclude this section with three important critiques on governance theory. 
a.  From government to governance 
Central to the discussion is the aforementioned notion of a decentred state, an idea that can, 
of course, only take form if one starts from a previously centred state. Most discussions on 
governance start by distinguishing themselves from the base model of the bureaucratic state 
(Pollitt, 2003; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017; Pyper, 2015).  
 Bureaucracy and hierarchy (Public Administration) 
Bureaucracy is a model of organising public policy and service delivery with a focus on 
predictable rules (rule of law), a clear hierarchy of competences, a central command structure 
and a distinction between administrators and politicians (Eliassen & Sitter, 2008; Osborne, 
2010; Pollitt, 2003). There are two important characteristics of the bureaucratic state that one 
must not overlook. Firstly, the bureaucratic state is a state that carries out its own policies 
instead of relying on third-party actors for implementation. Secondly, it has historically 
developed in tandem with the rule of law, securing both individual rights as well as 
mechanisms for collective solidarity. In the postwar years, government expansion was built on 
the social consensus that social problems necessitated active government intervention (Judt, 
2006).  
 
In the bureaucratic state, power over politics and public services is firmly situated in the 
government of a centralised state. The ideal-typical description of a Weberian bureaucracy as 
a rational process based on a clear hierarchy of tasks, rules and competences is, of course, 
always situated in a complex social environment. This social complexity is taken up in 
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Gramscian and Foucauldian literature which emphasises that even in a bureaucratic state, 
governments need to organise a power base outside of themselves in civil society (hegemony 
and domination) and build on specific power-knowledge connections with other parts of society 
(governmentality).  
 New Public Management 
Starting in the second half of the twentieth century, bureaucracy became increasingly 
evaluated in negative terms for being sluggish, dysfunctional, overly centralised and inflexible 
(Frederickson, Smith, Larimer, & Licari, 2012; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017; Pyper, 2015) (Pollitt 
[2003] offers a good overview of these critiques of bureaucracy). A crisis of the welfare state 
unfolded as the promise of full employment and endless economic growth came under 
scrutiny, the demographic evolution put the pension system under pressure and economic 
crises disrupted the political balance (Judt, 2006). In a changing ideological climate, the 
government was now seen as the root cause of societal problems while simultaneously being 
redeployed as an active instrument for the implementation of the new liberal strategies (Dardot 
& Laval, 2013; Wacquant, 2012). Liberal ideology, stemming from “an earlier generation of 
pre-Keynesian liberals”, had now “re-emerged, vociferous and confident, to blame endemic 
economic recession and attendant woes upon ‘big government’ and the dead hand of taxation 
and planning that it placed upon national energies and initiative” (Judt, 2006: 537). This shifting 
ideological hegemony meant that governments were now seen as institutions that had to 
reduce the collective mechanisms of solidarity and welfare, and instead emphasise individual 
responsibilities, autonomous markets and governmental deregulation. Privatisation of public 
services was seen as an answer to bureaucratic inefficiencies; in general, the relations of 
government with the rest of society preferably relied on competition and contracting. 
 
This ideological shift had a significant impact on public administration and management 
through the translation of these ideas into new concepts and policies under the umbrella term 
New Public Management (Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald, & Pettigrew, 1996; Hood, 1991; 
Metcalfe & Richards, 1990; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). An important consideration to keep in 
mind is that this movement to reform public management reached across the entire political 
party spectrum, from ‘new right’ to ‘socialist left’. The shared concern in NPM is the 
improvement of the three Es of public service: its economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
(Eliassen & Sitter, 2008; Fattore et al., 2012; Rhodes, 1994). In a seminal article, Christopher 
Hood (1991) argues that NPM presents itself as a universally applicable model (across 
countries, organisations, sectors) and as politically neutral—in this way, it is not unlike Public 
Administration. Hood explicitly approached NPM as a management system that is primarily 
concerned with the administrative values of frugality and economy (so-called sigma values) 
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(1991: 8), which leads to questions on whether NPM can be reconciled with other values such 
as equity and security. NPM is not a single set of tools and instruments, but a broad collection 
of governance techniques stemming from liberal ideologies which take aim at the way the 
bureaucratic state supposedly functions. The arsenal of proposed NPM-style alternatives 
includes a variety of techniques: “contracting out, decentralizing, granting greater discretion to 
managers, increasing citizen or customer choices, deregulating, organizing so that there is 
competition, and determining effectiveness according to outcome measurement” 
(Frederickson et al., 2012: 128).  
 
However important and influential these ideas were, research shows that the actual 
implementation of NPM ideas and techniques varies greatly across states. Pollitt and 
Bouckaert (2017) compared reforms in public administration across European and Anglo-
Saxon countries and synthesised their findings in four different strategies: modernising 
strategies (NPM-style reforms, but with a strong governmental role), maintaining strategies 
(safeguarding traditional mechanisms), marketising strategies (NPM-style reforms with a 
larger role for private actors) and minimising strategies (minimising the role of public 
institutions). These are dynamic concepts in the sense that one country is not limited to one 
strategy: elements of these strategies can be found in different degrees as some elements 
can be more strongly present than others. Strategies as well as the speed with which reforms 
are implemented also change over time, leading to a very dynamic view of public 
administration reform. In their discussion, Pollitt and Bouckaert point out that despite some 
differences, several European continental countries can be seen as having “a more positive 
attitude towards the future role of the state and a less sweepingly enthusiastic attitude towards 
the potential contribution of the private sector within the public realm” (2017: 118). Belgium 
and other countries that have a strong corporatist tradition of government are less prone to 
radical changes in public administration (2017: 73), which points to the important role of the 
close interaction between government and civil society in buffering the impact of NPM reforms.  
 Differentiated polity 
Although NPM attacks the state for its flaws, it can be argued that it is itself mostly a top-down 
strategy performed by a central government (Fattore et al., 2012), whereby NPM is thus not a 
complete rejection of state-led governance but can rather be seen as another form of it (Pyper, 
2015). In the UK in the early 1990s, however, a train of thought developed in which this 
movement towards NPM was interpreted not as a continuation of state-led governance but as 
the opposite. According to the so-called Anglo-governance school (Bevir & Rhodes, 2010; 
Marinetto, 2003a) or differentiated polity model (Rhodes, 2007), the government was 
becoming increasingly fragmented (Dunleavy & Rhodes, 1990; Rhodes & Dunleavy, 1995). 
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Rhodes argued that the state was being “hollowed out” (Rhodes, 1994) because of 
privatisation and contracting out, increasing use of arms-length public agencies, the transfer 
of functions to the EU and the limitation of public servants’ discretion by NPM techniques (such 
as performance measurement, managerial accountability, political control). The hierarchy that 
was seen as so characteristic of the bureaucratic state was supposedly giving way to markets 
and networks. Especially networks were perceived to be the new dominant organising 
principle, leading Rhodes to proclaim that governance should now be understood as network 
governance (Rhodes, 1996). In sum, the state was seen to be disintegrating into a patchwork 
of self-governing networks as a result of reforms implemented by that very same state. 
 
In this Anglo-governance school, network governance can be summarised “as consisting of 
something akin to a differentiated polity characterised by a hollowed-out state, a core 
executive fumbling to pull rubber levers of control, and, most notably, a massive growth of 
networks” (Bevir & Rhodes, 2010, ch. 5). This notion of differentiated polity has been highly 
influential in governance theory (Marinetto, 2003a; Marsh, 11/2008) and marks the shift from 
government to governance in thinking about the role of government in politics and public 
service delivery. In this school of thought, the decentring of the state is the core assumption 
around which the notion of governance is built.  
b.  Networks and New Public Governance 
Although there are many different conceptualisations of networks, they have reached a certain 
dominant status in governance literature (Lewis, 2011; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007). According 
to Davies and Spicer (2015), a specific interpretation of networks dominates the literature: 
networks are assumed to fit better with current macro-sociological conditions of society 
(globalisation, decentred society, individualisation, …) and they have supposedly expanded 
in multitude during the last few decades; networks supposedly operate on the basis of trust 
and are therefore well suited for open, flexible, democratic and better governance. Davies and 
Spicer also link this specific interpretation of network governance to the large body of literature 
on reflexive modernity and network society that we have discussed earlier. However, network 
analysis has a long history in many academic fields and is not easily pinned down to a singular 
view. Lewis (2011), for example, discusses a broad overview of network governance research 
that illustrates the wide variety of approaches, using examples of public administration, 
political science, sociology, social network analysis and organisational studies. Whatever the 
specific approach to networks, the fact that the concept dominates the research on 
governance is well established (6, 2015a; Ansell & Torfing, 2016; Bevir, 2012; Bevir & Rhodes, 
2010; Davies, 2011a; Frederickson, 2007).  
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At this point in the discussion, it is useful to look at a schematic for understanding public policy 
implementation and public service delivery that has been proposed by Stephen Osborne 
(Osborne, 2006, 2010). This framework places different modes of coordination within 
particular governance regimes or paradigms, although they serve more as conceptual ideal 
types.3 Three ideal-typical governance regimes can be distinguished: Public Administration 
(PA), New Public Management (NPM) and an emergent New Public Governance (NPG). Each 
of these governance models is linked to its dominant coordination mechanism: hierarchy (PA), 
markets (NPM) and networks (NPG). Table 2 presents the key elements of each model. 
Osborne’s proposed schematic is useful for our discussion not only because of its importance 
in academic literature4 but also because it succeeds in synthesising the historical development 
we have presented above. 
 
Table 2: Core elements of different governance regimes (Osborne, 2010: 10) 
Key elements Public Administration New Public Management New Public Governance 
Theoretical roots Political science and 
public policy 
Rational/public choice theory 
and management studies 
Institutional and network 
theory 
Nature of the state Unitary Regulatory Plural and pluralist 
Focus The political system The organisation The organisation in its 
environment 
Emphasis Policy creation and 
implementation 
Management of organisational 
resources and performance 





Hierarchy The market and classical or 
neoclassical contracts 
Networks and relational 
contracts 
Nature of the service 
system 
Closed Open rational Open closed 
Value base Public-sector ethos Efficacy of competition and 
the marketplace 
Dispersed and contested 
 
This table shows how NPG builds on the aforementioned theories of reflexive modernity and 
network society. First, “It posits both a plural state, where multiple interdependent actors 
contribute to the delivery of public services, and a pluralist state, where multiple processes 
                                               
3 While Osborne used the term “paradigm” in his 2006 article, he explicitly steps away from this 
terminology in his 2010 book: “[PA, NPM and NPG] are then denoted as policy and implementation 
regimes within this overall field – thus neatly skirting the above, rather redundant, argument as to 
whether these regimes are actually paradigms or not.” (Osborne, 2010, p. 1). And again, a page further 
down: “It must be emphasized that this book is not meant to propose “the NPG” as a new paradigm of 
public services delivery. It is neither that normative nor that prescriptive. The question mark in the title 
is deliberate” (2010, p. 2). 
4 The 2006 article metrics show 189 citations via Web of Science; Google Scholar gives 789 citations 
for the 2006 article and 801 citations for the 2010 book.  
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inform the policy-making system” (Osborne, 2010: 9). Second, networks form the basis 
resource allocation mechanism, in which power is dispersed and unequal, making the value 
base of the model contested. The underlying thought is that because of the fragmented nature 
of contemporary society, policymaking has become a matter of interorganisational networks 
through which resources, power, authority and accountability are distributed. This approach 
comes close to the idea that collectively, binding decisions in society cannot be controlled by 
a centralised government but have to be organised through multiple self-governing 
autonomous social actors of which government is only one. In its own way, NPG was also a 
response to the idea of decentring by recasting citizens and public administrators in a new 
role and placing management and market-type mechanisms at the centre of public service 
delivery (Radnor, Osborne, & Glennon, 2016). NPG is “a broader paradigm that emphasizes 
both the governance of interorganisational (and cross-sectoral) relationships and the efficacy 
of public service delivery systems rather than discrete public service organizations” (Osborne, 
Radnor, & Nasi, 2012: 135). Where PA and NPM focus on administrative processes and 
interorganisational management (Osborne et al., 2012), NPG is a framework for a broader 
systemic governance. This does not mean that first-order governing is no longer of concern, 
but rather that social complexity demands analyses of second or even third order. We 
recognise here some of the concerns taken up by the literature on metagovernance (see the 
following section). 
 
Osborne’s overview presents a good example of how the literature on governance has come 
to see networks as a new mode of societal steering, after markets and hierarchy. While for 
some, networks are the new dominant mode of steering, Osborne and others approach these 
modes more as a possible mix of strategies and institutions (Lowndes, 2001; Pollitt & 
Bouckaert, 2017). Indeed, these three ideal types should be considered as a cumulative 
evolution, where different steering principles build on each other and are often at work 
simultaneously: “Inevitably, such a tripartite regime model is a simplification – elements of 
each regime can and will coexist with each other or overlap” (Osborne, 2010: 2).  
 
Osborne’s scheme points to the necessity of dealing with how manifestations of different 
paradigms can be at work simultaneously. Say, for instance, that organisations in social work 
are confronted by a government arrangement that is steering policy by both bureaucratic 
procedures as well as NPM-style performance management and public-private governance 
partnerships for some projects. What is the impact on the organisation, on its clients, on the 
social workers? How do these different principles of steering function in relation to each other? 
And how can organisations in social work be considered as partners in a network while 
simultaneously confronted with bureaucratic realities and NPM-practices and monitoring? Are 
49 
these mutually exclusive ideas? If not, what mechanisms are at play through which the 
involved organisations and actors deal with this complexity? Lowndes (2001) already 
emphasised how the idea of a shift from government (meaning ‘hierarchy’) to governance 
(meaning ‘markets’ and ‘networks’) was too simplistic. According to her, governance should 
be analysed as an increasingly complex “institutional mix” of hierarchies, markets and 
networks and she stresses that networks, as ‘the new ingredient’, should be taken into 
significant consideration (Lowndes, 2001: 1962).  
 
Both Lowndes’ and Osborne’s take on governance as an institutional mix or cumulative 
evolution are still important ideas that will return in our own research model. Furthermore, 
several authors have argued that institutional changes such as, for instance, from hierarchy-
based coordination towards market- or network-based coordination almost occur as 
‘institutional layering’ (Streeck & Thelen, 2005). Importantly, this notion was developed in order 
to understand the shift from traditional welfare state systems towards more liberalised 
institutions. Institutional layering means that old institutions remain in place while new 
elements are gradually being introduced next to the old, instead of replacing them (Mahoney 
& Thelen, 2010; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). This does not mean that the old institutions are not 
affected: by introducing new elements, the consistency and logic of the old system can be 
impacted, leading to a weakening of the original institutions. Layering can thus, over time, lead 
to adapting existing institutions to the new logic (Koreh et al., 2019). 
 
This complexity of different principles of steering as well as discussions on the position of 
government in the complex web of actors, processes and social issues have also been taken 
up in governance literature with the concept of metagovernance, so we will first turn to a brief 
discussion of this literature.  
c.  Metagovernance: the governance of governance 
There are numerous authors that disagree with the idea that governance necessarily entails 
a hollowed-out state, but instead still see government as an important actor, albeit in a different 
role to play: not as a command-and-control centre but as a coordinating actor in a wider 
network. This is what Bevir and Rhodes identify as a so-called second wave in governance 
literature, focused on metagovernance and a re-evaluation of the role of the state (Bevir & 
Rhodes, 2010). Sørensen and Torfing (2005) describe it as a second generation in 
governance literature that has accepted the spread of governance networks and is now 
focused on issues such as the conditions of failure and success, the regulation of governance 
networks and the democratic quality of networks. In short, metagovernance concerns the 
governance of governance. 
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Metagovernance is another answer to the complexity of governance modes, coupled with a 
concern for a renewed steering role for governments. Where the first literature on governance 
prioritised self-organising networks at the expense of the state, the concept of 
metagovernance ‘brings the state back in’: rethinking the role of government so it can still be 
a relevant and strong actor in politics, public policy and service delivery. As the governance of 
governance, it is concerned with balancing the three ideal-typical modes of governance 
(hierarchies, markets, networks), thus focusing on what we described earlier as the mix of 
governance modes. Metagovernance can best be understood as a higher-order observation 
of governance. Meuleman summarised these characteristics in a useful working definition that 
can serve as a first understanding of metagovernance as an analytical concept:  
Metagovernance is a means by which to produce some degree of coordinated governance, by 
designing and managing sound combinations of hierarchical, market and network governance, 
to achieve the best possible outcomes from the viewpoint of those responsible for the 
performance of public-sector organisations: public managers as ‘metagovernors’. (Meuleman, 
2008: 68) 
 
Metagovernance in this sense thus comes close to our understanding of governance in its 
general meaning of coordination of collective principles. Meuleman based this definition partly 
on the works of Jan Kooiman and Bob Jessop, both influential authors in the literature on 
metagovernance. In general, three schools of thought on metagovernance occur in academic 
literature (Sørensen & Torfing, 2009), which we will discuss here. Summarising the literature, 
Sørensen speaks of three approaches: hands-on, hands-off and indirect governance: 
hands on through the facilitation of self-governance; hands off through political, financial, 
institutional, and discursive framing of self-governing networks, organizations, and groups; or 
indirectly through the presence of a strong shadow of hierarchy. (Bevir, 2007: 230) 
The first school of thought focuses on metagovernance as management of the network. 
Crucially, in this theory, networks are seen as self-organising entities, leading to the conclusion 
that metagovernance can only work through indirect means of influencing the self-organising 
capacities of the networks (Meuleman, 2008). In this theory, networks are defined as a 
complex set of social relations defined in terms of different expectations, values, competences 
and resources. In order to prevent network failure, mechanisms are required that are able to 
manage this complexity, which is a characteristic specifically attributed to the state (Lewis, 
2011). Network management in this regard entails “all the deliberate strategies aimed at 
facilitating and guiding the interactions and/or changing the features of the network with the 
intent to further the collaboration within the network processes” (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016: 11).  
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A second school of thought, exemplified by Bob Jessop (Jessop, 2002, 2016), focuses on how 
governance in different systems can be coordinated. The four main modes of governance that 
Jessop (2016) identifies are exchange (markets), command (state), dialogue (network) and 
solidarity (love). These can be considered the first-order modes of governance which all have 
their own possibilities of failure. When failures occur, second-order governance modes try to 
address these failures by either focusing on issues with the steering mechanism itself (the 
different modes) or with the conditions under which they operate (Jessop, 2016: 170). A 
second-order response to failures in governance can occur within the first-order institutions 
(e.g., market expansion in response to lack of profit), but it is the state that according to Jessop 
is best suited for “collibration” (his term for metagovernance): managing the balance between 
the different modes of governance in light of society’s collectively constructed goals. Jessop 
uses Gramscian and Foucauldian literature to argue that metagovernance affects the relations 
between different social institutions (state, markets, civil society). Furthermore, while the state 
has a privileged position to engage in metagovernance, its collibrative activities often evoke a 
considerable reaction from competing metagovernance activities (Jessop, 2016: 177). 
Jessop’s approach is closely related to theories that assume a decentred society, and his 
model places the state in a sort of ‘central yet displaced’ position: while the state’s central 
position in the social order is disputed, it is somehow the only domain in society capable of 
achieving collibrative coordination. Of particular concern for Jessop in the construction of the 
state’s influence and power is the role of hegemonies and governmental techniques. This 
approach to the position of government and state is partly the reason why in his earlier work 
he emphasised how metagovernance is a process of “muddling through” (Jessop, 2002: 242), 
whereby the state has to rely on processes of persuasion and its influence in the construction 
of collective intelligence as much as on its control over money, finance and law.  
 
A third approach to metagovernance, developed by Kooiman (2003), presents a systems-
theoretical perspective on metagovernance. Kooiman takes a decisively normative approach, 
starting from the position that metagovernance concerns “governing how to govern” (2003: 
188). Governance in the first order is concerned with the way “governing actors try to tackle 
problems or create opportunities on a day-to-day basis” (2003: 135). This social construction 
of problems and solutions are in their turn embedded in “institutional settings”, which are 
governed in a second-order mode of governance (2003: 153). First-order governance is 
concerned with how problems and solutions are constructed and the mechanisms social 
systems have to reduce the complexity of this process. Second-order governance is 
concerned with maintaining an overview of how institutions (such as state, civil society and 
market) facilitate or limit the possibilities for the construction of problems and solutions. 
Metagovernance is then a third-order form of governance that deals with “normative 
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governance issues” (2003: 170). Kooiman argues that this third order is not a higher order as 
such, but that it is an added normative dimension from which to reflect upon the whole: “Meta 
governing is like an imaginary governor, teleported to a point 'outside' and holding the whole 
governance experience against a normative light” (2003: 170). Kooiman also emphasises that 
it is through metagovernance that the use of norms for reflecting on the different orders of 
governance is always susceptible to debate by those governed. This meta-reflexivity is an 
inherent aspect of his take on metagovernance. 
 
These three theories all build on the notion of a decentred society in which government is no 
longer the central control centre but still is the only domain in society from which collective 
coordination can be achieved. They thus look for ways in which government can still play a 
vital role in securing some form of control over collective societal goals and strategies, despite 
its displaced position in society. Overall, in metagovernance, the preferred tactics are related 
to persuasive negotiation and other informal relations (Bevir & Rhodes, 2010). However, 
Davies (2011a, 2011b) rightly argues that the state still has more coercive measures at its 
disposal. Sørensen’s indication (quoted above) of the shadow of hierarchy points of course to 
Scharpf’s analysis of how self-organising organisations operate in the shadow of the state, 
i.e., in the hierarchically determined framework set out by the government (Scharpf, 1997). 
This shadow of hierarchy already contains the coercive powers at the disposal of 
governments, although at times in governance literature it seems to remain too much in the 
analytical shadows (Davies, 2011b, 2014b). Coercive measures taken by governments can of 
course also occur much more directly as, for example, in the use of police force in reaction to 
the early protests by the so-called Indignados in Spain, or in the forceful deportation of 
undocumented immigrants. Despite the fact that government can still rely on forms of coercive 
power in politics and public service delivery, metagovernance literature emphasises that its 
default position is that of coordination and persuasion.  
 
In his extensive critique on network governance, Jonathan Davies claims that for those 
adopting the theory of network governance “metagovernance (the network governance of 
network governance) is the least-worst, necessarily imperfect, governmental solution to social 
complexity” (2011a, ch. 1). Davies argues that metagovernance is another form of network 
governance, and in light of our previous discussion, we agree with this assertion. 
Metagovernance is built on concepts that are well-attuned to the theory of reflexive modernity 
wherein individual and collective actors are able to act reflexively on their position in fast-
expanding social networks, as well as to the idea that in a network society governing power is 
dispersed through these networks. This does not make the idea of metagovernance invalid, 
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but it does make it susceptible to the critiques on network governance, which we will discuss 
in the section below.  
2.3.3 Three critiques on governance and network governance 
We have argued that governance chiefly refers to the process of constructing collectively 
negotiated objectives in the interaction between different social spheres or systems, such as 
politics, economy and civil society. In this section, we wish to present some important critiques 
on the dominant position of networks in the current governance debate, as well as on the use 
of hierarchies, markets and networks as the main modes of governance in governance 
literature. First of all, we will clarify some conceptual misunderstandings in the debate on 
networks, hierarchies and markets. Our main critique here is that these concepts refer to 
different levels of analysis, and one should be careful to consider them as distinct modes of 
governance. Perri 6’s recent discussion (6, 2015a) on bureaucracies and networks will be a 
key source for our discussion. Secondly, the claim of a historical shift towards network 
governance does not fit with the actual historical developments of European states. We do not 
wish to dismiss the qualities of networks as a useful concept for analysis, but we do wish to 
highlight some important critiques on the dominance of network governance. In this way, we 
want to put networks in their place (Davies & Spicer, 2015) and bring the complex interplay 
between different institutions to the forefront. Lastly, network governance is often built on 
underlying normative assumptions that should be considered carefully. Specifically, we will 
briefly discuss Jonathan Davies’ argument that network governance has a strong neoliberal 
bias (Davies, 2012a, 2012b; Davies & Spicer, 2015).  
a.  Conceptual critique on the displacement of hierarchies 
Our first critique starts from the central claim in network governance literature that networks 
have displaced hierarchies as the dominant institutional form. Even Bevir by now admits that 
this claim was overly dramatic: “hierarchical bureaucracies are still the dominant form of public 
governance” (Bevir, 2012, ch. 4). Bell and Hindmoor argue that “states have not been hollowed 
out and the exercise of state authority remains central to most governance strategies” (Bell & 
Hindmoor, 2009: 1–2). They present a wide overview of cases of hierarchical governance by 
governments (2009: 71–92). For instance, despite the influence of the logic of privatisation, 
state-owned enterprises are still numerous in several countries and even where privatisation 
has occurred, it has been accompanied by an extension of regulatory powers (2009: 75). In 
relation to many CSOs, governments rely on extensive auditing procedures, further 
strengthening the argument that hierarchies are widely important (2009: 76). Arguing against 
the claims made by the UK-centred differentiated polity school, Perri 6 states that in the UK, 
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hierarchy was still very strong in the same period that this school of thought developed its 
claims on a hollowed-out state and dominant network governance (6, 2015a: 61). Davies 
(2000) also found that in the period 1992–97, hierarchies and markets were still prevalent in 
UK local governments. Furthermore, Perri 6 argues that from the immediate postwar years up 
to the early 1970s, UK governments were frequently engaged in negotiations with trade 
unions, limiting the hierarchical powers of government through network strategies and tactics, 
thus before networks were considered to be important governance modes (6, 2015a: 61–62). 
 
Bouckaert argues that at the turn of the twenty-first century, NPG consisted of a combination 
of network and hierarchical governance (Meuleman, 2008). As we have seen, Osborne also 
places NPG in a continuing cumulative evolution of governance modes. This is not to say that 
hierarchies are still operating in the same way as in the immediate postwar period and that 
states have not undergone any reforms. After considering several programmes of 
modernisation reforms in European and Anglo-Saxon countries, Bouckaert and Pollitt (2017) 
proposed that for some (mainly European continental) states, the neo-Weberian state (NWS) 
could be a better model to describe the impact of recent reform movements: “In essence, 
[NWS] was an attempt to modernize traditional bureaucracy by making it more professional, 
efficient, and citizen-friendly” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011: 19). NWS is thus a model wherein 
government systems operate with hierarchical principles combined with certain standards of 
professional capacities, efficient management and the consultation of external actors (civil 
society, market actors, …). Furthermore, we argue that this NWS model also leaves room for 
the possibility of a coercive state power—from an optimistic perspective as a guarantee for 
collective solidarity or individual liberties; from a pessimistic perspective as a safeguard for 
specific elite interests. When comparing NWS to NPG and NPM (as Pollitt and Bouckaert 
define them), it becomes clear these models do not operate through an exclusive mode of 
governance: NPM does not exclusively operate through markets, NPG not exclusively via 
networks, and NWS is not an exclusively hierarchical affair (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017). 
Contracts and marketisation can be pushed through by hierarchical authorities; networking 
partnerships can be established by centralised regulators and incorporate varying contractual 
agreements; hierarchies themselves often rely on informal networks and trust in order to 
achieve policy goals. Accordingly, the empirical reality of national governments cannot be 
simplified by assigning each government to a single model. Distinct policy domains might be 
in some regards attributed to a certain model, but the overall view of the public sector is a 
messy complex reality (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017). Again, the nuanced and complex mix of 
governance modes and institutions comes into view, on a conceptual level (models 
themselves are mixed) as well as the empirical level (reality is not a model).  
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Furthermore, the idea that networks have displaced hierarchies also implies that markets have 
not managed to take over the role that hierarchies once had, as was claimed in NPM literature 
and the accompanying liberal political ideologies. As we have seen earlier, markets were 
believed by many to be the answer to bureaucracy’s failings and the crisis of the welfare state. 
However, hierarchical intervention often occurs when confronted with market failures, such as 
in the management of scarce resources, public health and social security (Bell & Hindmoor, 
2009: 79–80). The shadow of hierarchy also points to the fact that many forms of privatisation 
are acted out under state oversight and control. The key issue is that these marketisation 
strategies and NPM policies have been designed, implanted and controlled by governments, 
positioned under its shadow of hierarchy. Bell and Hindmoor refer to Moran, who states that 
the current hierarchical modern state is “characterised by stronger central controls, and 
extensive auditing and quantitative measurement of performance” (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009: 
88–89). This last claim is also supported by Perri 6, who cites the rise of new regulatory 
agencies in the UK that are constantly monitoring and assessing the delivery of public services 
(6, 2015a).  
 
Perri 6 argues that claims about the displacement of hierarchies stem from a “theoretical 
misunderstanding of hierarchy” (2015a: 58). Hierarchies have often been confused with 
bureaucracies and coercion-based governing, while instead, they are essentially rule-based 
systems and as such, they can be coercive or bureaucratic but not necessarily so. He argues 
that hierarchy is an “ordered division of labour”, a distinct institutional form based on 
integrating values, norms, roles and expectations more than that it is based on domination 
and control (2015a: 67). Consequently, hierarchies can manifest themselves in many different 
ways and should not be reduced to instances of command and control. Hierarchical systems, 
according to this view, can function without issuing many commands or establishing strict 
control procedures. Furthermore, Perri 6 argues that hierarchies, markets and networks are 
analytical concepts of a different order. Whereas a hierarchy is a distinct institutional form in 
this view, markets are empirical descriptions of any event of exchange, which can thus occur 
in different institutional forms (2015a: 69). Markets are events of exchange between buyers 
and providers and can thus manifest as well in, among others, hierarchical settings. Consider, 
for example, the prolific use of government contracting of services and goods, “to the point 
that government procurement across the range of domestic public services is as hierarchical 
as it has ever been and probably more than it used to be, even in defence procurement during 
the great wars of the twentieth century” (2015a: 70). He makes a similar argument that 
networks are not a distinct institutional form. As opposed to markets, they are not empirical 
events but are an analytical tool for describing events in which nodes are related in sets of ties 
(2015a: 70). Consequently, networks are not exclusively tied to organising principles as trust 
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or self-organisation—these principles can be very well at work in hierarchies as well as in 
markets. According to Perri 6, this theoretical misunderstanding between the concepts thus 
undermines any claims of a historical shift, which in turn leads him to dismiss the notion of 
metagovernance as irrelevant (2015a: 71). 6 has written several articles in which he explores 
an alternative framework for analysing the institutional diversity of governing, which he builds 
on a Neo-Durkheimian institutional framework (6, 2014, 2015b, 2016). Using Durkheim’s 
concepts of social integration and regulation, he proposes different types of institutional 
settings in which policy decisions take place (6, 2014), whereby each institutional form 
functions as a horizon of possibilities and constraints in which decision-making takes place. 
While these articles offer a coherent theoretical framework to replace the conceptual 
inconsistencies of the hierarchy-market-network thinking, they focus primarily on the internal 
processes of government based on historical cases in the British core executive and 
administration.  
 
For our research, we take 6’s critiques into consideration while staying focused on the 
relationship between government and civil society. This does not mean that we believe that 
networks, markets and hierarchies are irrelevant concepts, but we do not see them as the 
main modes of governance. Instead, the analysis of how governance is contextually 
constructed is our focus of attention. In this regard, network analysis can still offer important 
insights, for example, in analysing the role of informal practices in settings with a formalised 
division of labour.  
b.  Historical context 
Our second critique is aimed at the claim of a historical shift from hierarchical governance 
towards network governance and follows from the insight that governance through networks 
is not a new phenomenon in the context of European welfare states. The idea that states have 
mostly relied on hierarchies before networks came along rests on two fundamental confusions. 
Firstly, as we have discussed above, the distinction between the three modes is theoretically 
inconsistent. Secondly, this idea ignores significant parts of the historical reality of politics and 
public policy, some of which we have already discussed in our first critique (as argued by Bell 
& Hindmoor [2009], Davies [2011b] and Perri 6 [2015a]). Many historians also point out that 
as far back as the Roman Empire, networks between state and private actors shaped 
important domains of the state (6, 2015a), such as the grain trade (e.g., Kessler and Temin 
[2007] argue that private merchants actively used their connections with state actors to ensure 
large-scale grain imports) or in organising tax and toll road collections (as Forrer et al. [2010] 
point out in their discussion of public-private partnerships). 
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Beyond public-private partnerships, network-based interactions between government and civil 
society also have a long history in European countries—certainly in the case of neocorporatist 
traditions as, for example, in countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and 
Austria  (Evers & Laville, 2005; Jahn, 2016; Siaroff, 1999). In his study on elderly care in 
Germany, France and England, Bode finds that “inter-agency collaboration as such is nothing 
new in this field so that viewing (co)governance as a substitute for hierarchical government or 
market governance does not make sense here” (Bode, 2006a: 551 - our emphasis). 
Furthermore, considering the possible expanding role of market-driven reforms in public 
services and the nonprofit sector, the so-called dominance of networks has even less empirical 
footing. Bode argues that this is precisely what is occurring internationally in welfare policy 
and healthcare (Bode, 2011). Moreover, in light of the previously discussed distinction 
between markets as empirical settings and networks as analytical tools, it is not difficult to see 
how networks are not a priori free from profit motives or market-type governance techniques. 
Networks and markets are not new phenomena, so analysis of the changes indicated by Bode 
should focus on how profit-driven exchange institutions can become the norm in public policy 
and not whether these changes should be categorised as markets or networks. 
 
Not only in service delivery but also the field of politics and policymaking, governments have 
since long actively engaged with nongovernmental actors. A clear example is the governance 
of labour policy through dialogue and negotiations between labour unions, business 
associations and governments (Lijphart, 2012; Siaroff, 1999). In broader terms, many 
European welfare states have historically developed through the socio-political integration of 
government and nongovernmental actors (Siaroff, 1999). Specifically for Belgium, and 
especially from the early twentieth century up to the 1960s, this integration took shape in so-
called pillars: vertical integration of organisations along certain societal fault lines, leading to 
a compartmentalised society, whereby individual members’ lives are taken up from “the cradle 
to the grave” (Hellemans, 1990: 26) (which we have discussed in chapter 1). A crucial element 
in this process is the close integration of political parties (and the political elite) with these 
pillars (Billiet, 2004). These pillars were resilient institutions since, despite the decline, 
traditional structures or pillars still functioned as strong organisational networks that have been 
described as political concerns (Huyse, 2003) or neo-pillars (Hellemans, 1990). The result was 
a state system in which political power was organised through a complex institutional setting, 
wherein these neo-pillars, via political parties and elite networks, took up a key institutional 
position between governments and civil society, and reaffirmed their position in key sectors 
(e.g., healthcare, education).  
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In short, the historically altering interaction of government and civil society needs a more 
nuanced approach to governance, particularly in the context of evolving neocorporatism. In 
recent years, several authors have contributed to our understanding of the evolution of 
neocorporatist institutions (Bode, 2011; Hartmann & Kjaer, 2015) 
c.  Governance networks: neoliberal and depoliticised? 
A third critique considers the possible ideological and normative bias in models of network 
governance. In her review of the governance concept in PA literature, Cepiku finds that there 
is often confusion in international literature between the normative and analytical dimensions 
of governance and that more attention should be given to separating the two (Cepiku, 2008). 
Two normative pitfalls of networks as a theoretical concept are especially important given the 
research question in this dissertation: the critique that networks are essentially tools for soft 
regulation or liberalisation, and the critique that the interaction between governments and 
CSOs through governance networks eventually lead to a depoliticisation of civil society.  
 
Concerning the issue of liberalisation, one bias that can be encountered is the equation of 
governance with the idea of a retreating government: a government with less influence than 
before, either as a deliberate political strategy or as a consequence of contemporary societal 
complexity. The retreat of government is often framed as neoliberalism whereby government 
gives way to market forces. However, as we have discovered, neoliberalism is a broader 
concept that can also be understood as an active state strategy instead of a retreating of 
government. We discussed these views earlier in this chapter (Dardot & Laval, 2013; Dean, 
2014; Wacquant, 2012). Jonathan Davies (2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2014b; Davies & Spicer, 
2015) has been especially critical of network governance literature, linking it to neoliberal 
ideology. Building on insights from Boltanski and Chiapello, he argues that networks are a 
crucial part of the neoliberal hegemony in the age of informational capitalism where the 
connectionist paradigm and the citizen-entrepreneur are celebrated and legitimised (Davies, 
2011a). At the level of local policies, some authors connect this network ideology with the 
spread of competitive development strategies aimed at the facilitation of economic growth and 
the flow of capital (Peck, 2002) as, for example, in Harvey’s work on the entrepreneurial city 
(Harvey, 1989). 
 
Davies’ critique of the network model is focused on the role it plays in the construction of the 
neoliberal hegemony in informational capitalism. Davies argues that in a neoliberal society, 
hierarchies take over where networks fail in order to ensure the hegemonic consensus, 
proving at once that hierarchies were never gone to begin with and that networks are mostly 
ideological vehicles (Davies, 2011b). We argue that this is a clear example of the conceptual 
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confusion we pointed out above. Hierarchies can be coercive but are not necessarily so, and 
hierarchies can integrate elements of exchange and profit (markets) as well as function in 
networked settings. Our view is that Davies observes governance arrangements too much in 
terms of a tension between hierarchy (coercion, domination) and networks (hegemony, 
ideology). We argue instead that focusing on how contextually situated institutions interact 
with each other offers more analytical flexibility than focusing on predetermined modes of 
governance. Indeed, in a later article, Davies and Spicier have developed their own view 
further, arguing instead that instead of “fetishizing” any particular form of governance, “a more 
agnostic approach to governance research” should be adopted (Davies & Spicer, 2015: 223). 
 
Concerning the issue of depoliticisation, governance runs the risk of becoming depoliticised, 
i.e., the pursuit of a shared consensus dominates the networks at the expense of more 
deliberate and potentially divisive political action (Kenis & Lievens, 2016; Sørensen & Torfing, 
2017; Swyngedouw, 2005). In public management literature, especially governance runs the 
risk of becoming a managerial strategy for achieving consensus (Davies, 2011a). Sørensen 
and Torfing summarise the issue clearly:  
In [the public management perspective], governance is not a contingent power strategy but a 
necessary response to the functional differentiation of modern society and a pragmatic tool for 
solving problems through the creation of a constructive interaction of relevant actors in networks and 
partnerships that, when properly managed, secure a smooth exchange and pooling of knowledge 
and resources. Clearly, the focus on politics, power, and democracy is replaced with a focus on 
management, coordination, and effective problem-solving (2017: 37 -  our emphasis).   
 
While this argument is not without merit, there are authors that see the potential for politics in 
governance networks, usually more inspired by sociological and political science literature 
(Davies, 2011a; Sørensen & Torfing, 2017). A good discussion is offered by Kenis and Lievens 
(2016) in a study of a governance network in Leuven (Belgium), which aims to create a carbon-
neutral city. Their study shows how a “discourse on partnerships, win-win situations and multi 
stakeholder cooperation” (2016: 1766) has led to a depoliticised outcome of the carbon-neutral 
city as a tool for city branding, while simultaneously enabling other actors to  re-politicise  the 
policy choices by re-symbolising the brand in order to “advocate radical sustainable 
alternatives” (2016: 1774). Instead of focusing on consensus and shared understanding, they 
see conflict as an essential part of governance networks: “Conflict and contestation (or to put 
it differently: politicisation) can enhance democratic participation and involvement, because 
they make clear that something important is at stake.” Without it, the network will not have 
“such a dynamising and mobilising effect” (2016: 1774). This crucial role of developing 
alternative narratives, visions or imaginaries for politicising governance arrangements has 
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also been argued in research on cases where collaborative or interactive governance was 
notably absent, and civil society actors had to break into the policy agenda. In an article on a 
large-scale urban development project in Antwerp (Belgium), Wolf and Van Dooren (2018) 
argue that a depoliticised discourse in order to avoid conflict has a boomerang effect: the 
conflict only temporarily disappears from view and can come back more forcefully, and the 
opportunities for mobilising citizen participation and contribution have been wasted. 
 
2.4 Neocorporatism and governance: analysis of 
intermediary institutions 
At this point we will take into consideration the implication of our three critiques on governance, 
which means we will have to provide answers to three issues: propose a conceptual 
understanding of governance that goes beyond the three modes of governance, build a 
historical and contextual perspective and work towards an agnostic understanding of 
governance to avoid the normative pitfalls of some governance models. In this dissertation, 
we argue that by establishing an explicit link between governance and the theories that we 
identified earlier (functional differentiation, the destabilisation of traditional structures), an 
evolutionary perspective on neocorporatism and governance becomes visible (Hartmann & 
Kjaer, 2015). This perspective places the relationship between government and civil society 
firmly in its historical context while providing a conceptual framework for institutional change 
(Streeck & Thelen, 2005).  
 
Neocorporatism describes a system of interest representation that is of particular concern for 
understanding many European welfare states. Briefly stated, in a neocorporatist system, 
CSOs are not only service providers, but they actively take part in shaping the policies that 
regulate those same services. For Salamon and Anheier (1997), corporatist regimes are 
characterised by the preservation of social consensus through the inclusion of (parts of) civil 
society in the state structure, whereby large public-sector spending is combined with a large 
nonprofit sector. Neocorporatism as a term is also often used to distinguish from earlier anti-
democratic corporatist systems (Bevir, 2007). In neocorporatist settings, CSOs are organised 
in representative peak organisations that, through various institutionalised channels, seek 
negotiated agreements with governments (Lijphart, 2012; Schmitter, 1974). 
 
There is a difference in how neocorporatism is defined in most of the literature and how we 
approach it here. In a strict sense, neocorporatism refers to a system of interest representation 
dealing with economic issues and the labour market (Lijphart, 2012; Siaroff, 1999). In this 
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perspective, neocorporatism deals with the integration of the economy with other systems or 
spheres in society as well as stabilises the relations between employers and workers 
(Hartmann & Kjaer, 2015). However, the term has also been used to describe similar systems 
covering a wider range of policy areas (education, health, environment, culture, arts, 
agriculture, ...) (Fraussen & Beyers, 2016; Öberg et al., 2011). In this dissertation, we use the 
broad perspective on neocorporatism: the institutionalised exchange between government 
and civil society across a wide range of domains.  
 
In short, then, a key characteristic of neocorporatism is that it secures a ‘mutual stabilisation 
of exchanges’ between government and other social spheres (Kjaer, 2016). This model of 
institutionalised exchange does not fit well with a linear evolution from bureaucracy to NPM 
and NPG. Yet, both theories share common ground as both governance theories and the 
neocorporatist model are expressions of the functional differentiation of society (Esmark, 
2009; Luhmann, 1997, 2013). In a functionally differentiated society, governance becomes a 
matter of intermediary institutions (Kjaer, 2016), which connect different function systems and 
through which resources, power, authority and accountability are distributed. While 
government holds an important central position in this arrangement, other social spheres do 
not lose their functional autonomy. In this regard, both in systems of neocorporatism as in 
systems of governance, the analysis of these institutions becomes key to understanding the 
relationship between government and civil society. 
 
Neocorporatism was confronted by the so-called crisis of the welfare state in the 1970s, during 
which the unfulfilled promise of full employment and endless economic growth became 
apparent as demographic evolutions put the pension system under pressure and economic 
crises disrupted the political balance (Judt, 2006; Kazepov, 2005). A dual movement took 
place regarding the position of government: it became regarded as the root cause of societal 
problems (considered to be overly sluggish, dysfunctional and inflexible), while simultaneously 
being redeployed as an active instrument for the implementation of the new liberal strategies 
(Dardot & Laval, 2013; Wacquant, 2012). The relationship between government and the rest 
of society shifted from a focus on collective mechanisms of solidarity and welfare to regulation 
by competition and contracting (Kazepov, 2005; Kjaer, 2016). Thus, even though NPM 
attacked government for its flaws, it is itself mostly a top-down strategy (Fattore et al., 2012). 
Others have argued that this crisis enhanced the functional differentiation of society, making 
it necessary to situate government in horizontal and flexible networks. Davies and Spicer 
(2015) argue that underlying the network paradigm is the assumption that networks are well 
suited for these sociological conditions: “Networks are purported to be beneficial because they 
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provide a better ‘fit’ with macro environmental changes such as globalization, the restructuring 
of the state, individualization, and knowledge capitalism” (2015: 223).  
 
There has also been empirical research that argues that neocorporatist institutions have been 
destabilised, especially by NPM-style reforms. Based on his research in Germany and France, 
Bode states that “the logics of competition and rivalry, entrance and exit, bargaining and 
instrumental behavior” are fuelling a “creeping marketization” of welfare state partnerships 
(Bode, 2011: 116). Other research in Germany, Italy and the UK found a “transnational 
movement towards quasi-marketization and managerialization” (Klenk & Pavolini, 2015: 253). 
Bode, Klenk and Pavolini also highlight that differences between countries and sectors remain 
important (Bode & Brandsen, 2014; Klenk & Pavolini, 2015): even though similar techniques 
are used across sectors and countries, their application and use have to be considered in light 
of institutional, political and cultural contexts. As stated elsewhere, “There is no global model 
(...), and there is no distinct, homogeneous continental European model either” (Pollitt, van 
Thiel, & Homburg, 2007: 198). Earlier we discussed the comparative research by Pollitt and 
Bouckaert (2017), which shows that in countries with a strong neocorporatist tradition, NPM-
style reforms have had a more moderate impact, which could point to the important role of the 
close interaction between government and civil society in buffering the impact of NPM reforms.  
 
This evolution and possible destabilisation of neocorporatism should be understood as a 
“cumulative model of social change”, as Kjaer rightly emphasises (2015: 18) in a passage that 
echoes the literature on institutional change and institutional layering. Several authors have 
argued that institutional reforms in this regard almost always include some form of institutional 
layering as new elements are gradually added on top of or alongside existing institutions 
without dismantling them (Koreh et al., 2019; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Streeck & Thelen, 
2005). Lowndes (2001) emphasises that governance should be considered a mix of different 
steering principles, as does Osborne (2006, 2010) in his overview of ideal-typical governance 
models. Importantly, institutional layering in modern society is taking place in a situation of 
increasingly permeable boundaries between civil society, markets and governments. In this 
context, hybridity is not only the permanent state of CSOs, but also of the governance 
arrangement as a whole (Brandsen et al., 2005; Hustinx, Verschuere, & De Corte, 2014). The 
welfare system has become increasingly hybrid with “complex and ever-changing interaction 
between  politics,  the  economy,  associations,  and  private households” (Verschraege in 
Hartmann & Kjaer, 2015: 107). However, institutional layering is not a neutral evolution: as 
new institutional elements are introduced, support for the original institutions tapers off and 
internal coherence can be reduced (Koreh et al., 2019). For sure, the impact of marketisation 
and NPM-style reforms can have a considerable impact on the social functions of CSOs in the 
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form of a mission drift away from community building, preferring service delivery over 
advocacy, or increased managerialism (Maier, Meyer, & Steinbereithner, 2016; Suykens, De 
Rynck, & Verschuere, 2018). Of particular consequence is the development of more 
entrepreneurial orientations (Bode & Brandsen, 2014) of CSOs at the expense of their 
community or advocacy roles.  
 
The question of whether incremental reforms are adding up to a gradual but fundamental 
institutional change is a difficult one but stands at the core of the discussion. This is why Bode 
(2011) speaks of a “creeping marketisation”, where he concludes that changes in both 
Germany and France resulted in “a hybrid mix of quasi-market governance and agreement-
based regulation” (2011: 135). Streeck and Thelen (2005) refer to other research (e.g., in 
France and Germany) in which gradual incremental changes in the fringe accumulated to a 
transformative shift towards further liberalisation of the broader welfare system. The same 
logic applies to the gradual emergence of governance networks that might be replacing 
neocorporatist exchange with more collaborative interactions (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Klijn & 
Koppenjan, 2016), where gradual changes can have a significant impact on the process and 
outcome of the interaction between government and civil society (which we have identified in 
our third network critique as issues of neoliberalisation and depoliticisation). In sum, 
institutional layering can have significant consequences, as new logics are introduced in 
existing neocorporatist institutions, which could lead to displacement or conversion (Koreh et 
al., 2019; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). 
 
This chapter has situated governance as a concept in the wider literature on the evolution of 
modern society in the form of increased functional differentiation of society and the decline of 
traditional structures. Both neocorporatism and governance are expressions of this functional 
differentiation, and many authors argue that governance is gradually replacing (or has already 
replaced) the traditional postwar neocorporatist institutions. This has contributed to the 
growing importance of alternative governance paradigms (NPM, NPG) which might be 
destabilising the neocorporatist institutional exchange between government and CSOs. 
Empirical analysis of neocorporatist institutions can offer more insight into this debate by 
establishing to what extent NPM-style or NPG-style institutional elements operate alongside 
or on top of neocorporatist institutions. Accordingly, this dissertation examines such 
institutional arrangements in a typical neocorporatist context (Belgium) through a multi-method 
research agenda on both the central (Flemish) regional level as well as the local (municipal) 
level. We will present analyses of both the governance institutions and organisational 
strategies within their respective institutional context. Our research is built on this institutional 
lens, given our goal of understanding the state of neocorporatist institutions. As Kjaer argues: 
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“Intermediary institutions possess a strategic location in society, and (...) the study of such 
institutions thus has an intrinsic heuristic value because it provides an optimal access point 
for understanding the more general transformations which society is going through” (Hartmann 
& Kjaer, 2015: 2).  
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3 Changing neocorporatist institutions? Examining 
the relationship between government and civil 
society organisations in Belgium 
Survey research on 339 CSOs in Flanders 
3.1 Problem statement and research question5 
The nature of the relationship between governments and CSOs has been part of a wide debate 
for many years. The postwar history of this relationship has been viewed in PA literature as a 
cumulative evolution from government towards governance, usually divided into three phases 
or paradigms (Cepiku, 2008; S. P. Osborne, 2010; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017; Salamon & 
Toepler, 2015): PA (the age of bureaucracy), NPM (the age of markets), and NPG or new 
governance theories (the age of networks). Both NPM and NPG are in their own way a critique 
on the inert, compartmentalised, and generally inefficient way that public services have been 
managed through bureaucracies. While NPM sees the cure for this illness in the healing 
qualities of efficient and effective markets, NPG emphasises how working in networks and 
partnerships can improve public services compared to both bureaucracies and markets. 
However, in many European welfare states, the idea of networks as innovative forms of 
governance does not fit with their history (Evers & Laville, 2005). Especially for those states 
with a neocorporatist tradition (e.g., Belgium, France, Germany, Austria, Sweden, ...), it is 
more accurate to speak of welfare partnerships (Salamon & Toepler, 2015), characterised by 
the institutionalised exchange between government, civil society and other social actors. In 
this context, CSOs do not only deliver services with the support of government but are also, 
through a myriad of peak associations, actively involved in the policy design of these services 
in close partnership with government (Evers & Laville, 2005).  
 
This does not mean, however, that the reforms that have been introduced through NPM have 
no meaning in this context of welfare partnerships. Indeed, some argue that NPM-style 
                                               
5 This chapter is published as: Pauly, R., Verschuere, B., De Rynck, F., & Voets, J. (2020). Changing 
neocorporatist institutions? Examining the relationship between government and civil society 
organizations in Belgium. Public Management Review, 1–22. DOI:10.1080/14719037.2020.1722209 
 
Corresponding CSI Flanders spotlightpaper: Pauly, R., Verschuere, B., & De Rynck, F. (2019). 
Bestuurlijke tradities onder druk? Survey onderzoek naar de verhouding tussen middenveld en overheid 
in Vlaanderen. Universiteit Gent. https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/8627251 
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reforms have had a considerable impact on these European partnerships (Aiken & Bode, 
2009; Ascoli & Ranci, 2002; Bode, 2011; Klenk & Pavolini, 2015; Zimmer, 1999). This research 
suggests that NPM-style reforms have been added to the existing institutions, resulting in a 
complex and hybrid arrangement of governance institutions. Indeed, it adds to the evidence 
that the relationship between government and CSOs consists of situationally bound mixed 
forms of governance, whereby elements of different paradigms are combined (Osborne, 2006; 
Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017). Competitive performance, hierarchical monitoring and coordinated 
policies can all coexist in increasingly “nervous patterns of governance” (Bode, 2011: 137).  
 
The question addressed in this article is to empirically explore to what extent the 
neocorporatist relationship between government and CSOs has been impacted by NPM-style 
reforms. This article presents the results of survey research with CSOs in Belgium, a typical 
example of a corporatist welfare state (Fraussen & Beyers, 2016). Our data is drawn from a 
large-scale database co-produced by the authors, containing a wide variety of Belgian 
(Flemish) CSOs (2475 organisations) of which 496 have participated in an extensive survey. 
This survey collected the responses of the leading managers of these CSOs, and thus 
presents their perceptions concerning their organisation. Thus, we provide an empirical test 
for the current state of a governance arrangement in a region considered to be neocorporatist, 
making it relevant for the wider discussion on the changing nature of neocorporatist relations 
between government and CSOs. 
 
In the following paragraphs, we will first discuss the concepts of neocorporatism and 
governance. Then we will present a brief overview of the developments in Belgium. Next, we 
will present our methodology, including a discussion of the measured variables. We will then 
present our findings, comparing the results between sectors. Finally, we will discuss some of 
the implications of our findings.  
3.1.1 From neocorporatism to governance? 
Neocorporatism describes a system of interest representation that is of particular concern for 
understanding many European welfare states. Briefly stated, in a neocorporatist system CSOs 
are not only service providers, but they actively take part in shaping the policies that regulate 
those same services. Neocorporatism is distinguished from earlier anti-democratic corporatist 
systems (Bevir, 2007). In neocorporatist settings, CSOs are organised in representative peak 
organisations that, through various institutionalised channels, seek negotiated agreements 
with governments (Lijphart, 2012; Schmitter, 1974). In a strict sense, neocorporatism refers to 
a system of interest representation dealing with economic issues and the labour market 
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(Lijphart, 2012; Siaroff, 1999). However, the term has also been used to describe similar 
systems covering a wider range of policy areas (education, health, environment, culture, arts, 
agriculture, ...) (Fraussen & Beyers, 2016; Öberg et al., 2011). For Salamon and Anheier 
(1997), corporatist regimes are characterised by the preservation of social consensus through 
the inclusion of (parts of) civil society in the state structure, whereby large public-sector 
spending is combined with a large nonprofit sector.  
 
A key characteristic of neocorporatism is that it secures a “mutual stabilization of exchanges” 
between government and other social spheres (Kjaer, 2016: 134). This model of 
institutionalised exchange does not fit well with a linear evolution from bureaucracy to NPM 
and NPG. Both governance theories and the neocorporatist model are expressions of the 
functional differentiation of society (Esmark, 2009; Luhmann, 1997, 2013) which states that 
society consists of different function systems and no single function system (e.g., politics, 
economy, religion) holds the societal centre from which an ultimate source of power emanates 
over all other systems. Following on from this position, the governance of public services 
becomes a matter of intermediary institutions (Kjaer, 2016), which connect function systems 
and through which resources, power, authority and accountability are distributed. 
Neocorporatism is a model in which peak associations functioned as stable connections to 
coordinate between government, civil society and the economic system (Kjaer, 2016). While 
government held an important central position in this arrangement, other social spheres did 
not lose their functional autonomy.  
 
However, neocorporatism was confronted by the so-called crisis of the welfare state in the 
1970s, during which the unfulfilled promise of full employment and endless economic growth 
became apparent as demographic evolutions put the pension system under pressure, and 
economic crises disrupted the political balance (Judt, 2006; Kazepov, 2005). A dual movement 
took place regarding the position of government: it became regarded as the root cause of 
societal problems (considered to be overly sluggish, dysfunctional and inflexible), while 
simultaneously being redeployed as an active instrument for the implementation of the new 
liberal strategies (Dardot & Laval, 2013; Wacquant, 2012). The relationship between 
government and the rest of society shifted from a focus on collective mechanisms of solidarity 
and welfare to regulation by competition and contracting (Kazepov, 2005; Kjaer, 2016). Thus, 
even though NPM attacked government for its flaws, it is itself mostly a top-down strategy 
(Fattore et al., 2012). Others have argued that this crisis enhanced the functional 
differentiation of society, making it necessary to place government in horizontal and flexible 
networks. Davies and Spicer (2015) argue that underlying the network paradigm is the 
assumption that networks are well suited for these sociological conditions: “Networks are 
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purported to be beneficial because they provide a better ‘fit’ with macro environmental 
changes such as globalization, the restructuring of the state, individualization, and knowledge 
capitalism” (2015: 223). Yet, critics have pointed out that many of these networks can be 
considered especially suited for the further advancement of the aforementioned competitive 
liberal strategies (Davies, 2011a, 2011b; Swyngedouw, 2005).  
 
Some authors have empirically argued that neocorporatist institutions have been destabilised 
especially by NPM-style reforms. Based on his research in Germany and France, Bode states 
that “the logics of competition and rivalry, entrance and exit, bargaining and instrumental 
behavior” are fuelling a “creeping marketization” of welfare state partnerships (Bode, 2011: 
116). Other research in Germany, Italy and the UK, found a “transnational movement towards 
quasi-marketization and managerialization” (Klenk & Pavolini, 2015: 253). Bode, Klenk and 
Pavolini also highlight that differences between countries and sectors remain important (Bode 
& Brandsen, 2014; Klenk & Pavolini, 2015): even though similar techniques are used across 
sectors and countries, their application and use have to be considered in light of institutional, 
political and cultural contexts. As stated elsewhere, “There is no global model (...), and there 
is no distinct, homogeneous continental European model either” (Pollitt et al., 2007: 198). 
Comparative research by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2017) has shown that in countries with a 
strong neocorporatist tradition, NPM-style reforms have had a more moderate impact, which 
could point to the important role of the close interaction between government and civil society 
in buffering the impact of NPM reforms.  
 
Furthermore, several authors have argued that institutional reforms in this regard almost 
always include some form of ‘institutional layering’ as new elements are gradually added on 
top of or alongside existing institutions without dismantling them (Koreh et al., 2019; Mahoney 
& Thelen, 2010; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). Lowndes (2001) emphasises that governance 
should be considered a mix of different steering principles (hierarchies, markets and 
networks), as does Osborne (2006) in his overview of ideal-typical governance models. 
Importantly, this institutional layering is taking place in a situation of increasingly permeable 
boundaries between civil society, markets and governments. In this context, hybridity is not 
only the permanent state of CSOs but also of the governance arrangement as a whole 
(Brandsen et al., 2005; Hustinx et al., 2014). However, institutional layering is not a neutral 
evolution: as new institutional elements are introduced, support for the original institutions 
tapers off and internal coherence can be reduced (Koreh et al., 2019). For sure, the impact of 
marketisation and NPM-style reforms can have a considerable impact on the social functions 
of CSOs in the form of mission drift away from community building, preferring service delivery 
over advocacy, or increased managerialism (Maier et al., 2016; Suykens et al., 2018). Of 
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particular consequence is the development of more entrepreneurial orientations (Bode & 
Brandsen, 2014) of CSOs at the expense of their community or advocacy roles.   
 
The question of whether incremental reforms are adding up to a gradual but fundamental 
institutional change is a difficult one but stands at the core of the discussion. This is why Bode 
speaks of a creeping marketisation (Bode, 2011), where he concludes that changes in both 
Germany and France resulted in “a hybrid mix of quasi-market governance and agreement-
based regulation” (2011: 135). Streeck and Thelen (2005) refer to other research (e.g., in 
France and Germany) in which gradual incremental changes in the fringe accumulated to a 
transformative shift towards further liberalisation of the broader welfare system. This 
institutional layering can thus have significant consequences (Koreh et al., 2019; Streeck & 
Thelen, 2005). Empirical analysis of neocorporatist institutions can offer more insight to this 
debate by establishing to what extent NPM-style institutional elements operate alongside 
neocorporatist institutions. Accordingly, this chapter examines such institutional arrangements 
in a typical neocorporatist context (Belgium) where some recent reforms in different parts of 
civil society could indicate the layering of the neocorporatist institutions. Below, we will discuss 
this context briefly, before we continue with our research methodology and findings.  
3.1.2 The Belgian-Flemish case 
Belgium matches all the criteria of a neocorporatist regime, with high degrees of formalised 
exchange between government and CSOs (Bloodgood, Tremblay-Boire, & Prakash, 2014; 
Jahn, 2016). A clear illustration of this is the presence of the strategic advisory boards in which 
the Flemish government engages with representative umbrella organisations concerning a 
wide range of policy issues (economic, social, cultural, environmental, ...). Belgium also has 
one of the largest nonprofit sectors globally (Salamon & Sokolowski, 1999), with 12.3% of the 
total workforce active in nonprofits (in 2014) (Rigo et al., 2018). In turn, the nonprofit sector in 
Flanders, the northern region of Belgium, has the highest proportion of paid nonprofit 
professionals in Belgium (59.5% of all paid nonprofit professionals in Belgium work for a 
Flemish nonprofit) (Rigo et al., 2018).  
 
In Belgium, this neocorporatist structure has historically intersected with a strong 
consociational legacy, the so-called pillarisation (Fraussen & Beyers, 2016; Van Den Bulck, 
1992; Wayenberg et al., 2010): tight coupling between CSOs, political parties and government 
representatives that is constructed around shared values or interests (Billiet, 2004; Witte et 
al., 2009). Although pillarisation reached its peak in the 1960s, some argue that networks 
between political parties and CSOs can still be of significant impact on public policymaking 
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(Huyse, 2003; van Haute et al., 2013), especially in domains such as health, social security 
and labour market (Fraussen & Beyers, 2016).  
 
Starting in the 1960s, new social movements (Hellemans, 1990) organised themselves around 
social issues that in their view were being ignored by the traditional pillarised CSOs: women's 
rights, environmental concerns, pacifist causes and international solidarity (Develtere, 2004; 
Hooghe, 2004; Stouthuysen, 2004). Many of these new movements evolved into successful 
organisations and developed umbrella organisations outside of the pillarised structures, with 
some considerable impact on the political and social agenda (Hooghe, 2004) and themselves 
becoming part of the institutionalised consultation system. In the 1990s, as society became 
further depillarised (with citizens no longer living their lives under the cloak of the pillars), the 
political position of pillarised CSOs was increasingly contested (Huyse, 2003). Instead, the 
role of CSOs in generating social capital became increasingly valued, especially with the rise 
of extreme-right politics in the early 1990s. As one researcher put it, the societal discourse 
concerning the role of CSOs at the end of the 1990s seemed to shift from reprehensible pillars 
(i.e., political) to praised civil society (i.e., community, social capital) (Billiet, 2004). 
  
Meanwhile, the Flemish Region developed its own substantial powers with the further 
federalisation of the Belgian state. Importantly, the Flemish Region has mostly copied the 
same corporatist traditions from the federal level (Wayenberg et al., 2010), although NPM-
style reforms were introduced by both the federal and Flemish governments at the start of the 
2000s. These reforms fit a broader continental European approach as modernisers, in which 
administrative reform is built on the core elements of the traditional system with modernising 
elements, such as an increased focus on performance and results (instead of adherence to 
bureaucratic rules) and more citizen-oriented design of services (citizens as customers of 
public services) (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017). 
  
Recent policy reforms have introduced new market-type mechanisms in the governance of 
several nonprofit sectors, mainly stimulation through increased competition, pressure to gain 
more market-based income and the introduction of more market-type management 
techniques. In the domain of health and wellbeing, cash-for-care systems have been 
introduced which entail a shift from clients to consumers along with increased competition 
between service providers (nonprofit, social profit and for-profit organisations). In the social 
economy (i.c. Work Integration Social Enterprises, or WISEs), recent regulatory reform has 
introduced a unification of the sector, the centralisation of administrative monitoring and 
steering mechanisms through the central governmental labour agency, and is expected to 
push towards a more market-oriented reintegration of WISEs’ target employees. In the 
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sociocultural domain, concerns have arisen over the affirmation by Flemish policymakers that 
CSOs need to become less reliant on public funding, which resulted in an official white paper 
on alternative (read: nonpublic) sources for funding (Gatz, 2017). 
 
The above illustrates how Belgium (Flanders) constitutes a salient context for the study of 
neocorporatist institutions. It illustrates the complexity and diversity of its civil society, as well 
as how the position of CSOs has evolved over the years to what some argue is a less political 
and more service- or community-oriented focus (Billiet, 2004). We provided three illustrations 
which show how different NPM-style reforms are currently undertaken across a diverse set of 
organisations. In the following section, we present how our study examines these three sectors 
in depth and present their main characteristics. 
3.2 Methodology 
We focused on organisations working at the Flemish regional level—CSOs that aim to provide 
services beyond the local community, organise political work at the level of the Flemish Region 
or take up the role of umbrella organisation for the Flemish Region. Specifically, we collected 
data from CSOs in three domains in civil society: health-and-wellbeing organisations, social-
cultural organisations and social economy enterprises. ‘Wellbeing’ includes organisations and 
associations active in providing care for specific target groups (youth, people with disabilities, 
people in poverty) as well as general wellbeing services for those dealing with personal, 
relational or social issues. The social economy consists of WISEs6, which include sheltered 
workshops (for people with mental and physical disabilities) and social workshops (for people 
with various psychological or social disadvantages). The sociocultural sector consists of a 
more diverse range of organisations striving for certain kinds of social change: social rights 
movements, ethnic-cultural associations, professional associations, patient and disability 
organisations, political organisations, sociocultural organisations, youth work organisations 
and faith-based organisations.  
 
Data were collected in three consecutive phases. Firstly, since there is no single database 
that collects from all organisations across these different sectors, we analysed different public 
databases (COBHRA, SISCA, Crossroads Bank for Enterprises, Social Map, NACE-BEL), 
                                               
6 In Flanders, the term ‘social economy’ is predominantly associated with WISE (Defourny & Nyssens, 
2008). The term ‘social enterprise’ is also closely associated with WISE. As for instance argued by 
Kerlin (2006), in Belgium, the term ‘social enterprise’ refers, in the first place, to “service organizations 
that are developing commercial activities” and, in the second place, to WISE: “This second definition 
stems from the specific social service needs around which social enterprises have developed in Europe 
causing them to be associated with employment creating initiatives” (Kerlin, 2006: 250).  
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lists provided by the Flemish government and lists produced by different network- and 
umbrella organisations (social economy, environmental organisations, North-South 
movement, women’s organisations, self-help associations, faith-based organisations, etc.). In 
order to ensure a homogeneous data collection, the research team frequently discussed how 
to categorise organisations. To ensure that each organisation in the database was still active, 
a web search was done to see if these organisations had some form of online presence 
(dedicated website, social media account, or up-to-date contact details). This resulted in a 
collection of 2475 organisations. 
Secondly, following the distribution of the database population, a representative sample was 
extracted. In order to achieve a sufficiently representative sample with a 95% confidence level 
and a 5% margin of error, a minimum set of ca. 350 organisations was needed. Taking into 
account the wide variety of organisations, our goal was to reach a net response of 500 
organisations. In total, 747 CSOs were contacted of which 496 organisations participated. We 
provide more details on the distribution of the sample and populations in the appendix at the 
end of this chapter. 
 
Third, a survey was sent out in two phases, and in each phase, the highest-placed managers 
of the CSO were the respondents. In the first phase, a trained professional conducted face-
to-face interviews; in the second phase, additional questions were presented using an online 
web tool or postal survey (respondents could also opt for another face-to-face interview). The 
survey questions were pre-tested, used expert respondents, offered incentives for 
participation7 and used labelled response options (Lee, Benoit-Bryan, & Johnson, 2012). 
Invitation letters were sent out at the end of September 2017, and the final surveys were 
completed in May 2018. The first phase resulted in 496 interviews, which is a response rate 
of 66.39%. The second phase had a lower response rate of 53.95% (403 participants). In order 
to check whether the respondents reflected the composition of our sample framework, we 
used the chi-square test. The results indicated that there was no significant difference between 
the distribution of the sample framework and the final respondents.  
 
Lastly, because of the complex Belgian state structure, the survey asked respondents to 
indicate which government was the most important for their organisation. For this article, we 
selected those organisations that indicated the Flemish government as most important (thus 
excluding 157 CSOs that selected the local, provincial, federal or European government). This 
                                               
7 We offered a report in which the responses of the organisation were compared to the mean scores of 
their respective sector or domain. 
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means that our final sample included 339 CSOs (277 in the second survey phase). Details are 
reported in the appendix of this chapter. 
3.3 Measures 
We have constructed several variables that measured how managers of CSOs evaluated 
some of the key components of the neocorporatist relationship between CSOs and 
government that we described above. Firstly, we measured how managers perceive the 
functions of CSOs in the state system, focusing specifically on their role in the policy process. 
Secondly, managers reported how they assess the extent of governmental monitoring as well 
as governmental control over strategic organisational decisions. Thirdly, we measured 
managers’ estimation of the proportion of different income sources (market, government, 
community), the occurrence of competitive public funding, and the competitive struggle for 
clients (or members) and organisational resources. Finally, we added several measures to 
assess whether some form of shared or negotiated decision-making was present: to what 
extent do managers believe that government is a substantive partner (or not), that 
governmental monitoring leaves room for consultation and that certain strategic organisational 
decisions are made in consultation with the government? 
3.3.1 Functions of CSOs 
We focused on four specific functions of CSOs: service delivery, advocacy (policy influence), 
political work (striving for social change) and social capital (providing a sense of belonging). 
The functions that CSOs fulfil can change over time and can become part of public debate, as 
we have illustrated earlier with the increased attention for social capital in Flanders. One can 
also argue that the creation of social capital is usually fundamental to the other functions of 
CSOs (service delivery, policy work and political work), as it helps to build trust and solidarity 
between its members (Edwards, 2014) and will thus always be present. In the neocorporatist 
system, the functions of service delivery and advocacy would also be an important part of the 
self-identification of the CSOs.  
 
We measured these different functions by four items, each on a five-point Likert scale. The 
question was: 'To what extent does your organisation fulfil the following roles?', presenting 
several responses: 'Giving people a sense of belonging' (social capital), 'providing a service 
or product that fulfils a specific societal need' (service delivery) or '(trying to) influence 
policymakers' (advocacy). The political function was a separate question in the survey, 
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measured on an 11-point scale, asking 'to what extent does your organisation strive, or argue, 
for specific social or political change?' 
 
The advocacy role of CSOs deserves special attention since it is considered a crucial element 
of neocorporatists systems. In order to influence policy and policymakers, CSOs can combine 
different strategies: gaining direct access to policymakers (politicians and administrators), 
building external pressure through political work or through forming coalitions in umbrella 
organisations (Heylen, Fraussen, & Beyers, 2018; Verschuere & De Corte, 2013). We 
measured each of these strategies using a five-point scale. In neocorporatist systems, the role 
of umbrella organisations (or peak associations) is especially important: it is through the 
representative function of umbrella organisations that institutionalised participation in the 
policy process is regulated (Fraussen & Beyers, 2016; Lijphart, 2012). Umbrella organisations 
help individual CSOs to deal with the high transaction costs and required capacity to organise 
direct access to policymakers (Beyers & Braun, 2014). In the specific case of Flanders, the 
Strategic Advisory Councils (here called: formal advisory boards) are of particular importance: 
they are a central part of the governance arrangement in Flanders and provide CSOs 
(representative organisations, umbrella organisations) with institutionalised access to the 
policy process (Fraussen & Beyers, 2016). To include other forms of institutionalised access, 
we have also included the less regularly organised but still highly formalised participation in 
various governmental committees or workgroups. In sum, we asked managers to assess in 
broad terms how often their CSO engaged in each of these five advocacy strategies: personal 
contact with administrators, personal contact with politicians or cabinets, participation in formal 
advisory boards, participation in governmental committees and participation in activities of 
umbrella organisations (responses included: not, only once, several times, often, very often).  
3.3.2 Governmental monitoring and partnership 
Monitoring by government expresses a top-down mechanism, which can be part of 
bureaucratic and NPM-style oversight. Even in network-like relationships or partnerships, 
some form of oversight (e.g., on the correct use of provided finances) can exist. We measured 
four different types of monitoring that assess a variety of monitoring practices. This was done 
by asking managers to score the following monitoring activities of the Flemish government: 
'monitors your activities', 'monitors whether your finances are in order', 'monitors the 
performance of your organisation', and 'asks about your social impact'. Again, all items were 
measured using a five-point scale.  
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We also measured to what extent this monitoring relationship offered room for consultation. 
We used an item that expressed that 'during monitoring, there is room for consultation with 
the government' (again on a five-point scale). Of course, in a neocorporatist setting, there is 
more to the relationship than mere consultation: government and CSOs can be considered 
partners in the state system. We, therefore, asked managers to assess whether government 
'is a partner with whom your organisation cooperates substantively'. 
3.3.3 Financial resources and competitive environment 
In neocorporatist partnerships, large public spending goes hand in hand with a large nonprofit 
sector that is supported by significant public resources. To measure the extent to which CSOs 
rely on public funding, market income or community contributions, we asked respondents to 
assess the proportions of each of these three sources of income. We excluded all responses 
that did not add up to 100 percent, resulting in 256 valid responses. Government subsidies do 
not exclude market-type steering: the use of project-based or contractual funding can 
introduce significant levels of competition between CSOs. We, therefore, asked managers 
whether government funding includes these types of funding, using a binary yes/no item.  
 
Furthermore, we asked whether government was considered a crucial financier (5-point 
scale). This is important since the subjective assessment of public funding can significantly 
influence how CSOs position themselves politically vis-à-vis their subsidising government 
(Arvidson, Johansson, & Scaramuzzino, 2018). A second subjective indicator was measured 
by asking respondents to assess the evolution of the different sources of income (government, 
market, community) over the last ten years. We also asked respondents to assess the 
following statement on a five-point scale: ‘Compared to ten years ago, governments today opt 
more for temporary contractual support than for structural subsidies of your core activities.’ 
 
If the claims of a destabilisation of neocorporatist governance patterns are correct, we should 
also find that CSOs are active in a more competitive environment than before. Because of the 
variety in context and income sources, we focused on two dimensions of competition: 
obtaining organisational resources and gaining clients or members. Both were again asked by 
a subjective assessment on a five-point scale. Furthermore, a binary yes/no item measured 
whether managers believed the Flemish government stimulates competition for clients.  
3.3.4 Strategic organisational decisions 
We look at three main areas of decision-making in CSOs that can capture the possible 
influence of governments: the goals (or mission), their work processes (or methods) and their 
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desired results (Verschuere & De Corte, 2014). In market-type arrangements, governmental 
control over the desired results (targets) is of particular concern for governments (Bouckaert, 
Peters, & Verhoest, 2010). The three dimensions were measured using a five-point scale with 
two poles (organisational autonomy versus governmental control). The middle of the scale 
indicated the decisions were made by government and organisation together. 
3.4 Findings 
We compared the results between sectors, using a series of Kruskal-Wallis tests with post-
hoc Mann-Whitney tests (with Bonferroni correction) for pairwise comparisons. We used mean 
scores (M) for the descriptive overview of the findings and median scores (Mdn) to report the 
findings of the Kruskal-Wallis test (as these are more correct for this type of rank-sum test). 
All statistical findings are reported in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Overview of findings for Flemish survey 
Kruskal-Wallis test (p<.05 *, p<.01 **, p<.001 ***) with post-hoc Mann-Whitney pairwise comparison (Bonferroni correction) 
















/ social economy 
social economy   
/ wellbeing 
Functions of CSOs      r (effect size) 
Service delivery 
4.00 5.00 5.00 Yes (40.165 ***) -0.3606 *** -0.1823 *** n.s. 
Political function 4.20 3.80 3.20 Yes (31.879 ***) -0.2617 *** -0.3179 *** n.s. 
Advocacy 
4.00 4.00 3.00 No - - - - 
Social capital 
4.00 5.00 5.00 Yes (21.532 ***) -0.1913 **  -0.2779 *** n.s. 
Monitoring and partnership      r (effect size) 
General monitoring 
5.00 5.00 5.00 Yes (15.292 ***) -0.2163 ** n.s.  -0.2110 * 
Use of finances 
5.00 5.00 5.00 Yes (7.110 *) n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Performance 
5.00 5.00 4.00 Yes (11.276 **) -0.1581 * n.s. -0.2295 * 
In consultation 
4.00 4.00 4.00 No - - - - 
Demands impact 
4.00 4.00 4.00 No - - - - 
Govt. as partner 
3.00 4.00 3.00 No - - - - 
Sources of income      r (effect size) 
Public income 
60.00% 95.00% 41.90% Yes (70.340 ***) -0.5065 *** n.s. -0.4833 *** 
Market income 
10.00% 0.60% 55.00% Yes (51.829 ***) -0.3208 *** -0.3598 *** -0.5435 *** 
Community income 
10.00% 2.00% 0.00% Yes (38.630 ***)  -0.2392 ** -0.4128 *** -0.4437 *** 
Govt. is crucial financier 
5.00 5.00 5.00 Yes (30.873 ***) -0.2929 *** -0.2099 ** n.s. 
 (continues on next page) 
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/ social economy 
social economy   
/ wellbeing 
Evolution of income (10 years) r (effect size) 
Public income 3.00 3.00 2.00 Yes (17.804 ***) n.s. -0.3255 *** -0.3555 *** 
Market income 3.00 3.00 4.00 Yes (20.434 ***) n.s. -0.33447 *** -0.4384 *** 
Community income 3.00 3.00 3.00 No - - - - 
Competition      r (effect size) 
Resources (CSOs) 3.00 3.00 3.00 Yes (7.054 *) -0.01380 * n.s. n.s. 
Resources (Corp.) 1.00 1.00 2.00 Yes (42.939 ***) n.s.  -0.3450 ** -0.4962 *** 
Clients (CSOs) 2.00 2.00 2.00 No - - - - 
Clients (Corp.) 1.00 1.00 2.00 Yes (45.102 ***) n.s.  -0.3569 ***  -0.5038 *** 
Govt. stimulates client competition 
(0/1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 Yes (14.672 **) -0.2365 ** n.s. n.s. 
Advocacy strategies      r (effect size) 
Contacts with administrators 
3.00 3.00 3.00 No - - - - 
Contacts with politicians 
3.00 2.00 2.00 Yes (11.736 **) n.s.  -.2230 ** n.s. 
Advisory boards 
3.00 3.00 1.00 Yes (24.178 ***) n.s.  -0.3317 *** -0.3286 *** 
Committees 
3.00 2.00 2.00 Yes (8.491 *) n.s. -0.1778 * n.s. 
Umbrella orgs. 
4.00 4.00 5.00 Yes (6.501 *) n.s. -0.1702 * n.s. 
Control over strategic decision-making r (effect size) 
Goals 5.00 4.00 4.00 Yes (35.777 ***) -0.3456 *** n.s. n.s. 
Methods 
5.00 4.00 4.00 Yes (16.175 ***) -0.1932 ** -0.2232 ** n.s. 
Results 4.00 3.00 4.00 Yes (16.122 ***) -0.2294 *** n.s. n.s. 
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3.4.1 Functions of CSOs 
Whereas managers of CSOs in wellbeing and social economy on average report a primary 
concern for service delivery and social capital, CSOs in the sociocultural sector are reportedly 
more balanced concerning these different functions. Overall, the highest mean scores are 
found for service delivery (M=4.19) and social capital (M=4.28), followed by the political role 
(M=3.57) and advocacy (M=3.49). However, this view can be very different depending on the 
sector, as can be seen in Table 4. In wellbeing and the social economy, managers are clearly 
more concerned with the function of social capital and service delivery. In the sociocultural 
sector, there is a smaller distance between the different functions: social capital is followed 
closely by the political function and service delivery, and a bit further down by advocacy. The 
political function scores especially low in the social economy.  
 
Table 4: Functions of CSOs (mean scores, scale 1–5) 
Functions Sociocultural Wellbeing Social Economy 
Social capital 4.02 4.45 4.78 
Service delivery 3.82 4.60 4.33 
Political function 3.91 3.35 2.92 
Advocacy 3.56 3.43 3.45 
 
We found that advocacy is not statistically different between these three sectors. For the other 
three functions we found that CSOs in the sociocultural sector scored significantly lower on 
the functions service delivery and social capital, although in general, the scores on these are 
still high. In terms of striving for social or political change, the sociocultural sectors score 
significantly higher than wellbeing and the social economy.  
 
Considering the different advocacy strategies, we found that managers across the three 
sectors seem to prefer the strategy of networking through umbrella organisations to other 
institutionalised advocacy strategies (direct personal contact, advisory boards, committees). 
On average, participating in umbrella organisations is reported to occur frequently (M=3.85, 
Mdn=4.00), and managers in the social economy report higher participation in umbrella 
organisations than those in the sociocultural sector (although the effect is small) but lower 
participation in formal advisory boards compared to the other sectors. There is also a 
significant difference concerning the participation in governmental commissions, although this 
is mostly due to the difference between the sociocultural sector (higher) and the social 
economy (lower). Personal contacts with administrators also seem to occur frequently across 
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all the sectors (M=3.38). Direct access to politicians is lower than access to administrators 
and is especially lower for the sectors of wellbeing and social economy, compared to the 
sociocultural sector (small but significant effect).  
3.4.2 Governmental monitoring and partnership 
The four different types of monitoring (monitoring of general activities, use of finances, 
performance and impact) all received high mean scores across the sectors. Some statistical 
differences between the sectors could be found concerning the general monitoring of activities 
and performance monitoring, but the effects were all rather small. These differences were due 
to the statistically higher score reported by managers in wellbeing on the monitoring of 
activities and performance, compared to the managers in other sectors. The scores for 
monitoring the use of finances were also statistically different, although no pairwise statistical 
differences were found. We also measured whether managers indicate to engage in 
consultation with government concerning this monitoring, and the overall response was 
slightly positive. Interestingly, there were no significant differences between the sectors, which 
implies that this practice is a part of the administrative relationships across sectors. We also 
found that managers believe that the Flemish government is interested in some measurement 
of impact, and again, this seems to be the same across all sectors as no statistical difference 
was found.  
 
Concerning whether managers see government as a partner, we found a low positive average 
score across all sectors (M=3.23). Even though we found that in the social economy a lower 
proportion of CSOs agrees with this statement, there are no significant differences between 
the sectors.  
3.4.3 Financial resources and competitive environment 
In general, managers estimate that public funding is the most important source of income 
(M=66.17% of the total income of all CSOs), followed by market income (M=18.75%) and 
community-based income (M=15.08%). However, the three sectors have distinctly different 
financial structures. Based on the respondents’ estimates, CSOs in the wellbeing sector are 
statistically more dependent on government income (M=84.81%, Mdn=95.00%) compared to 
the other two sectors (where the proportion of government income is about half of the total 
income). Market income is significantly different for all sectors. It is reported to have only a 
marginal role in the wellbeing sector (M=7.41%, Mdn=0.60%), a slightly bigger role in the 
sociocultural sector (M=21.96%, Mdn=10.00%), and, as can be expected, a more important 
role in the social economy (M=49.62%, Mdn=55.00%). Community income is estimated to play 
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the biggest role in the sociocultural sector (M=23.20%, Mdn=10.00%), a small role in the 
wellbeing sector (M=7.78%, Mdn=2.00%) and almost no role in the social economy (M=4.20%, 
Mdn=0.00%). 
 
When asked for a subjective assessment of how this income structure has evolved over the 
last ten years, managers generally believe that things have remained somewhat stable (overall 
mean scores fluctuate around a value of ‘3 – remained the same’, with an SD lower than 1). 
When we compare this across sectors, we find that the managers in the social economy more 
than those in other sectors believe that the share of public income has dropped somewhat, 
and the share of market income has risen.  
 
The above shows that overall, the income provided by the government takes up a large 
proportion of the total income for all these organisations and that managers generally believe 
that this proportion has remained somewhat stable over the last ten years (except in the social 
economy). Yet, many variations exist in how governments fund CSOs. Our findings pertaining 
to three different types of public funding can be found in Table 5. The managers of nearly 
every CSO indicate receiving subsidies for their core activities. NPM-style public funding also 
occurs in all sectors. Project-based funding is reported by over half of managers in the social 
economy and the sociocultural sectors and to a somewhat lesser extent in the wellbeing sector 
(a small statistical difference). Contracts (to provide services or products) are also frequently 
reported on average by just over one in five managers in the sociocultural and social economy 
sectors and 14.00% in the wellbeing sector (with no statistical difference between the sectors). 
We also found that the statement of increased contract-based funding at the expense of 
structural subsidies is slightly affirmed (M=2.26) and is shared by managers across the 
different sectors (no statistical difference was found).  
 
Table 5: Types of public funding (% of organisations) 
Percentage of organisations that have this type of income (yes/no question) 
Chi-square with Cramer’s V test (p<.05 *, p<.01 **, p<.001 ***) 
Types Sociocultural Wellbeing Social Economy Cramer's V 
Subsidies for core activities 94.40% 98.10% 100.00% n.s. 
Subsidies for one-time projects 53.90% 37.20% 58.30% 0.176 * 
Contracts (services, products) 21.40% 14.00% 22.70% n.s. 
 
Furthermore, across all sectors, the Flemish government is perceived to be a crucial financier, 
with an overall high mean score (M=4.54) and with the managers in the social economy 
(M=4.90) and wellbeing (M=4.87) being particularly outspoken. Our statistical test shows that 
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even in this overall high score, the sociocultural sector differs significantly from the other 
sectors, but the effects are rather small. The overall appreciation of government as a crucial 
financier is positively correlated with the received percentage of public income (Spearman 
r=0.459, p<.01) and negatively correlated with community (-0.218, p<.01) and market income 
(-0.135, p<.05). 
3.4.4 Competition 
Respondents indicate that they experience rather little competition for organisational 
resources or clients (or members) from other CSOs and almost none from corporations. 
Generally speaking, competition with other CSOs for resources is considered reasonable 
(three on a scale of five). In the social economy, competition is experienced somewhat more 
than in other sectors (the difference with wellbeing generates a rather strong statistical effect), 
although, on average, competition is still not considered strong. Here, the strongest statistical 
difference is found concerning both types of competition with corporations, although it 
concerns the difference between no competition (sociocultural, wellbeing) and weak 
competition (social economy). Managers also indicate that the Flemish government is 
generally not a strong driver of competition for members (or clients).  
3.4.5 Strategic decision-making 
CSOs across the sectors indicate on average a high level of autonomy concerning their 
organisation’s strategic decisions, although, for goals (M=4.13, Mdn=5.00) and methods 
(M=4.34, Mdn=5.00), this is somewhat higher than for results (M=3.65, Mdn=4.00). There are 
statistically significant differences between the three sectors, which are mostly due to higher 
scores of organisational autonomy for the CSOs in the sociocultural sector in comparison to 
the wellbeing sector (although the effects are small). We also looked at the extent of shared 
decision-making and interestingly, found that this is the highest when it comes to the desired 
results: more than one in three CSOs see this as a shared process (37.10%). In the case of 
goal setting, about 1/5 of CSOs (21.7%) report sharing the decisions with the government, 




This chapter set out to assess key characteristics of the governance arrangement in Flanders, 
addressing the issue of whether its typically neocorporatist governance patterns can still be 
observed. It provides an empirical test that contributes to the wider discussion on the changing 
nature of governance in neocorporatist welfare states. Our empirical contribution is built first 
and foremost on establishing a database for analysis that captures a wide variety of CSOs 
from different sectors (sociocultural, health and wellbeing, social economy). Secondly, we 
conducted an extensive representative survey of CSOs, providing a rich set of quantitative 
data. Importantly, all data in our survey are self-reported and originate from one source (i.e., 
the leading managers of CSOs). Thus, we do not include the perspective of other important 
members of CSOs (board members, other professionals, volunteers). Because our data are 
self-reported, we must also be careful not to treat these findings as objective measurements. 
Indeed, while these perceptions provide useful insights into a large section of civil society, 
they cannot express what is going on in practice. Moreover, our survey data consist of 
perceptions on the current state of affairs (and some subjective reflections on historical 
evolutions) and is therefore not suited for assessing claims on ongoing trends or evolutionary 
dynamics. Also, while we provide an explorative overview of a wide range of organisations, 
we do not identify any causal mechanisms. However, based on our explorative cross-sectoral 
comparison, the current state of the governance, relations can be considered as the 
(preliminary) outcome of the processes identified in the theory review. Using our data, we can 
assess whether some of the claims made concerning the creeping marketisation of 
neocorporatist welfare states can be observed. 
 
First, our data suggest that CSOs should not be considered primarily as service providers. 
While service provision is generally seen as very important, the most important function the 
managers in our survey see in their CSOs is providing a sense of belonging to people (social 
capital). Interestingly, social capital scored significantly higher in the social economy and 
wellbeing, the sectors that also scored high on service delivery. A possible explanation might 
be the historical roots of these sectors in community-based social initiatives. This does not 
mean that social capital and service delivery were not important for the sociocultural sector. 
However, here we found a more balanced combination of different functions. Most likely, this 
has to do with the more diverse composition of this sector compared to the other two sectors 
(cf. supra). In general, we see a civil society that can be described as multipurpose (Bode, 
2011): if we are to believe the self-assessment of the managers, most CSOs combine at least 
two roles to a higher degree (service delivery and social capital), coupled with a third role that 
is still relatively highly regarded (either advocacy or a political role). What is not clear from our 
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results is to what extent these different roles are actually fulfilled in practice, especially given 
the self-reported nature of our data.  
 
Second, as expected in neocorporatist settings, government is reported to be a crucial 
financier by almost every respondent, but we do find three very different financial structures 
between these sectors. Given the position of the respondents (leading managers) in the 
organisations, we consider their estimates of these percentages as adequate variables for 
measuring their ‘objective’ income streams. The wellbeing sector is still mostly dependent on 
public funding, the social economy on a combination of public funding and market income, 
and the sociocultural sector combines a large degree of public funding with significant market- 
and community-based income. Moreover, only in the social economy (WISE) do respondents 
report to have experienced a decline in public funding and a rise in market-based income.  
WISE might be an exception because of their more pronounced hybrid status as social 
enterprises. Higher engagement in commercial market activities could indeed explain this 
reported increase in market-based income. In the other sectors, on average, the proportion of 
the different income sources are considered to have remained stable. We hypothesise that 
this might be due to the rigid neocorporatist framework in which public services provided by 
CSOs cannot easily be replaced or repealed. Another explanation might be a case of 
institutional conversion in which the nature of public funding has changed towards more 
competitive types of funding. We discuss this further below. However, these findings on the 
evolution of income sources should be considered carefully: it relies on a subjective 
recollection from the respondents and is thus susceptible to hindsight bias.  
 
Third, we have found little evidence of market-type governance, with the strongest indicator 
being NPM-style public funding: managers estimate that both project- and contract-based 
public funding are frequently used, although to a somewhat lesser extent in the wellbeing 
sector. Respondents have also indicated they have experienced a rise in project-based 
funding at the expense of structural subsidies (again, with the same methodological caveat of 
hindsight bias). Yet, these results do not reflect the competitive nature of these types of 
funding in practice: maybe some percentage of these public funding strategies are embedded 
in a broader preferred partnership, whereby projects and contracts are tailored to the mutual 
needs of CSOs and government. We have also found no evidence of a highly competitive 
environment for Flemish CSOs, as managers report only low to moderate levels of competition 
for resources and members or clients.  
 
Fourth, managers experience government in different roles, with a combination of hierarchical 
oversight and negotiated partnership. Hierarchy is most clearly expressed by the high 
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importance given by managers to the procedural and performance monitoring by government 
in every sector, whereby managers in the wellbeing sector report the highest scores. An 
important limitation to this finding is the narrowly defined indicator for performance monitoring 
(single-item question: “This government monitors the performance of your organisation”). 
Looking at organisational strategic decision-making, more than one in three managers reports 
sharing of decision-making power with government when it comes to determining the results 
to be achieved by the CSO. This percentage drops significantly lower for goal setting and 
decisions on work methods—both in favour of higher organisational autonomy. Of course, one 
should be careful to take these responses at face value: since these questions concern the 
autonomy of the CSOs, this could lead to some degree of socially desirable answering 
strategies (Verschuere & De Corte 2013). As such, a part of this shared decision-making might 
actually be hiding a higher percentage of governmental control. One could assume that 
managers prefer to see the desired results of their CSO as a power-sharing process rather 
than of (implicit or soft) coercion by government. However, if these responses instead reflect 
a genuine sharing of decision-making, they might point to a close intertwinement of CSOs and 
governments on some key organisational decisions. The higher focus on results could reflect 
a more NPM-style interest in the performance of the organisations.  
 
Fifth, as expected, we found that for most CSOs, participating in umbrella organisations is the 
most important advocacy strategy. This might reflect the institutional rigidity of neocorporatist 
policy participation. Yet, again, we cannot speak of the resulting outcomes of these advocacy 
strategies. These might occur in an increasingly adversarial relationship whereby government 
only formally includes CSOs in the policy process but does not take their input into account. 
3.6 Conclusion: change from the margins? 
Our study adds to the literature on the relationship between government and CSOs and shows 
that the neocorporatist institutions on which it is built have not been replaced by NPM-style 
institutions. Indeed, we find that NPM-style reforms occur mostly in the functioning of public 
funding: while public funding is for the most part considered stable by our respondents, they 
do report frequent use of competitive public funding. We argue that this form of institutional 
layering is important but can be considered marginal in the broader institutional framework. 
This does not mean that these elements are trivial but only that the old rules (in this case the 
neocorporatist institutions) are still at work while new elements are introduced (in this case 
NPM-style public funding) (Streeck & Thelen, 2005). As argued by Mahoney and Thelen 
(2010), the reason that such layering occurs instead of a displacement of the old rules by new 
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institutions is because of the political position of the actors involved and little room for a 
reinterpretation of existing institutions. Indeed, while CSOs report high levels of governmental 
monitoring, our study shows a relationship between government and CSOs in which 
administrative and political negotiation is still important. Moreover, our study does not find high 
levels of competition. This suggests that the changes we are seeing are indeed in the fringe 
of the neocorporatist institutions, where negotiation-based agreements form the core of the 
institutional framework and market-type elements are marginal while not trivial. Theoretically, 
it can be argued that this mix of old and new could lead to lower institutional coherence, which 
in turn might undermine the neocorporatist institutions (Koreh et al., 2019).  
 
To understand the effects of these changes on CSOs, our study also underlines the 
importance of contextualising the discussion on the impact of NPM-style reforms, not only 
between countries or regions but also between different sectors within countries or regions. 
Within the boundaries of what seems to be a rather stable configuration of neocorporatist 
relations, each of these sectors has its particular kind of hybridity. These different contexts 
matter to understand the impact of current or future market-type reforms. For WISE, a rise in 
relative and absolute terms of market-based income can enhance the entrepreneurial 
autonomy of many of these organisations—spurring further innovation, but possibly at the 
expense of its socially oriented goals. In the wellbeing sector, CSOs have a more limited 
experience with market-type actions, which could result in a less autonomous position as their 
source of income is less diverse. In this sector, the marketisation of CSOs seems to appear 
mostly through the introduction of customer-oriented principles (e.g., cash-for-care systems) 
or competitive public funding. Sociocultural organisations report a considerable proportion of 
private income (market and community), yet, because of the wide diversity of the sector, it 
might prove difficult to develop strategies for an even lower dependence on public funding. 
While highly professionalised CSOs might be able to renew themselves, voluntary 
associations might possibly face an uphill battle.  
 
For now, our research does not suggest a strong destabilisation of the neocorporatist 
institutions. A challenge for further research is to identify whether the neocorporatist structures 
that we have identified do also provide an institutional space in which CSOs can effectively 
contribute to policymaking and politics, and how CSOs from different sectors experience 
marketisation tendencies in practice. While quantitative research provides much-needed 
context, more in-depth qualitative research or mixed methods can focus on the practices that 
actually matter. Furthermore, future research should also ask what the impact is of the 
changing political landscape on neocorporatist institutions, as political parties with no historical 
ties to CSOs become key actors in European governments.  
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3.7 Appendix to chapter 3 
 









 N % n % n % % 
A. Social Economy (WISE) 159 6.42% 49 9.88% 34 6.85% 10% 
B. Wellbeing 603 24.36% 158 31.85% 130 26.21% 30% 
C. Socio-cultural 
Organizations 1713 69.21% 289 58.27% 239 48.19% 60% 
TOTAL 2475 100% 496 100% 403 81.25%  
** percentages of wave 2 are calculated against the initial total response of wave 1 to illustrate the lower 
response  
 
Our sample is a good representation of the distribution between the three sampled sectors. In 
order to account for the organizational diversity within these sectors – a key characteristic of 
the nonprofit sphere in general (Salamon & Sokolowski, 2016) – we over- (e.g., ethnic-cultural 
associations) and under-sampled (e.g., professional associations) some organizational 
segments in the sociocultural sector.  
 
 











 n %   n % n % 
A. Social Economy (WISE) 49 9.88% 40 11.80% 34 6.85% 27 9.75% 
B. Wellbeing 158 31.85% 134 39.53% 130 26.21% 111 40.07% 
C. Social & Cultural 





% 403 81.25% 277 
100.00
% 




4 A (self-)imposed road to the market? 
Examining the response strategies of WISEs in a 
neocorporatist governance arrangement 
4.1 Introduction8 
In the previous chapter, we concluded that in Flanders, NPM-style reforms occur mostly in the 
form of public funding: government is still a crucial financier for civil society organisations, yet 
CSOs’ managers also report that competitive forms of public funding are frequently used. On 
the whole, it seems that only some moderate NPM-style reforms operate along with the more 
traditional neocorporatist institutions. We argued that this form of institutional layering can be 
considered marginal in the broader institutional framework: we identified NPM elements in the 
fringe of the neocorporatist institutions, where negotiation-based agreements form the core of 
the institutional framework and market-type elements are marginal (while not trivial).  
 
In this chapter, we look deeper into how NPM-style reforms work in the Flemish context. We 
build on the conclusions from the previous chapter by looking at one of the three sectors that 
we have researched: the social economy; in particular, WISEs. WISEs are CSOs in the social 
economy that engage in market activities in order to provide labour for disadvantaged workers. 
The reason for selecting WISEs is twofold. First, new legislation has been introduced that 
reformed this sector, and there has been some discussion in the sector on whether this 
legislation introduced NPM-style reforms (we will discuss this in more depth in this chapter). 
Second, WISEs are typical cases of hybrid organisations that operate in a field with fuzzy 
boundaries between civil society, markets and government and that operate with more market-
like internal and external characteristics. Looking at the internal organisational characteristics 
of CSOs in the Flemish social economy, they show signs of increased business practices (e.g., 
more commercial income, more use of management tools) when compared to the sociocultural 
                                               
8 A draft of this chapter was presented at EGPA 2018: Pauly, R., Verschuere, B., & De Rynck, F. (2018). 
Steering Civil Society towards the Market? A Mixed-Methods Study of the Governance Arrangement of 
WISE in Flanders http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-8573613   
& TAD 2018: Pauly, R., Verschuere, B., & De Rynck, F. (2018). Steering civil society towards the 
market? An analysis of organisational strategies in the governance arrangement of WISE in Flanders. 
http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-8564934  
  
Corresponding CSI Flanders spotlightpaper: Pauly, R., Suykens, B., Verschuere, B., & De Rynck, F. 
(2020). Tussen Regels en Praktijken in de Sociale Economie. Overheid en Middenveld in Actie. 
http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-8659190 
89 
and wellbeing sectors (Suykens, De Rynck, & Verschuere, 2020)9. Their market position 
varies, from regional markets (second-hand stores, landscaping services) to national or even 
international markets (industrial assembly and packaging). Regarding their relationship with 
government, WISEs play a dominant role in the social economy and have gradually been 
institutionalised in the governmental labour market policies, not only in Flanders but wider 
across Europe (Defourny & Nyssens, 2010). Overall, we argue that of the three Flemish 
sectors in our research, WISEs are the most typical case of CSOs where we can expect NPM-
style governance. 
 
The question we ask in this chapter is: what organisational strategies are used by WISEs to 
navigate NPM-style reforms in the Flemish neocorporatist context? In order to answer this 
question we must look at three issues: one, how can we understand organisational strategies? 
For this, we will turn to the literature on how CSOs deal with institutional demands in their 
environment (Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010). Two, to analyse the relationship with 
government, we look at how WISEs have gradually evolved from experimental projects to a 
unified sector that has become an institutionalised part of the Flemish labour market policies 
(Defourny & Nyssens, 2010). Third, to understand the strategies of WISEs, we will look at the 
level of the organisations as well as the level of the encompassing policy network. Therefore, 
this chapter presents a multi-method approach to our research question: we combine survey 
results with qualitative data (analysis of legislation, semi-structured interviews) to gain a broad 
insight into this particular sector.  
 
In the following, we first discuss how we will look at organisational strategies, after which we 
give a brief presentation of WISEs in Flanders (core characteristics, historical 
institutionalisation). Then we present our methods and main findings.  
4.2 Organisational strategies 
In the previous two chapters we have discussed the concern that across Europe, the traditions 
of neocorporatism are becoming increasingly disorganised, specifically through marketisation 
pressures (Bode, 2006b). We concluded in our previous chapter that we could not confirm this 
concern for Flanders. Yet, for the sector of the social economy, some of these concerns about 
                                               
9 Their research was part of the same research consortium (CSI Flanders), thus using the same 
selection of Flemish CSOs across three sectors (sociocultural sector, health and wellbeing, and the 
social economy). See: Suykens, B., De Rynck, F., & Verschuere, B. (2020). Examining the Extent and 
Coherence of Nonprofit Hybridization Toward the Market in a Post-corporatist Welfare State. Nonprofit 
and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 1–22.  
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marketisation and NPM might be more relevant than for other sectors. Suykens et al. (2020) 
measured international organisational characteristics of Flemish CSOs that can be described 
as business practices and found that the social economy, more than the other two sectors 
(wellbeing, sociocultural), has a higher degree of commercialisation and more frequent use of 
management tools. A particular concern is whether the use of business-like practices can lead 
to managerialism in CSOs. Managerialism can be understood as the dominance of 
management practices and ideas’ (Meyer, Buber, & Aghamanoukjan, 2013: 173), which can 
manifest itself at the level of the governance arrangement (a business-like approach to the 
relationship between CSOs and government) and at the level of the organisation (in the form 
of business-like practices and discourse). Furthermore, as we have found, the social economy 
is almost equally dependent on the market as on public income. WISEs are not only providing 
a public service for a specific target group (providing employment and labour market training 
for disadvantaged workers), they are also enterprises working in a commercial market. 
Therefore, WISEs can be considered typical hybrid organisations (Billis, 2010) for whom the 
boundaries between civil society, markets and governments can be particularly blurry. This 
means that not only are the organisations themselves characterised as hybrid, but this goes 
as well for the nature of the relationship between these organisations and the government 
(Brandsen et al., 2005; Hustinx et al., 2014). As we have discussed, at the level of governance 
relationships, this can lead to an institutional mix or institutional layering. Concerning the 
organisations involved, hybridity means that CSOs have to deal with different institutional 
demands within complex environments (Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010). Part of these 
complex environments is their relationships with government, as well as market expectations 
(as is the case for WISEs) or expectations from CSOs’ community or organisational network.  
 
When organisations are confronted with external influence, they can choose to comply or not. 
Oliver (1991) developed an overview of ideal-typical organisational strategies, using 
institutional and resource dependence theory. These strategies vary in their degree of 
(non)conformity: acquiescence (compliance), compromise (partial compliance), avoidance 
(preventing compliance), defiance (rejecting the external demands) and manipulation 
(influencing the external expectations). Yet, as Pache and Santos (2010) rightfully argue, 
Oliver does not account for multiple external influences on organisations. When confronted 
with two competing expectations, how can we still speak of (non)compliance? Indeed, CSOs 
might choose to ignore one demand while following another. Pache and Santos add two forms 
of complexity to Oliver’s model: the internal differentiation in organisations (different actors 
inside CSOs can have different expectations) and the differentiation of the environment 
(different types of external expectations, often competing with each other). Specifically, they 
argue that conflicting or competing expectations have a higher chance of occurring in 
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environments that are highly fragmented (many different relevant external actors, e.g., 
governmental actors, commercial clients, civic actors, organisational partners) and have only 
a moderate degree of centralisation (only some external actors have considerable influence 
over the CSO) (Pache & Santos, 2010). How organisations respond to these competing 
demands depends on the internal differentiation of the CSO (i.e., is there agreement 
concerning the organisation’s orientation toward the external expectations?) and the nature of 
the external demands themselves. It particularly matters, Pache and Santos argue, whether 
the external demands concern ideological (“prescribing which goals are legitimate to pursue”) 
or functional (“requiring organisations to adopt appropriate means or courses of action”) 
expectations (2010: 459—460). The distinction is important, since organisations are more 
flexible regarding functional demands, whereas goals are “not easily challenged or negotiable” 
(2010: 460). Concerning the internal differentiation, Pache and Santos argue that it matters 
how the members of the organisation regard the external expectations and whether there are 
different groups among the members with different beliefs on how to act. Using Oliver’s 
response strategies, they present a range of possible scenarios in which these strategies 
might be used, depending on the nature of the external expectations and the internal 
differentiation of the CSOs. We present their response model in Table 8 below, which is taken 
from their article (with some slight rephrasing and with the addition of their definition of the 
strategies). 
 
This model shows that when organisations have no particular concern regarding the external 
expectations (absence of internal representation), there is a high possibility of partial 
compliance (compromise). Yet, when these expectations concern the goals of the 
organisations, organisations will more likely seek strategies of noncompliance, even in the 
absence of internal representation. Interestingly, avoidance strategies are most likely used in 
cases where there are no multiple groups with different beliefs inside the organisations, both 
for expectations concerning means and goals. Avoidance strategies concern such tactics as 
disguising nonconformity or attempting to “reduce the extent to which [the organisation] is 
externally inspected, scrutinized, or evaluated by partially detaching or decoupling its technical 
activities from external contact” (Oliver, 1991: 155). Defiance strategies follow a similar context 
(no multiple groups), although they are more likely in the case of ideological expectations 
(although they can also act on concerns regarding means). Defiance strategies are “a more 
active form of resistance” (Oliver, 1991: 156) since they entail a rejection of external 
expectations. Finally, manipulation strategies are highly dependent on being supported by 
members that are more powerful than others. Manipulation is “the most active” response 
strategy because it “is intended to actively change or exert power over the content of the 
expectations themselves or the sources that seek to express or enforce them” (Oliver, 1991: 
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157). According to Pache and Santos, this strategy depends on the possibility of a “powerful 
party [with] the ability to impose its views” (2010: 466); for instance, a CSO in which the board 
of directors chooses to hire new management more attuned to their beliefs. Yet, when it comes 
to the goals of the organisation, there is a danger that internal conflict paralyses the 
organisation when no apparent dominant group can control the organisational strategies, and 
conflicts are left to escalate internally. 
 






Likelihood of adopting response strategies 
Compromise Avoidance Defiance Manipulation 
Means Absence high high low low 
Single low high high low 
Multiple high(*) low low high(**) 
Goals Absence low high high low 
Single low high high high 
Multiple low low low high(***) 
 (*) balanced power; (**) unbalanced power; (***) The more balanced the power 
structure, the higher the likelihood of organisational paralysis or breakup. 
Definitions of the strategies: 
Compromise ‘An attempt to achieve partial conformity in order to at least partly accommodate all 
institutional demands’ 
Avoidance ‘An attempt to preclude the necessity to conform to institutional demands’ 
Defiance ‘Explicit rejection of at least one of the institutional demands’ 
Manipulation ‘Active attempt to alter the content of the institutional demands’ 
 
(table based on Pache & Santos [2010], with some slight rephrasing and with the addition of their 
definition of the strategies) 
4.3 Case study: Work Integration Social Enterprises in Flanders 
4.3.1 Work Integration Social Enterprises 
In this chapter, we focus on WISEs active at the level of the Flemish Region. In essence, this 
comprises two similar, yet distinct legal types: sheltered workplaces (SHW) and social 
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workplaces (SOW), which can be considered the cornerstones of the social economy sector 
(as we explained in chapter 3, in Flanders the term ‘social economy’ is predominantly 
associated with WISE). WISEs aim to (re)integrate disadvantaged workers into a job in the 
normal labour market through a combination of economic productivity, training and coaching. 
In this dissertation, we will use the term ‘reintegration’ to refer to this process of training and 
coaching with the explicit goal of gaining employment in the labour market outside of WISEs. 
In Flanders, however, this reintegration proves to be quite challenging: in the period 2008–
2013, only 8% and 5.8% of the disadvantaged workers employed in sheltered and social 
workplaces obtained a job in the ‘normal’ labour market. (see Table 9). In fact, during this 
period in social workplaces, more workers became unemployed than moved into the labour 
market.  
 
Table 9: Movement of employees of SOWs and SHWs in Flanders, 2008–2013 
WISE Remained ‘Normal’ 
labour market 
Unemployment Retirement Other (*) Unknown 
SHW 75.8% 8.0% 2.9% 2.6% 4.3% 5.9% 
SOW 64.5% 5.8% 9.5% 4.0% 8.6% 5.8% 
(*) Other = other forms of benefits or labour market support 
Based on Van Waeyenberg, Van Opstal, & De Cuyper (2016) 
 
Sheltered workplaces (SHWs mostly employ individuals with physical or mental disabilities, 
whereas social workplaces (SOWs focus on individuals that struggle with various psychosocial 
issues, ranging from poor education and long-term unemployment to addiction issues. WISEs 
receive their income from the profits from market activities and governmental subsidies. These 
subsidies consist of wage subsidies and subsidies for providing professional support and 
coaching. Wage subsidies are meant to compensate for the loss of efficiency of employing 
disadvantaged workers, and because the number of eligible WISE employees has a maximum 
limit (determined by the Flemish government), these wage subsidies largely cap the 
organisational size, as WISEs would have to pay full wages at their own expense if they would 
decide to recruit additional disadvantaged workers into their workforce. 
4.3.2 Gradual institutionalisation of a sector 
Apart from different target populations, it is important to note that SHWs and SOWs are active 
in different types of the market and emerged from different historical backgrounds (see Table 
10 below). Emerging in the 1950s–1960s, SHWs started as initiatives that provided care and 
meaningful activities for those with disabilities, and they soon received governmental 
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accreditation as human wellbeing service providers (in 196310). As part of labour market policy 
reforms, the regulatory framework for SHWs was later (in 2006) transferred from the wellbeing 
sector to the social economy sector (Flemish Decree of 200611). They are mostly active in 
assembly, packaging, recycling, processing and mailing services across various sectors. 
SOWs, in turn, were formed in the 1980s through experimentation with alternative forms of 
employment by CSOs active in the field of social work and human wellbeing and were 
gradually supported by the labour market policies at the time with the goal of maintaining some 
form of full employment. After a phase of experimental subsidised projects, a law was 
introduced in 199812 that established SOWs as a distinct domain in the social economy 
subsided by the government. In Belgium, the WISE sector is a typical case of a sector that 
has gradually developed deeper links with governmental policies and politics: “(...) the 
progressive institutionalization and professionalization of the field over the years, through 
public schemes increasingly linked to active labour market policies, generated strong 
pressures to make the social mission instrumental to the integration of the disadvantaged 
workers into the labour market” (Defourny & Nyssens, 2010: 237). 
 
Table 10: Key characteristics of sheltered and social workplaces in Flanders 
 Sheltered workplaces Social workplaces 
Target 
group 
People with a physical or mental 
disability 
People with psychosocial issues 
Target 
market 
assembly, packaging, recycling, 
processing, mailing in various sectors: 
printing, electronics, pharmaceuticals, 
landscaping, food industry, 
woodwork, metalwork, IT, plastic 
landscaping services, restaurant services, 
tourism, cleaning and maintenance, second-
hand use and recycling, construction and 
renovation, food services, biological 
agriculture, bicycle repair services, small 
production workshops (wood, metal, textile, 
packaging) 
Origins Emerged in the 1950s-’60s with the 
overall aim of providing care and 
meaningful activities for those with 
disabilities 
Emerged in the 1980s as experiments in 
providing alternative employment for specific 
target group (long-term unemployed, low or 
no education) 
 
Since the 1970s, WISEs have been gradually institutionalised in the governmental labour 
market policies, secured more access to public funding and established themselves as 
partners in the policy design (Lemaître, Nyssens, & Platteau, 2005; Nyssens, 2006; 
                                               
10 By federal law: “Wet betreffende de Sociale Reclassering van de Mindervaliden”, April 4th, 1963 
11 Ordinance by the Flemish Government: “Besluit van de Vlaamse Regering tot aanpassing van de 
regelgeving met betrekking tot de integratie op de arbeidsmarkt van personen met een handicap binnen 
het beleidsdomein Werk en Sociale Economie”, November 17th, 2006 
12 By Flemish Decree: “Decreet inzake sociale werkplaatsen”, July 14th, 1998 
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Vanheeswijck & Breda, 2017). This evolution fits in the wider European context of labour 
market policies. Starting from the 1990s, labour market policies throughout Europe shifted 
towards the so-called active welfare state approach, a policy strategy for “promoting the 
employability and labour-market participation of unemployed people” (Berkel, Graaf, & 
Sirovátka, 2011: 1). 
 
Thus, WISEs are not only subsidised for providing sustainable and adjusted labour in and of 
itself, but gradually, additional principles of active labour-market participation started to gain 
political support. In 1999, the social economy in Flanders was institutionalised as a distinct 
policy domain by the Flemish government with its own appointed minister. However, social 
and sheltered workplaces were still regulated by their own respective legislative framework. 
Befitting the Flemish neocorporatist context, the representative peak associations in the sector 
engaged in policy negotiations with the Flemish government in working towards a unified 
legislative framework for the sector: in 2006 both peak associations established a separate 
organisation in which they both formed the board of directors, with the explicit goal of 
promoting collaboration.  
 
They declared their objective towards a unified framework and established some of the basic 
principles for such a framework, among others: attaining objective selection workers eligible 
for WISE positions, individual financing of workers’ wages (so-called rucksack model) and 
entrepreneurial autonomy (De Mey, Breda, & Van Landeghem, 2008). While the negotiations 
with the Flemish government started around this time (2006–2008), it was not until 2013 that 
the unifying WISE Decree was approved. The coalition government of that time did not 
succeed in reaching a consensus on the ensuing governmental ordinances that would 
implement the legislation. The following coalition government (with a new Minister of Social 
Economy, from another political party) approved a new ordinance to implement the WISE 
Decree, which would then go into effect on April 1st, 2015. However, this new ordinance was 
suspended by the Council of State (Raad van State, highest administrative court) in January 
2016 because some of the regulations meant to guide the transition from the old to the new 
legislation violated the legal certainty and financial viability of WISEs13. By 2017, a new 
ordinance was approved, and the WISE Decree was reactivated on January 1st, 2019.  
 
                                               
13 Raad van State, January 26th, 2016, nr. 233.620. The regulations regarding the transition were 
unclear about the changing calculation of the subsidies, which could result in significant financial 
instability for the organisations. The Council determined this to be a matter of pressing concern that 
warranted an immediate suspension of the ordinance. The legal dispute had been initiated by two 
SHWs. 
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In sum, although sheltered and SOWs both provide employment and vocational training to 
disadvantaged workers and are closely entangled with the government in terms of public 
service delivery and policy formulation, they are characterised by a different target population, 
target market and historical origins, yet, both social and sheltered workplaces have evolved 
towards becoming a sector that is an institutionalised part of the active labour market policies 
of the Flemish government. Since 2019, they are for the first time in their history regulated 
under one legislative framework.  
4.4 Methods 
Our case study in this chapter is built on data collected in two phases. Firstly, we analysed the 
legislative reforms in the WISE sector in Flanders, with a focus on NPM-style reforms. We 
used this analysis as our guide in collecting qualitative interviews with both key policy actors 
as well as individual WISEs. Secondly, we used a subset of the dataset presented in the 
previous chapter to extract the WISEs included in our survey. From this basis, we could 
identify some of the key characteristics of their relationship to the Flemish government (as 
discussed in the previous chapter), as well as some core elements regarding their 
management. Table 11 below presents an overview of the methods used. In sum, 53 WISEs 
are included in our case study: 21 in a qualitative study (semi-structured interviews) and 43 
through survey research (because of the random sample in our survey design, 11 
organisations were included in both phases of the study: 43+21-11=53 organisations).  
 
We collected these data during 2017–2018, which falls in the period right after the newly 
approved governmental ordinance (in response to its suspension by the Council of State). 
This period of uncertainty provides an interesting opportunity to examine the relationship 
between policy changes, practical implementation and organisational responses. First, all 
organisations were confronted with these changes during several months in 2015, and there 
was an active debate on these reforms in the sector. Also, the peak associations had been 
providing information and training to the professionals in the field in light of the coming reforms. 
Second, the suspension provided us with the opportunity to speak with the CEOs as they were 
reflecting on how to move forward as the decree would be reinstated by January 1st, 2019.  
4.4.1 Qualitative research: legislation, organisations and policymakers 
First, we delved into the particularities of the new decree by analysing relevant legislative 
documentation and discussed the implications of these reforms with various professionals in 
the field through several interviews (although these were not recorded). These were done 
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mostly with professionals of the WISEs’ umbrella organisations (of both social and sheltered 
workplaces). The goal of these conversations was to establish an understanding of the new 
legislation as well as of the perceptions of professionals regarding this legislation. 
 
Second, we set out to systematically explore organisational strategies in the field. To ensure 
we could reach a diverse group of WISEs, we trained master’s students in Public 
Administration at Ghent University to conduct interviews with the general managers (CEO or 
equivalent) and other professionals of selected WISEs. If the general manager was 
unavailable, other leading managers were interviewed (e.g., personnel manager, financial 
manager, strategic manager). Students also collected information on the main activities from 
the organisation through yearly reports. In order to ensure data quality, the authors intensively 
coached the students both in terms of theory and knowledge of the field as well as interview 
quality. Regarding theory and knowledge of the field, we organised four three-hour training 
sessions: two on theories of governance and organisational hybridity and two sessions on the 
historical development of WISE in Flanders and the latest legislative reforms. These last two 
sessions were presented by experts in the field: one by a manager of a social workplace who 
is also active in various network organisations; the other by a political actor involved in the 
latest policy reform. Regarding the quality of the research, students were obligated to attend 
three face-to-face feedback sessions in which preliminary findings were discussed at length.  
 
Third, and parallel to this systematic exploration, we conducted semi-structured interviews 
with four key actors involved in the latest policy reform: a member of the political cabinet of 
the previous Minister of Social Economy (who was a central figure in the negotiations), the 
leading managers of the two main peak associations (one for social workplaces and one for 
sheltered workplaces), and the director-general of the governmental department of Labour 
and Social Economy. These interviews were focused on the development of the latest reform, 
the response by the actors and their assessment of the ensuing legislative framework.  
4.4.2 Survey data 
Lastly, we used the survey data that were presented in the previous chapter. We selected only 
the SOWs and SHWs from that dataset. All SOWs and SHWs were included in the initial 
population dataset, of which 43 SOWs and SHWs partook in the survey. First, we focused on 
the relationship between WISEs and the Flemish government, as was done in the previous 
chapter. Second, we used additional survey data on managerial practices, mainly the use of 













SOWs 30 69.8% 14 66.7% 90 65.2% 
SHWs 13 30.2% 7 33.3% 48 34.8% 
 43 100% 21 100% 138 100% 
Interviews (4) with key decision-makers in the policy process: 
● Peak associations (SHW & SOW) (2) 
● Former Ministerial Cabinet (1) 
● Dept. of Labour and Social Economy (1) 
(*) Because of the random selection in the survey, 11 organisations were included that were also 
interviewed, giving a total of 53 (= 43 + 21 – 11) organisations. 
(**) The number of SOWs and SHWs in our mapping population is slightly lower than the officially 
reported numbers because some WISEs are enterprises that combine multiple legal nonprofit 
entities that are each individually recognised as either SHW or SOW. We counted such combinations 
as one organisation.  
(***) In two cases we counted organisations that combined a large SHW with a small SOW as SHW 
(i.e., their dominant activity). 
 
4.5 Findings 
We will first present a quick recap of the key characteristics of WISEs that we found in the 
survey that was presented in the previous chapter. Next, we will look at the new legislative 
framework, and discuss to what extent this framework introduces NPM-style reforms in the 
sector. We will then turn to the role of WISEs and their umbrella organisation in shaping how 
this legislative framework is formed in practice and how organisations deal with this new 
context.  
 
When analysing the legislative framework and organisational strategies we focus on three 
points of friction: the standardisation of the intake process of disadvantaged workers with 
psychosocial issues, the increased focus on reintegration (i.e., the transition of disadvantaged 
workers to the normal labour market) and the use of business-like management tools in 
support of work integration trajectories.  
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4.5.1 A quick recap: WISE in numbers 
We presented the main findings of our survey in the previous chapter. In this paragraph, we 
want to briefly reiterate some of the key characteristics of WISEs in our survey. Table 12 
presents those key findings. Interestingly, underlining the hybrid character of these 
organisations, managers of WISEs invariably view their organisation as an enterprise (avg. of 
4.81 on a five-point scale, with a minimum score of 4). Furthermore, these managers see their 
organisations as primarily focused on social capital (providing a sense of belonging) and 
service delivery (providing a service that fulfils a specific societal need) and only to a lesser 
extent focused on advocacy ([trying to] influence policymakers) or their political role (striving 
for social or political change). Regarding different advocacy strategies, we found that 
managers report being mostly active in umbrella organisations, compared to other strategies. 
Furthermore, we learned that the WISEs are on average slightly more dependent on market-
based income than public funding. In terms of employees, SHWs are on average larger than 
SOWs, with the SOWs in our survey reporting between 8 and 450 employees and SHWs 
between 150 and 949. 
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Table 12: Overview of WISEs (survey data) 
Type & roles (1–5) SHW SOW Total 
Enterprise avg. 4.77 4.83 4.81 
n 13 29 42 
Service delivery avg. 3.38 4.80 4.37 
n 13 30 43 
Social capital avg. 4.69 4.80 4.77 
n 13 30 43 
Advocacy avg. 2.54 3.67 3.33 
n 13 30 43 
Political avg. 2.45 3.13 2.93 
n 13 30 43 
Income (percentages) SHW SOW Total 
Public funding avg. 45.70% 41.32% 42.42% 
n 7 21 28 
Market avg. 54.30% 53.35% 53.59% 
n 7 21 28 
Community avg. 0.00% 5.33% 4.00% 
n 7 21 28 
Employees (averages) SHW SOW Total 
Total employees avg. 416.77 102.44 204.60 
n 13 27 40 
min. 150 8 8 
max. 949 450 949 
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4.5.2 A new decree: a new public management for WISEs? 
After being about ten years in the making, a new Flemish decree14 went into effect as of 
January 1st, 2019 (Maatwerkdecreet; literal translation: ‘customised work decree’, from here 
on called the ‘WISE Decree’). Actually, the reform was first introduced in 2015, but it was 
suspended in 2016 after legal proceedings by two SHWs (the cause were problems with 
transitional measures that were supposed to handle the change from the old to the new 
legislation). The goal was to bring the Flemish policy in line with EU regulations regarding 
state support for economic activities, as well as to mitigate the perennial waiting lists for 
disadvantaged workers. This, combined with the insight that only a few disadvantaged workers 
succeed in securing a job in the normal labour market (see Table 10 discussed earlier), the 
WISE Decree aimed to address these waiting lists. At crucial points in the legislation, several 
NPM-style principles are introduced: incentivising competition and efficiency, business-like 
management techniques, standardisation of the workforce as well as strengthening the role of 
the decentralised labour market agency. 
 
Firstly, there is the abrogation of the distinct legal forms of SOWs and SHWs in favour of a 
unified framework of so-called customised work enterprises.15 The intended goal of this 
unification is to establish customised employment and support (hence the name) for the 
individual worker by simplifying the legislative framework. It also continues the possibility for 
for-profits to become eligible for public funding to set up WISE divisions in their company. This 
might also, however, introduce more competition in the sector.  
 
Second, the law formally requires WISEs to use specific management procedures and 
instruments such as quality management, sustainability reporting and self-evaluations as well 
as personal development profiles for the employees (i.e., documenting the evolution of their 
capabilities). The assumption is that these tools can improve the quality of the individual work 
integration trajectories as well as organisational efficiency.  
 
Third, the procedure for selecting eligible disadvantaged workers has changed dramatically, 
at least for those with workers with psychosocial issues. For those with a disability, the existing 
standards remained unchanged. For those workers experiencing psychosocial issues, an 
international instrument was introduced to standardise the intake procedure the International 
                                               
14 To be clear: ‘decree’ designates a Flemish law. The term ‘decree’ is used to distinguish Flemish laws 
from federal laws (which is called ‘Law’). 
15 In Dutch: Maatwerkbedrijven. As our data were collected before 2019, we differentiate throughout 
the study between sheltered and social workplaces when discussing the cases examined.  
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Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF). Before this change, the admission 
criteria were defined in more general terms, i.e.,  being long-term unemployed (five years), 
being low-educated and having some form of psychosocial issues. The ICF instrument now 
introduces a score (between 42 and 173) for each employee which is used as the basis for a 
final evaluation.  
 
Lastly, the governmental agency VDAB (the Flemish Labour Market Agency) is now given 
responsibility for the selection (ICF method) as well as the evaluation of workers with regards 
to (re)integration into the normal labour market. Regional agency administrators will have to 
perform the ICF measurement as well as evaluate the reintegration possibilities for WISE 
employees. Whereas previous legislations viewed the overarching goal of WISEs as providing 
a long-term, stable job where reintegration was always part of the goal, the new legislation 
more explicitly emphasises reintegration as a goal to strive for (e.g., reintegration now has its 
own chapter in the Decree), including a formally defined target for reintegration (i.e., 10% of 
workers will be screened) to incentivise WISEs to increase their efforts towards reintegration.   
4.5.3 Who steers? Unravelling the WISE-government nexus 
In this section, we aim to unravel both formal and informal dynamics characteristic for the 
WISE-Flemish government nexus using the latest policy reform as our focal point.   
a.  Eligibility: standardising the means of recruitment 
From the start of the policy negotiations in 2009, the actors involved wanted to construct a 
new selection process in order to provide an unambiguous and transparent selection of 
persons eligible to work in WISEs. This goal was shared by both peak associations and 
governmental actors. It was already one principle of the joint strategy by the peak associations 
in 2006 and was confirmed during our interviews as one of the principles on which the 
policymakers agreed. While the actors agreed on the principle, they were less clear about the 
means to achieve it. Then, somewhere during the early negotiations with the Flemish 
government, representatives of the VDAB proposed the ICF as a possible tool for selection. 
ICF is an instrument developed by the World Health Organization in 2001 for measuring health 
and disability, which the VDAB believed could be used to adapt according to the needs of 
WISEs. With the ICF, an individual score could be assigned to possible candidates for WISE 
employment. This score would then be used as part of the final motivation regarding the 
individual’s eligibility. While the ICF would result in standardised scores for each individual, 
the final motivation would still have to be made by an administrator of the agency’s disability 
department. The construction of this adjusted ICF instrument was coordinated by the VDAB 
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and developed in cooperation with the WISEs and their peak associations. The instrument 
itself is not part of the WISE Decree, which only stipulates that the government can set the list 
of criteria used for determining eligibility; the instrument itself has been implemented by 
executive ordinance. Despite being defined in this ordinance, there is still a lot of room for 
discussion on how to precisely implement the instrument in practice, and it has been under 
ongoing evaluation. There is a discussion between WISEs and administrators over the impact 
of this instrument. Throughout our interviews, WISE managers claimed that the ICF instrument 
would lead to the exclusion of the stronger profiles (which the VDAB confirms to some extent), 
which in turn could result in a relative increase of so-called weaker profiles among the people 
eligible for WISE employment (which the VDAB denies). This might result, some managers 
claim, in an imbalance between stronger and weaker employees in terms of the organisation’s 
capacity in the market, thereby negatively impacting the productivity of WISEs. Interestingly, 
this discussion between sector and administration takes place in formal workgroups that are 
part of the institutionalised policy process. In the period of our data collection, there were 
ongoing negations on how to implement the procedures for selection, which led most actors 
to be reluctant to share more information. Yet, these negotiations illustrate how closely 
umbrella organisations are involved in the policy process. 
 
The participation of WISEs in the policy process via their peak associations is echoed in our 
survey findings. Asked how—and to what extent—WISEs are active in policy formulation 
through participation, we found that peak associations played a vital role (see Table 13). 
Repeated direct personal contacts between WISEs and the ministerial department only 
occurred for 37.21% of WISEs. Interestingly, personal contacts with administrators scored 
much higher (81.40% at least ‘repeatedly’), which might be explained by the fact that public 
administrators play an increasingly important role in assessing both the influx and transition 
process of disadvantaged workers. In sum, these findings show how peak associations 
primarily serve as sectoral connections to policymakers, while the WISEs themselves are 





Table 13: Frequency of participation in activities of peak associations (from the start of 
2015 up to the time of the survey) 
Frequency SHW SOW Total 
n 13 30 43 
Not 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Once 0.00% 3.33% 2.33% 
Repeatedly 23.08% 26.67% 25.58% 
Often 7.69% 26.67% 20.93% 
Very often 69.23% 43.33% 51.16% 
 
b.  Setting the goal of reintegration 
The involvement of WISEs in the policy process was also apparent in the discussions 
concerning the reintegration of workers into the normal labour market. Attention to this issue 
has always been part of the policy debate concerning WISEs in coalitions with socialist 
Ministers of Social Economy to the latest coalition with Flemish nationalist (and more liberal) 
ministers. As we stated earlier, the fact that 64.5% (SOWs) to 75.8% (SHWs) of WISE 
employees do not leave the organisation for employment in regular enterprises frames the 
debate on reintegration policies. In the new WISE Decree, reintegration is more explicitly 
emphasised. Some argue that this can be related to the growing importance of more liberal-
oriented political parties in the previous and current coalition government, as one respondent 
stated: “It was the [liberal-oriented] party that achieved in getting reintegration into [the 
Decree]. So, reintegration became a real fetish. Really.”16 There is indeed more 
acknowledgement towards reintegration in the legislative framework; for instance, there is now 
a separate chapter on reintegrating both in the WISE Decree and the ensuing governmental 
ordinance. However, this does not necessarily mean that reintegration has become a narrowly 
defined goal for each WISE. In fact, looking at how the policy was designed and how 
organisations perceive these changes, there is still considerable room for manoeuvre. The 
resulting policy framework has not only been determined by this abovementioned ‘fetish’ since 
the policy process included the WISEs and their peak associations, the administrative agency, 
the ministerial department, as well as input from other political parties in the coalition 
government, and from representatives of labour unions and employers’ associations.  
 
                                               
16 Translated from Dutch by the author. 
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Throughout the steps of the multi-layered regulatory framework, new conditions have been 
added: the legislative framework consists of different levels (from the Decree to executive 
ordinances) and while the WISE Decree emphasises reintegration, it does not set specific 
targets and still leaves much room for manoeuvre. For instance, the Decree states that in its 
evaluation, the VDAB takes into account the possibilities for sustainable employment as well 
as the personal situation and the continuity of operations of the WISE. The governmental 
ordinance that implements the WISE Decree picks up these three criteria and adds the 
dimensions which are considered relevant for the evaluation of the personal situation of the 
employee (i.e., health, mobility, age, familial situation, financial situation and the individual 
capacity and motivation for labour career management). The ministerial ordinance which 
followed later still adds a new dimension to the reintegration evaluation process by stating that 
a specific target of employees (i.e., 10% of all target-group employees) should be evaluated 
by the VDAB. The WISE Decree itself requires only that every WISE employee should be 
evaluated within five years, based on at least three elements: the personal development profile 
of the employee, information provided by the organisation and a conversation with the 
employee. However, while there are these general targets for evaluating WISE employees 
(10% of all employees, each employee evaluated after five years), no actual transition targets 
are set. Not all of the professionals in the WISEs that we spoke with seemed to understand 
this; some seem to think the legislation has set a hard target of 10% in terms of reintegration. 
At the policy level, the actors are more attuned to the complexity of the legislation, and we 
found that they generally agree on the room to manoeuvre within the formal framework: 
despite the political affirmation of reintegration, no mandatory targets were set and the criteria 
for evaluation are still very broad and encompass both characteristics of the employee 
(motivation, personal situation) and the organisations (continuity of its operations). Yet, the 
fact that there is now some form of target still causes some concern. A respondent described 
it as an important precedent: “(...) I do think that this will hang over the sector as a sword of 
Damocles. That, if one day someone would say ‘and now we will regulate ‘reintegration’ more 
strictly and sharpen it’, that you might have a problem.” Such a more strict approach to 
reintegration is possible since the actual procedures and targets regarding reintegration are 
not set by law, but by the executive (governmental and ministerial) ordinance. Some fear that 
ensuing coalition governments might opt for such a more strict approach to reintegration, 
which they see as part of a growing liberal political discourse.  
 
Reintegration has since long been a policy concern as WISEs have become gradually more 
institutionalised as part of the active labour market policies. It seems that the latest Decree, 
coordinated by the cabinet of a socialist minister in a coalition government with liberal parties, 
has formally emphasised reintegration as a policy goal, but still leaves lots of room for 
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administrators and WISEs to manoeuvre in terms of the evaluation of workers in practice. On 
the whole, this legislative framework is the expression of a long-negotiated political 
compromise: for some, the emphasis on reintegration is achieved; for others, there is room for 
a case-by-case evaluation, and hard targets are avoided. 
4.5.4 Organisational response strategies of WISE 
The policy framework creates a significant amount of room for manoeuvre for both 
administrators and WISEs, which increases uncertainty: administrators are unsure how to 
exactly implement these new rules and regulations in practice, which in turn also means that 
WISEs do not know how and if policies will be enforced. In preparation for the renewed 
implementation of the new regulations, many organisations express doubt over the capacity 
of the VDAB to be able to handle all the tasks it has been assigned and how organisations will 
be impacted by the new eligibility and evaluation criteria. In this section, we draw on our data 
to examine how the new decree has impacted organisational behaviour. Using the model of 
Pache and Santos, which we have discussed earlier, we identify the possible strategies used 
by CSOs in response to external expectations. However, considering that our data collection 
included only the perspective of the general managers, we do not know to what extent there 
are internal organisational differences between different groups of members (e.g., 
management, board of directors, professional trainers, target-group employees). Therefore, 
we will have to reduce the model to only include the perspective of the general managers. 
Specifically, this means that we can only look at situations in which management is either 
concerned (adherence to a single side of the demand) or not (absence) about the expectations 
discussed. Table 14 below shows this adjusted model.  
 







Likelihood of adopting response strategies 
Compromise Avoidance Defiance Manipulation 
Means Absence high high low low 
Single low high high low 
Goals Absence low high high low 
Single low high high high 
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a.  Eligibility: bargaining the means of recruitment 
Standardising selection is seen as a legitimate goal by most actors in the sectors, but there is 
uncertainty about its actual implementation. At first glance, the formal rules seem rather strict 
and clear: only those individuals that have passed the eligibility screening by the agency 
administrators can be hired by WISEs. One consequence is that all vacancies have to be 
communicated to the agency, which then places the vacancy in its job database or looks at 
possible candidates in the registration pool. WISEs cannot directly hire a new employee; the 
agency will assign workers. However, the ICF instrument is used by administrators to make 
an assessment in which they have discretionary room for a final motivated decision. Some 
WISE managers express doubt about the capabilities of the agency administrators to use the 
ICF instrument, and they are uncertain on how strict the ICF scores will be used in the final 
assessment. In terms of external expectations, the standardisation process concerns a 
functional dimension of the WISEs and internally, it is experienced as an unclear principle that 
might have a significant impact on the balance of the WISE workforce. Therefore, the 
hypothesis is that organisations have a higher likelihood of using avoidance and defiance 
strategies. For those organisations that are less concerned with the abilities of administrators 
to implement the new rules, compromise and avoidance are more likely. Indeed, we find both 
these strategies used by the organisations, while we could not identify any defiance strategies 
used by WISEs. 
 
Compromise is often used, even for those organisations that express concerns about the 
selection process, specifically through bargaining with the regional agency administrators: 
agency administrators are often invited to visit the organisation so that managers can 
communicate what kind of workers are most suited for that specific labour environment. 
Avoidance strategies are some of the most used strategies and take the form of constructing 
some form of buffering between the organisation and the agency by a form of self-selection: 
WISEs find a candidate in their own social and organisational network, which they then send 
to the agency for screening, informing the agency on the qualities of the individual and the 
reasons why they would be a good fit for the organisation. Some WISEs even do a pre-
screening of the candidate before they are sent to the agency for final screening. 
 
Two factors are important in understanding why compromise and avoidance strategies are the 
most used strategies in dealing with the standardisation of eligibility. One, ICF screening is a 
crucial instrument but remains part of the functional dimension of WISEs. It concerns the 
means with which WISEs organise their productivity (i.e., the capabilities of the workers to 
impact the production process) as well as their job training and coaching (i.e., what type of 
training has to be used?). It does not change the goal of the organisation: WISEs will still 
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provide suitable labour for disadvantaged workers. Adjusting to means is relatively more low-
cost than adjusting to new goals for the organisation; therefore, more compliance-based 
strategies are to be expected. Second, even though the process includes significant 
discretionary space for decision-making, the formal framework assigns the VDAB with all the 
administrative decision-making. Compromise and avoidance strategies are relatively low-cost 
strategies for WISEs to influence the administrative decision-making process, while defiance-
based strategies would require organisations to reject these new rules without having 
alternatives available (i.e., they cannot hire workers that are not screened, unless they are 
willing to pay the full wages, which is considered too costly). At the policy level, however, we 
saw that peak associations engage in ongoing policy negotiations on the use of the ICF 
instrument. Indeed, these negotiations can also be seen as a form of bargaining (seeking 
compromise with government officials by negotiating adjustments to the instrument or 
procedure).  
b.  Reintegration: dismissing an unattainable goal 
The attention to reintegration in the legislative framework was generally seen as an unrealistic 
political discourse: while in principle the idea is laudable (making sure that disadvantaged 
workers overcome their difficulties and find other work in non-WISE organisations), many 
managers remained sceptical about its feasibility. Importantly, the reintegration of workers, 
more than the selection screening process, refers to the ideological dimension of the 
organisations (their goals): providing a suitable labour environment for disadvantaged 
workers. Whereas selection was seen as a means to find eligible workers (with some possible 
negative side effects of how to balance workforce capabilities and productivity), the focus on 
reintegration was seen as directly impacting the extent of the autonomy of WISE in providing 
individual guidance and professional training for their employees. Concerning the 
organisational strategies, the hypothesis is that WISEs are more likely to engage in avoidance 
and defiance strategies. For those organisations that explicitly reject the policy goal of 
increased reintegration, manipulation strategies are also more likely. 
 
Sceptical WISE managers expressed their concerns about increased reintegration based on 
two main reasons: (a) their experience that there are not many disadvantaged workers that 
have sufficiently strong capabilities to thrive in non-WISE labour environments and (b) that so-
called normal enterprises are not willing to adjust their expectations to the needs of these 
workers. Concerning the first reason, many managers argue that their past experiences have 
shown how difficult it is to expect workers to find stable employment. The reaction of an SHW 
manager illustrates this general belief: “We are realists. In all those years that we have been 
doing this, one percent has been reintegrated. And of that one percent, fifty percent has 
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returned. Do I have to put all that energy into that?” For most managers, this experience of 
low success shows that policies emphasising higher reintegration do not correspond with 
reality. Concerning the second reason, managers feel that so-called normal enterprises are 
not looking for WISE workers: “Normal cleaning companies are begging for workers, 
transportation companies are begging for drivers. Only, when a single mom or dad with three, 
four children, .... it is impossible for them to function in a system in which these cleaning 
companies, in which these transportation companies work.” 
 
Given these concerns, WISEs turn to defiance strategies by dismissing the new rules. Two 
reasons contribute to this occurrence of defiance: the general belief that the administrative 
capacity for enforcement is low and the belief that the achievement of higher integration 
percentages is unattainable. One manager states that reintegration could never be the primary 
goal of his organisation: “We are not against the whole reintegration story, but I wouldn’t turn 
it into the spearhead of policy, because the people who believe that that is the essence of 
WISEs know nothing about private entrepreneurship and they know nothing of protected 
entrepreneurship.” Moreover, many managers believe that higher reintegration targets would 
threaten the organisational functioning as this would come down to some of their strongest 
workers leaving. These in turn are believed—due to the implementation of the new ICF 
instrument—to be replaced by weaker disadvantaged workers, while the level of market 
competition remains unchanged. These strong beliefs, coupled with the expectation of low 
administrative capabilities for enforcement, have in general led to a dismissive approach 
towards the reintegration policies. 
 
Alternatively, we found one SOW that developed an interesting avoidance strategy in their 
rejection of the reintegration policies. They established two cooperative enterprises (i.e., an 
enterprise form with limited profit distribution), which they use not only for commercial activities 
that do not fit with their nonprofit SOW but also as an organisation to which some of their 
employees can migrate and which then also counts as reintegration. One of these enterprises 
is a cooperation with two other CSOs (one WISE, one wellbeing organisation). This strategy 
enables the organisation to alter its internal processes: some forms of reintegration can be 
oriented towards these cooperatives under their own control, instead of towards external non-
WISE organisations.  
 
Interestingly, in some social workplaces, we found several instances of compliance with the 
goals of reintegration, where the main driver behind this compliance is the strong consistency 
between the internal goals and the policy of reintegration. Three social workplaces explicitly 
stated that the reintegration of workers is one of their primary goals. The first SOW refers to 
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itself as a reintegration company and has set its own internal target for reintegration (target of 
10% of all workers; in 2016 they achieved a 13% transition rate to employment in non-WISE 
organisations). Some transitions of employees are not focused on reintegration but are used 
to make room for hiring new employees that can then enter the reintegration programme. For 
instance, the SOW engages in partnerships with some SHWs who can hire some of their 
employees that need to be in a sheltered environment for a longer time. For employees that 
are aged 55 years or older, the SOW employs some of them under a different programme, 
which means they lose their WISE wage subsidies, but this makes room for new hires under 
the WISE programme. The manager of the second SOW also refers to reintegration as a 
primary goal: “We deliver two outputs; we deliver re-use and we deliver reintegration 
processes.” Even so, this manager agrees with the fact that there is little administrative 
capacity for enforcement and that reintegration is mostly a political discourse. The third SOW 
provides guidance for people struggling with addictions and sees the goal of regular 
employment in the labour market as part of the process (about 20% of their disadvantaged 
workers leave the organisation, either to work in other WISEs or non-WISE organisations).   
c.  Management tools: whose expectations? 
The management tools used in WISEs are part of their functional demands, i.e., the means 
by which they organise the economic activity in their organisations. They respond to certain 
expectations, either by how the government expects them to organise themselves, by how the 
organisations themselves believe they should act and by how organisations believe their own 
sector expects them to act. In our survey, we were able to measure these expectations.  First, 
we asked the respondent to indicate which management tools from a list of tools they used:17 
SWOT analysis, SMART analysis, lean management, benchmarking, pay-for-performance 
incentives, quality standards (e.g., ISO, EFQM) and key performance indicators (KPIs). We 
learned that, except for pay-for-performance principles, all of the tools were reported as 
frequently used by at least half of all WISEs, with SWOT (70%), quality standards (75%) and 
KPIs (66%) being the most frequently used. Second, we asked to indicate what the most 
important reasons were for using these tools. Table 15 shows the correlations between 
frequency of use and the reasons for using these tools. Here we see that respondents primarily 
point to their belief that these tools are standard for their organisation (“We use this tool 
because we are convinced that this is how it should be for an organisation like ours.”). 
Government expectations (“We use this tool because the government expects us to do so.”) 
or sectoral expectations are only marginally at play (“We use this tool because other 
                                               
17 For each instrument, a short definition was presented 
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organisations in our field do so.”). Thus, the more these management tools are used, the more 
managers report that this frequent use is related to their own organisational beliefs.  
 
Table 15: Correlation between management tool use and reasons of use (WISE) 
REASONS 
Management Tools 







The government expects it -.127 .176 -.285 -.051 -.131 .126 .036 
Similar CSOs in our sector 
do it 
-.026 .308(*) -.261 .243 .108 -.045 .124 
A CSO like ours should 
use it 
.216 .516(**) .417(**) .378(*) .627(**) .419(**) .459(**) 
 Spearman correlations: (*) p<.05; (**) p<.01; n=43; (+) n=42 
Management tools: variables ranging from 1 (not) to 5 (often) 
Reasons: variables ranging from 0 (not) to 3 (most important reason) 
 
Certain management practices are mandated by the legislative framework: quality 
management, human resources (including personal development profiles of its employees) 
and strategic self-evaluations. Yet, our survey results show that it would be an overstatement 
to portray the new legislative framework as the main driver behind the use of business-like 
management tools, as WISEs use a multitude of management tools that are not required by 
legislation. Management tools in general are thus not a response to governmental demands. 
The belief that organisations should organise themselves according to these management 
principles seems to stem from the demands in the markets in which WISEs operate. Sheltered 
workplaces are mostly larger WISEs that perceive their market environment as highly 
competitive. They strongly depend on contracts with private enterprises, which implies certain 
expectations in terms of organisational management. As a result, in our interviews with 
management, we also found them to be frequent users of management tools such as EFQM 
modelling, lean management, just-in-time organisation, KPIs, and SMART goals. Crucially, 
managers also indicate that it is a continuous concern to not only meet market demands but 
to do it in such a way that it fits their organisational goals of providing suitable labour for their 
workers. Thus, when one manager of a large sheltered workplace speaks about EFQM 
modelling, he frames it as follows: “Our EFQM says we are a company with three core 
processes: supply chain, HR and sales. (...) Concerning sales, everything has to meet certain 
criteria so that our employees can easily manufacture [what is demanded]. Concerning the 
supply chain, also, simple labour is key, as with for example the division of tasks. We want to 
make them strong, which means being multipurpose. Also concerning investments revenue is 
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not key, but the employability of the employees.” Moreover, sheltered workplaces increasingly 
engage in automation of labour processes in order to meet market demands, whereby 
managers also point out that automation efforts make the workplace more accessible to their 
disadvantaged workers. One manager tries to explain the reasoning: “How far do you go 
towards automation... There where you can use it to improve the work of your people or make 
their work easier, that is the right decision. Not to exclude people and replace them with 
robots.” Social workplaces certainly also frequently use various management tools. In certain 
reuse centres, techniques based on lean and agility management were introduced. One 
reason for this seems to be the role played by a professional network organisation of reuse 
centres, that organised information sessions and training on these techniques. Furthermore, 
KPIs were certainly well established in many social workplaces, although these indicators can 
of course be very broadly defined. We found that EFQM modelling was also used in many of 
these SOWs.  
 
Thus, seeing this broad acceptance of management tools, the introduction of certain new 
instruments could be seen as a minor adjustment for these organisations. Still, certain 
instruments (e.g., sustainability reporting) introduced by the new legislation were at the time 
of our data collection not clearly defined, leading managers to wonder what exactly had to be 
reported. Other instruments, such as the personal development profiles for WISE employees 
were generally considered as nothing new, and maybe only a new format to a practice that 
was since long established in the sector. Those few organisations that did not yet have such 
an instrument were currently developing it. Some smaller SOWs wondered whether they 
would be able to manage, as their capacity for more administrative work was already limited.  
d.  Competition: avoiding WISE market pressures 
A final set of response strategies concern the way WISEs organise themselves with regards 
to the level of competition. When managers in the social economy were asked in the survey 
to assess the level of competition for resources, the response was, on average, that 
competition for resources was reasonable (3 on a scale of 5). In our interviews, we learned 
that WISEs can experience competition in different ways. Competition can mean offering the 
lowest price, or it can mean offering the fastest and most flexible service, or both at the same 
time. SHWs and SOWs are active in different markets and on different scales. SOWs usually 
provide services that are linked to a certain region of customers (although some SOWs 
operate across Flanders): they are most active in markets for reuse and recycling, agriculture, 
building and renovation, bicycling maintenance, household services, etc. SHWs are larger 
organisations that are often suppliers for private enterprises, specialised in providing fast on-
time delivery of products for particular enterprises. This also means that SHWs are to a certain 
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degree active on international markets, as they have to compete for contracts with suppliers 
in low-wage countries. In terms of the model of response strategies, market demands (price, 
quality, production time, delivery) are not easily distinguishable as either means (functional 
demands) or goals (ideological demand) of WISEs. However, from our interviews, we learned 
that WISEs’ managers emphasise that their goods and services are judged like a normal 
business in the market, so competitive performance is expected. In response to these 
competitive demands (on price, production time, quality) we see two types of strategies. The 
first type concerns cooperation between WISEs and can be seen as a form of manipulation 
(i.e., a strong form of noncompliance to external demands). The second type concerns a more 
compliant strategy of internal reorganisation, a form of compromise. 
 
We observed the strategy of manipulation in one particular province of Flanders. The WISEs 
in this province joined in a network organisation that not only served to advocate the 
contribution of the WISEs to the local and Flemish politicians (specifically, WISEs’ contribution 
to the local economy) but also served as a platform to exchange information. The 
organisations in this network developed two strategies which Suyoung Kim (2014) labelled as 
‘dividing’ and ‘merging’ the market (in a study on organisational responses to increased 
competition in South Korea). A market division was first established through a so-called 
gentlemen's agreement or non-aggression pact between WISEs. Instead of entering into 
competition with each other for new contracts and clients, WISEs agreed to refrain from 
dishonest competition, respect each other’s specialities and not engage in competition when 
the activity would require large investments. Also, when WISEs find they do not have the 
expertise for a certain contract, they agree to inform other WISEs (which do have this 
expertise) about the existence of these possible contracts. This way, WISEs would not 
compete in each other's domain, or compete for the same contracts and clients.  
 
Merging the market is not a manipulation strategy but a cooperative strategy aimed at 
avoidance. This merging occurred in different regions in Flanders. It mostly took the form of 
mergers of different organisations into larger organisations. While this merger strategy is 
certainly used to reduce the overall operational costs, some organisations engaged in (or were 
planning to engage in) mergers because the new legislation requires a minimum of 20 full-
time equivalent employees (and was thus a highly compliant strategy): for such smaller 
organisations, mergers were a question of organisational survival. Mergers were also used to 
create an overarching organisation that handles the shared services of personnel and 
resource management of several WISEs at once. Interestingly, we found that some 
organisations handled this sharing of resources in a more informal manner, by making WISE 
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employees available for other organisations when they were in short-term need of additional 
workforce capacity because of temporary spikes in market demand. 
 
The second set of strategies has to do with the internal organisation of WISES as a compliant 
strategy to market demands. We found that some sheltered workplaces developed strategic 
partnerships with for-profit enterprises. They are highly dependent on contracts with the 
private sector, and in order to create some stability for their workforce, they seek to establish 
a relationship with large enterprises by orienting their production process in function of these 
specific partners. The risk of this strategy is that over-reliance on a single enterprise can cause 
substantial financial risk. Other SHWs choose the opposite path: instead of focusing on one 
partner, they specialise in rapidly changing production processes which they can continuously 
adjust to the needs of new clients. 
4.6 Discussion 
In this chapter, we explored how NPM-style reforms have been introduced in the legislative 
framework concerning WISEs in Flanders, whereby we focused on how WISEs operate in 
relation to these changes. Building on the survey findings (presented in the previous chapter) 
on 43 WISEs, we also added a more in-depth qualitative exploration of organisational 
strategies on 21 WISEs. On the whole, this chapter provides an empirical contribution to the 
literature on organisational strategies in a context of intense policy interaction with 
government. There are some important limitations to our data collection. Concerning the 
survey results, the same considerations as discussed in the previous chapter hold here as 
well: the data are self-reported, based on perceptions, and originate from a single source 
(managers of the WISEs). The qualitative data have the same limitations, and thus also do 
not include the perspective of other members of the organisations (e.g., board of directors, 
trainers, target-group employees).  
 
WISEs have gradually become institutionalised in the state structures and their labour market 
policies. Over the last four decades, social and sheltered workshops have organised 
themselves in peak associations, have gained access to public funding in exchange for 
providing employment and vocational training for disadvantaged workers, and together with 
the Flemish government, they have initiated an institutional reform towards becoming a unified 
sector. This chapter has briefly described this evolution, pointing to the close interaction 
between sector and government in the development of WISE policies as well as the gradual 
institutionalisation of the sector in the government’s labour market policies. We then focused 
115 
on the latest legislative reform, which forms the preliminary culmination of this historical 
institutional change. We argue that it is preliminary since some questions remain open: given 
the fact that SOWs and SHWs are now regulated by a single legislative framework, will they, 
in fact, also start mixing their target-group employees? Also, despite some early attempts, the 
two main peak associations have as of yet not merged and remain separate entities. Given 
the importance of peak associations in the Flemish context, this could be a crucial factor in 
the further evolution of the sector.  
 
Based on our survey results, we concluded in the previous chapter that peak associations 
remain important policy actors although we could not say what the outcome of their advocacy 
work was. For WISEs, we found that peak associations are their most important advocacy 
strategy. In fact, this chapter shows that peak associations were actively involved in the 
development of the latest legislation, starting with their calls for unification more than fifteen 
years ago. They were closely involved during the negotiations and have continuously been 
involved in further evaluation of the new instruments (e.g., ICF screening). We cannot say 
which aspects of the resulting legislative framework can be assigned to the influence of the 
peak associations. The complexity of the policy development was too extensive for this, and 
our case study did not entail a complete tracing of the policy process. However, we learned 
from our interview that the policy framework is both a political (see reintegration) as well as an 
administrative compromise (see the ICF screening).  
4.6.1 A new public management for WISE? 
To discuss the impact of NPM-style reforms, this chapter presented an analysis of the new 
regulatory framework. Starting from the WISE Decree, we found three key NPM elements that 
were introduced: the standardisation of the eligibility criteria (ICF screening), the emphasis on 
reintegration and the emphasis on organisational management tools. 
a.  Reintegration 
Of these three, reintegration is the element that has gathered the most political discussion. It 
concerns directly the ideological discussion regarding the function of WISEs: do they employ 
disadvantaged workers because of their inherent value (i.e., providing a sense of belonging 
and meaning through labour), or are WISEs primarily a training ground for future employment 
elsewhere (i.e., socialising disadvantaged workers in labour market discipline)? Formally, the 
WISE Decree and its ensuing ordinances emphasise the reintegration process, setting certain 
terms and expectations for the evaluation of WISE employees. At the same time, the 
legislation is layered, providing new nuances and criteria, that leaves some room for 
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manoeuvre for both administrators and organisations. It is the result of political compromise,  
balancing the discursive emphasis on reintegration with the concern for contextually situated 
evaluation. Still, future governments can use the administrative tools at their disposal to further 
narrow the criteria for reintegration. Turning to how WISEs deal with these formal demands in 
practice, we see that most of the managers agree with the idea of reintegration but dismiss 
the expectation that much higher numbers can be achieved. Even though WISEs have 
become institutionalised in the state structures, they do not passively accept the political shift 
concerning integration policy. Institutionalisation has not led to submissive orientation. This 
dismissal of the formal framework is not only driven by their past experiences with 
reintegration, but also by the belief that many workers would not be able to function in a normal 
labour environment and that these normal enterprises are not willing to adapt to these workers. 
Moreover, there is doubt concerning the capacity of administrators to properly evaluate WISE 
employees with regards to reintegration. Thus, the dismissive strategy that we identified stems 
from this combination of experience, strongly held beliefs and the doubt concerning the 
capacity for regulatory oversight. Yet, we also found that when organisational goals are 
aligned with the demand for more reintegration, these concerns regarding the administrative 
capacity are less at play: it is the organisational goal that drives the internal focus on 
reintegration.  
 
It remains to be seen if and how the change in policy discourse concerning labour market 
integration will affect future developments. If it is indeed, as one of the respondents mentioned, 
a sword of Damocles looming over the sector, the groundworks on which more NPM-style 
reintegration targets will be introduced. 
b.  Eligibility: ICF screening 
Regarding the ICF screening, we found that there is general acceptance of the core principle 
of creating objective criteria to assess whether workers are eligible for WISE employment. At 
the start of the formal negotiations with the government, both peak associations spoke in 
favour of more unambiguous and transparent selection criteria. Nevertheless, while there was 
agreement on the principle, the practical implementation remained unsure for some time. It 
was a proposal of the VDAB that brought the ICF instrument into play. Here, we see how this 
process has led to two strategies: organisations try to find informal ways of dealing with the 
new regulations, and at the policy level, the instrument is being refined through ongoing 
negations. Some WISEs seek to compromise with the labour market agency (by sharing their 
insights and expertise with local administrators), while others try to buffer the impact of the 
regulations (by pre-selecting or even pre-screening possible candidates).  
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We argue in our findings that the screening process relates more to the means than the goals 
of the organisations, and is therefore relatively more low-cost to adjust to, which leads to more 
compliance-based strategies. Furthermore, the administrative decision-making power of the 
VDAB gives WISEs little formal room to develop alternative strategies: without these 
administrative decisions, they cannot hire subsidised employees.  
c.  Management tools 
Overall, we find that when it comes to the use of management tools, WISEs are not responding 
to any specific demands in the legislative framework. Certainly, government demands include 
the use of specific management practices (quality management, human resources, strategic 
self-evaluations). Apart from these demands, however, we found a strong belief in the 
usefulness of business-like management tools, both in our quantitative and qualitative data. 
We see WISEs responding to how they believe the market in which they operate functions 
and to how organisations such as their own should function in this context. These expectations 
seem to play a larger role than governmental demands. There seems to be rather high 
flexibility in adopting new management techniques, which fits the hypotheses of our reduced 
model of organisational responses: management tools are clearly functional tools that 
managers believe can be adapted to the specific goals of the organisations.  
However, the question then remains: is the use of business-like practices and the occurrence 
of market-type relations always indicative of managerialism? When does management 
become so dominant that it can be seen as managerialism? Our case study focused on 
organisational strategies identified through surveys and semi-structured interviews with 
managers and leading professionals. However, at the level of discourse, we see that 
managers still ascribe strongly to their role in community building and their mission with 
regards to the WISE employees. Of course, one point of discussion is whether these 
managerial beliefs align with the experiences of the WISE employees themselves. Thus, in 
order to assess the dominance of management practices and ideas, more research is needed 
on how management strategies affect the WISE employees with regards to their individual 
development and their working environment. While we have gained some insight into the 
managerial practices of these WISEs, little can be said about their concrete impact on the 
social mission.  
4.6.2 Competition and strategic networks 
We found that WISE managers see their organisations as enterprises and that they emphasise 
that WISEs are expected by their customers to compete in terms of quality and price. Thus, 
even though our survey shows that in the social economy, competition is, on average, 
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considered reasonable, our interviews with WISE managers adds some more nuance to their 
understanding of competition. Moreover,  competitive expectations regarding WISEs (in terms 
of price, quality, production time, delivery) are not oriented towards either means (functional 
demands) or goals (ideological demand) of these organisations; they relate to both. 
Competition can relate directly to the extent to which the labour environment can be adjusted 
to the needs of the workers, which is why some WISEs opt for automation of production. 
Competition can also relate to how organisations handle their competitors in the markets. We 
found that in one particular region, WISEs opted to cooperate with each other. Others have 
opted for mergers or at least the sharing of certain administrative services. 
4.6.3 The roles of WISEs 
WISE managers report a higher focus on social capital and service delivery than on other 
roles. Indeed, they see themselves as enterprises with a specific social mission. This mission 
is primarily the employment of disadvantaged workers, but in many cases (in our interviews 
mostly the SOWs), their economic activity also reflects a concern for social change or doing 
things differently (e.g., reuse centres or sustainable agriculture). WISE managers report being 
less directly involved in advocacy and in striving for social or political change. In sum, these 
findings show how peak associations primarily serve as sectoral connections to policymakers, 
while the WISEs themselves are mainly preoccupied with managing the administrative 
dimension of policy work.  
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we looked at how organisations respond to NPM-style reforms, and as such 
we have expanded the research started in the previous chapter by focusing on a specific 
sector. We presented a formal analysis of the new regulatory framework regarding WISEs in 
Flanders, the role of the sector in the policy process and the organisational responses of 
WISEs in the implementation of the new regulatory framework. We argue that the negotiated 
policy process along with the room for manoeuvre by the WISEs in the implementation of the 
new regulatory framework confirms our finding of the institutional layering that occurs in the 
Flemish neocorporatist context: the elements of NPM that we identified operate next to or on 
top of the neocorporatist institutions, where negotiation-based agreements still form the core 
of the institutional framework and market-type elements are added to the institutional nexus—
which does not mean they are trivial. In fact, as we have seen, some reforms (such as the 
emphasis on reintegration’ and ICF screening) touch the core target group of these 
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organisations: the very disadvantaged individuals for whom these organisations are providing 
employment and training. 
 
What can we learn from this case study regarding the question of governance? In this 
dissertation, we started from a central proposition found in the literature on governance, 
namely that traditional structures (such as neocorporatist institutions of exchange) are 
increasingly coming under pressure by both NPM-style and NPG-style evolutions. In the 
previous chapter, we concluded that the traditional Flemish institutional exchange between 
government and civil society across three sectors remains rather stable, although identifiable 
changes are occurring in the margins that could theoretically further destabilise the existing 
institutional framework. In the current chapter, we looked deeper into a specific sector, asking 
how organisations deal with NPM-style reforms in their relationship with the government. We 
added the dimension of how not all of these NPM-style reforms come ‘from’ government ‘to’ 
civil society, but rather that throughout the policy process, new dimensions are introduced and 
compromises are established. Adding to this policy development, we see how WISEs have 
responded to handling expectations from various actors, both in government and in the 
market. Throughout this process, new elements have been layered on top of the existing 
negotiation-based institutional framework. We have provided ample illustrations of the 
complexity of steering modes and principles and the blurred boundaries between civil society, 
government and market. Our research shows the institutional mix at work through policy 
networks, strategic interorganisational networks, bureaucratic administrative oversight and 
market-type management and competition. This does not mean that the underlying traditional 
institutions have not been changed; it could indeed mean that there has been a qualitative 
shift in the governance institutions towards both more network-type governance (see the role 
of strategic networks) and more market-type governance (see the shift from CSO-based 
experimentation to enterprises). This shift would then have occurred on top of the existing 
network-type institutions (see the historical development of the sectoral peak associations) 
and market-type institutions (the blurry boundaries of the social economy).  
 
Some authors have argued that the way forward for dealing with this complexity of institutional 
mixing and layering lies in metagovernance. For these authors, the role of government lies in 
balancing different governance modes. To translate these ideas to the sector of WISEs, the 
government would face quite a challenge as it would have to deal with the well-documented 
tensions between social and economic goals (Vidal, 2010; Young, Searing, & Brewer, 2016) 
as well as balancing the market regulation of WISE and non-WISE economic activity. Still, the 
question would remain: who would be the metagovernor? In chapter 2, we discussed how 
Sørensen summarised the metagovernance literature in three positions: stimulating self-
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governance (hands-on), organisational networking (hands-off) or indirect governance (shadow 
of hierarchy). We argue that how WISEs have developed in the neocorporatist context of 
Flanders (a negotiation and exchange-based model), this sector has already developed a mix 
of all three approaches. Indeed, the hierarchical administrative and political framework is 
shaped through intense negotiations with peak associations. Organisational networking 
shapes how WISEs handle competition (albeit not across the entire Flemish region) but also 
how they exchange ideas, diffuse new management techniques and develop political 
strategies. Some of the core principles that were introduced in the current legislative 
framework were already formulated by the sector itself before formal negotiations started.   
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5 Living apart together?  
A multi-method study of the relationship between local 
government and civil society organisations in Flanders 
5.1 Introduction18 
This chapter explores the relationship between CSOs and government at the local level in 
Flanders. The issue addressed in this chapter connects to the research presented in the third 
chapter that focused on CSOs on the Flemish regional level: what is the current state of the 
local governance arrangements in municipalities and cities in a region that is considered to be 
neocorporatist? In our third chapter, we concluded that at the regional level our research does 
not suggest a strong destabilisation of the neocorporatist institutions. Of course, in that 
chapter, we focused on CSOs at the Flemish regional level. In this chapter we turn to the local 
level, in which we specifically focus on organisations that are locally active, meaning that have 
a reach within their city or its immediate environment.  
 
In this research, we build on Edward’s study on civil society (Edwards, 2014) which views 
CSOs as combining different societal roles: they not only generate social capital but can also 
provide services and goods, influence public policy, strive for social change or generate 
political action and awareness. Many believe that traditional civil society is eroding (Bauman, 
2000; Beck et al., 1994), and new types of initiatives are emerging that are often more informal 
and ad hoc (Brandsen et al., 2015). This change is part of a broader dynamic in society in 
which both the position of the government and civil society is changing, as argued by post-
structuralist (Marinetto, 2003a) or post-traditional (Lee, 2006) theories: society has become 
structured without a centre (Esmark, 2009; Luhmann, 1997, 2013), power has become 
diffused throughout a wide array of actors and structures (Castells, 2010a), and traditional 
institutions have become unstable and fluid (Bauman, 2000; Beck et al., 2003, 1994). In this 
process, according to Castells, the local and regional governments have gained importance, 
being “the closest point of contact between the state and civil society” (Castells, 2010a: 334). 
                                               
18 A draft of this chapter was presented at ARNOVA 2018: Pauly, R., Verschuere, B., & De Rynck, F. 
(2018). Living apart together? A mixed-method study on local governance in Flanders. 
http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-8601027 
 
Corresponding CSI Flanders spotlightpaper: Pauly, R., Suykens, B., & De Rynck, F. (2018). Lokaal 
middenveld: instrument of partner van lokale overheden? http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-8573634  
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Indeed, cities are often seen as a breeding ground for social innovations in both government 
and civil society (Brandsen, Cattacin, Evers, & Zimmer, 2016).  
 
Two issues follow from these changes that are particularly important. First, it is often assumed 
that new types of CSOs are forming and operating more informal and flexible than the 
traditional CSOs (Brandsen et al., 2015). Second, new types of governance relationships are 
assumed to emerge that are replacing the traditional neocorporatist institutions. Local 
communities and cities are said to have gained importance (Castells, 2010a), whereby local 
citizen initiatives are often pointed at as the newest form of CSOs (Igalla, Edelenbos, & Van 
Meerkerk, 2019). Yet, little is known of how much of the traditional landscape has eroded, 
what the scale of the new initiatives are and what the impact of these changes is on the 
relationship with local government (Brandsen et al., 2015: 3; Igalla et al., 2019). These issues 
are especially salient for the relationship between government and civil society in a 
neocorporatist setting. As discussed in chapter 2, in neocorporatist countries (e.g., Belgium, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Austria), the key issue is that CSOs form an integral part of the 
political system. In chapter 3 we have also shown that at the Flemish regional level, this 
neocorporatist system is rather stable, despite the literature on the destabilising impact of 
NPM, although we also saw that new NPM-style elements are being introduced gradually in 
the existing institutional framework. The question then is whether the societal changes 
identified in our literature review (chapter 2), and summarised briefly above, have had an 
impact at the local level on the relationship between local government and CSOs. 
 
This chapter provides a multi-method empirical exploration of the neocorporatist relationship 
between local governments and local CSOs. This exploration takes place in three parts: first, 
an empirical description of local civil society across different types of municipalities; second, 
a description of the institutional relationships between government and civil society; and lastly, 
a focus on smaller, non-metropolitan municipalities to identify whether new forms of CSOs are 
emerging in these municipalities and what (if any) the impact is on the relationship with local 
government. In order to provide answers to these issues, we constructed a mixed-method 
study that collects data from CSOs in 14 Flemish municipalities. As a first step, we constructed 
a database of 1757 CSOs. Secondly, we sent out a survey to all CSOs in our database (with 
a response of 413 CSOs). Thirdly, we organised focus groups in five non-urban municipalities. 
 
We will first discuss the particular contact of Belgium, including the issue of pillarisation and 
the debate on newly emerging citizen initiatives. Next, we present our methodology, followed 
by the measures used in our research and findings. We end this chapter with a discussion, in 
which we provide answers to our research questions, and the conclusion.  
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5.2 Local government and CSOs in Belgium (Flanders) 
In chapter 1 we argued that Belgium is a particularly salient setting for research on the 
relationship between government and civil society in a country with a neocorporatist tradition. 
We will not repeat those same arguments here, but we refer to the discussion. We have also 
discussed that this neocorporatist structure was historically interwoven with Belgium’s history 
of pillarisation: the tight coupling between CSOs, political parties and government 
representatives that is constructed around shared values or interests (Billiet, 2004; Huyse, 
2003). This system had its heyday during the 1950s and 1960s with many local CSOs being 
part of larger pillar organisations. From the 1960s onwards, Belgium has experienced a 
process of depillarisation, and the neocorporatist system of institutionalised exchange has 
been expanded toward non-pillarised CSOs as well. During the 1960s and 1980s, so-called 
new social movements challenged the existing Belgian (and Flemish) pillarised structures 
(Hellemans, 1990). They aspired to set new social issues on the political agenda: women’s 
rights, environmental challenges, third-world solidarity, equality and pacifism (Develtere, 2004; 
Hooghe & Billiet, 2004; Stouthuysen, 2004). Hooghe argues that these movements have 
gradually been integrated into the existing political system, setting a new agenda, creating 
more openness and bringing women into the political decision-making process (2004: 350). 
At the local level, the most prominent form of institutionalised exchange between government 
and CSOs are the so-called local advisory councils. Legislation by the Flemish government 
makes the formation of these councils mandatory for specific domains (spatial planning, 
culture, youth work, sports)19, and local governments are free to create others. These advisory 
councils deal with many different domains. Besides the four that were already mentioned, 
there are also councils on environmental issues, agricultural policies, local trade, childcare 
initiatives, education, international solidarity, senior citizens, and health and wellbeing, among 
others.  
 
Recently, there has been a growing debate on the emergence of so-called new types of CSOs. 
This can be seen from the grey literature in Flanders produced by CSOs and others which 
discusses a range of CSOs that are active as local or urban commons (Bauwens & Onzia, 
2017; De Rynck et al., 2016; Hautekeur, 2017; Holemans et al., 2018; Kuhk et al., 2018; Van 
Meerbeek, 2018), for which different names are used besides commons, such as citizen 
collectives, citizen initiatives or citizen action. CSOs discussed in these publications are mostly 
active in domains such as climate and sustainability, local sharing economy, social inclusion, 
                                               
19 Since 2017, a separate advisory council for sports is no longer required. When a local government 
wants to abolish this council, they are required to integrate it into the cultural advisory council (creating 
an advisory council for leisure).  
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energy, food production or agriculture. While many of these publications succeed in shedding 
light on local initiatives that might otherwise remain unnoticed, we must also critically assess 
what this means for our research. Indeed, while they offer anecdotal evidence of new types of 
CSOs, there is very little systematic analysis across different cities and municipalities. 
Furthermore, many publications focus on larger urban environments but can only offer some 
indications of non-urban or rural environments.  
5.3 Methodology20 
5.3.1 Mapping local civil society 
Our research took place in three phases. In the first phase, we constructed a database of local 
CSOs in different municipalities. These municipalities represent the different local social-
economic contexts in Flanders. We categorised the municipalities according to an often-used 
socio-economic typology of Belgian municipalities (Belfius Bank NV, n.d.) as the basis for 
constructing four different clusters: rural municipalities,  residential municipalities, semi-urban 
municipalities and cities. In order to make the construction of the database manageable, we 
randomly selected 14 municipalities from a total of 300 Flemish municipalities. Within each 
cluster, a fixed number of municipalities were randomly selected: two rural, three residential 
and five semi-urban municipalities and four cities. The full overview of municipalities and cities 
and their population numbers can be found in the appendix of this chapter. Considering their 
population size, the four largest cities were only partially mapped (about half of the population 
represented), which was compensated in the analysis by adding weights to our calculations. 
 
We focused on organisations that aim to generate some form of social change, perform a 
political or civic role in their city or provide some form of community or public service. As such, 
our focus was mainly on the domains of wellbeing and welfare (e.g., elderly care, help for 
people with disabilities, organisations for underprivileged people), the local social economy 
(energy cooperatives, labour care initiatives, housing cooperatives,...) and so-called 
sociocultural organisations (social rights movements, ethnic-cultural associations, political 
organisations, youth work, faith-based organisations, ...). Consequently, organisations that 
focused primarily on recreation (leisure time, sports, arts, ...) were not included. The research 
was done by combining existing databases and canvassing in the local communities. In a first 
step, existing databases were used, such as the national database for associations (KBO-
                                               
20 The data collection of this local research is the result of the joint efforts of the members of the CSI 
Flanders research consortium.  
125 
NACE), the database for sociocultural associations (SISCA), lists of members of local advisory 
councils, newspaper archives of regional editions of national newspapers, as well as 
databases of members from several umbrella organisations. Local administrators were 
contacted and asked to provide lists of local organisations in the many advisory committees 
established in Flemish municipalities. For each organisation, researchers checked whether 
they were still active in some form of online presence (website, social media account, up-to-
date contact details, ...). After this phase, researchers contacted local residents with an active 
knowledge of local civil society. Every researcher contacted local administrators, chairpersons 
of local advisory boards and community workers, where possible. These contacts were then 
asked to evaluate our existing list of local initiatives and asked about other initiatives or other 
useful contacts. Given our interest in new forms of civil society, these local contacts were also 
used to look for organisations that could be seen as new CSOs: initiated and organised by 
citizens, in which citizens fully participate and that strive for some form of social change. The 
result is a database of 1757 organisations, which represents a weighted size of 2581 CSOs. 
Table 16 provides an overview per municipal cluster (in the appendix to this chapter a full list 
of all included cities is provided). 
5.3.2 Survey research 
In the second phase of our research, we sent out invitations for an online survey: of the 1792 
organisations, 1660 had available contact details. These 1660 organisations were invited to 
take part in the survey, reaching a response rate of 24.9% (413 CSOs). When we did not have 
an email address, we sent out invitation letters (121 organisations) or invitations via their social 
media accounts or website forms (54 organisations). In our invitation, we asked for a person 
with a leading or managerial function of the organisation to fill in the survey, although we 
cannot confirm the position of the actual respondent. Invitations were sent out in November 
2017, reminders at the start and end of December, and the final results were collected in 
February 2018. We used a chi-square test to assess whether there is a bias according to the 
distribution of the number of CSOs across municipalities in the survey response in relation to 
the population. We did not find a significant bias (Chi² 12.667, df=13, p=.474) using the 
unweighted data. We categorised the organisations according to their main field of activity and 
found that youth organisations, ethnic-cultural organisations and faith-based organisations are 
underrepresented (Chi² 66.1, df=13, p<.001). Sociocultural organisations for senior citizens 
and adults are overrepresented, so are neighbourhood associations, environmental 
organisations, poverty-relief organisations and organisations that are active for global 
solidarity. Because of this thematic bias and because we only mapped part of the larger cities, 
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a weighting correction was made for survey analysis. Table 16 below shows the number of 
organisations per cluster. 
 
Overall, our mapping and survey cannot be representative of the entire local civil society in 
Flanders. Our mapping (14 out of 300 municipalities) is too limited to achieve this. However, 
our research does present the first overview of local CSOs across a wide range of 
municipalities and domains in Flanders. Thus, while we do not claim to generalise for the 
whole of the local civil society in Flanders, we are confident that the trends established in our 
research are sufficiently robust to contribute to the academic literature on local civil society.  
 
Table 16: Number of CSOs per municipal cluster 
 
POPULATION SURVEY 
Raw data Weighted data Raw data Weighted data 
Category n % n % n % n % 
Rural 87 4.95% 87 3.37% 29 7.02% 13 3.15% 
Residential 171 9.73% 171 6.63% 37 8.95% 27 6.54% 
Semi-urban 497 28.29% 497 19.26% 122 29.54% 81 19.61% 
Cities 1002 57.03% 1826 70.75% 225 54.48% 292 70.70% 
Total 1757 100% 2581 100% 413 100% 413 1000% 
 
5.3.3 Focus groups in non-urban environments 
In a third phase, focus groups in five municipalities were used to provide more insight into the 
dynamics of local civil society. This was especially driven by a debate with representatives of 
Flemish umbrella organisations during early presentations on our research project, who 
argued that in smaller and non-metropolitan municipalities, new types of CSOs were 
emerging. We randomly selected five municipalities in each of the non-urban clusters in our 
population: the rural (1 of 2), residential (1 of 3) and semi-urban (3 of 5). Our focus group 
design sought to bring in perspectives from within local CSOs as well as local governments. 
Thus, we set up two focus groups in each municipality: one with representatives of CSOs and 
one with local administrators and elected officials (mayors, aldermen). The CSO groups were 
constructed using our database. We purposely selected CSOs from different types or 
domains. For the government groups, we contacted the mayor and a local administrator and 
asked them to help select the appropriate aldermen and administrators. Table 17 provides an 




Table 17: Overview of focus groups in five municipalities 
Town GOOIK NEVELE BORNEM  DIEST 
HEUSDEN-
ZOLDER 
Cluster rural residential semi-urban 
Number of CSOs mapped 52 54 74 118 129 
Focus group participants (number of persons) 
Local CSO 8 8 11 8 10 
Local Government 2 4 5 2 4 
Heterogeneity of focus groups (local CSOs) 
Number of participants per type of organisation 
Pillarised 2 6 4 7 6 
- pillarised CSO for women   2 2  
- pillarised CSO for elderly  2 2 2 2 
- pillarised CSO for youth  1   1 
- Other pillarised 2 3  3 3 
Environment & Mobility 3 1 2   
Health & Sickness   2  2 
International Solidarity 2     
Other 1 1 3 1 2 
 
A key issue in designing focus groups is to ensure social homogeneity within the group while 
maintaining sufficient heterogeneity between the participants to discuss the issue at hand 
(Duchesne et al., 2013; Myers, 1998). The social homogeneity of the group was ensured by 
taking into account three criteria: all members are active volunteers in local civil society, they 
take up key roles within their CSO (president, secretary, core volunteer), and they are active 
in smaller non-metropolitan municipalities. We opted to prioritise the fact that these 
participants took up these key roles in their organisation over their individual characteristics, 
such as age, gender or education. To ensure sufficient heterogeneity among the participants, 
we selected individuals from different types of organisations (as shown in Table 17). Each 
group was designed to have individuals from pillarised organisations, ad-hoc action groups 
(when available), environmental organisations and others. We sent out invitations to 15 
organisations per municipality. In one case (Diest), most of the participants that responded 
came from the pillarised organisations.  
128 
5.4 Measures 
In our population database we included some variables to identify organisations by their field 
of activity and target groups. For the survey we constructed several variables that measured 
how representatives of the local CSOs evaluate some of the key components of their 
organisation and their relationship with the government. Firstly, we measured how the 
respondents perceived the roles of their CSOs in society. Secondly, we asked respondents 
about their CSO’s relationship with the government, which included the level of local funding, 
an assessment of governmental monitoring, the amount of personal contact with local 
government and the degree to which local governments can be considered partners. The 
focus groups were then used to discuss some of the results from our database and survey 
analysis. We focused on: pillarisation, interaction with local government and new forms or 
activities of CSOs.  
5.4.1 Fields of activity, target groups and ideological affiliation 
We categorised CSOs in different ways, using a combination of desktop research and survey 
items. When organisations were included in the population database, researchers assigned 
different codes according to three criteria. These criteria were identified through online desktop 
research. Firstly, does the organisation have a specific target group (youth, women, senior 
citizens, ethnic-cultural groups, people in need of care)? Secondly, is the organisation active 
in a particular field of activity (e.g., environment, mobility, poverty, sickness and health)? 
Thirdly, we identified whether the organisation was part of the traditional pillars (catholic, 
socialist, liberal) or other ideological organisations (Flemish nationalist, others). Lastly, we 
categorised whether the CSO was a religious or spiritual organisation (including houses of 
faith). Organisations can be included in different categories, but only in one subgroup per 
category.  
5.4.2 Roles and types of CSOs 
In order to assess the claim that CSOs might be under pressure to become less multi-
purposeful (Bode, 2011) we measured which societal roles CSOs take up. In this article, we 
focus on roles that were important for our research question considering our empirical 
selection of CSO sectors: social capital, political advocacy and service delivery. We presented 
a list of 17 items to respondents, which they could score from 1 to 5. We used factor analysis 
on this set of items, which resulted in three meaningful factors, and for each role, a reliable 
mean scale was constructed (see the appendix at the end of the chapter for a list of items and 
factor loadings). Furthermore, we asked respondents to describe their own organisations 
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according to a list of several types, which they could score from 1 (totally not) to 5 (very much). 
Here we measured to what extent respondents viewed their own CSO, among others, as being 
a citizen initiative, an enterprise or an organisation that historically belongs to a pillar. 
5.4.3 Governmental funding, monitoring and partnership 
In a neocorporatist context, CSOs are supported by considerable public funding. To assess to 
what extent this is true as well for local governments, we asked respondents what percentage 
of the CSO’s income came from public funding. We offered different response categories: 0%, 
1–4%, 5–19%, 20–39%, 40–59%, 60–79%, 80–94%, 95–100%. We also asked to what extent 
the respondents felt that their organisation was monitored by the local government, using four 
different items, each measured using a five-point scale: The local government ‘...monitors your 
activities’, ‘...monitors whether your finances are in order’, ‘...monitors the performance of your 
organisation’, and ‘...asks about your social impact’. Given the importance of the local advisory 
councils as part of the institutionalised exchange between government and CSOs, we asked 
respondents whether their CSOs participated in these councils (during the previous two years) 
using a five-point scale (not, once, several times, often, very often). Respondents were also 
asked to indicate how often they had personal contacts with local administrators or politicians 
(in function of their CSO), again using the same five-point scale (not, ..., very often). 
Furthermore, we asked to what extent respondents considered the local government to be ‘a 
partner with whom you collaborate substantively’.  
5.4.4 Focus groups: pillarisation, interacting with government, new CSOs 
In each of the five selected municipalities, we first organised a focus group with 
representatives of local CSOs. The focus groups with local government officials were 
organised afterwards and used to discuss the same topics but also our findings from the 
discussions with local CSOs. The CSO groups were divided into two parts. In the first part, the 
representatives introduced their organisation and their main activities, whereby all participants 
spoke in turns. In the second part, we introduced three topics to discuss, each accompanied 
by some results from our quantitative research: pillarisation, the issue of partnerships with 
local government (and the wider interaction with local government) and our findings 
concerning new CSOs or new initiatives. We discussed each topic by starting with a statement. 
Concerning pillarisation, the statement was: “We found that civil society in your town still has 
many of the ‘traditional’ pillarised organisations. Is this finding correct? Does it concern 
‘pillarisation in name’ but not in practice?” This statement was preceded by the percentage of 
pillarised CSOs in the municipality. Concerning the interaction with local government, the 
statement was: “For many local CSOs local government is a partner with whom they 
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collaborate substantively. Does this count for you as well? What does ‘collaboration’ mean?” 
We then used this topic to discuss the broader meaning of interaction with local government, 
including the role of the local advisory councils. Concerning the new forms of CSOs, the 
statement was: “We found only a few examples of innovation in your municipality. By 
innovation we mean new organisations or new activities within an existing organisation.” This 
statement was accompanied by illustrations of new organisations (local commons, local 
sharing economy, action groups) and new types of activities in existing organisations 
(traditional nature-preservation organisations organising local sharing initiatives).  
5.5 Findings 
Table 18 below presents the most important descriptive results from our database and survey. 
All results are calculated with a weighted correction, as discussed earlier. Below we will 




Table 18: Overview of descriptive findings from local database and survey 
  Municipal clusters n 
Target groups of CSOs All Rural Residential Semi-urban Cities 2581 
Youth 17.5% 20.7% 15.2% 12.7% 18.9%  
Senior citizens 6.0% 12.6% 11.7% 7.6% 4.7%  
Women 6.0% 8.0% 11.7% 11.5% 3.9%  
Ethnic-cultural organisations 5.2% 0.0% 0.0% 2.4% 6.7%  
LGBTQ 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8%  
Field of activity All Rural Residential Semi-urban Cities 2581 
Neighbourhood or city-focused 15.1% 1.1% 4.1% 8.5% 18.7%  
Sickness and health 10.4% 16.1% 13.5% 11.1% 9.6%  
Houses of faith 10.3% 5.7% 5.8% 11.1% 10.7%  
International solidarity 8.4% 9.2% 9.4% 5.6% 9.0%  
Social inclusion and poverty 8.0% 2.3% 0.6% 3.6% 10.2%  
Sociocultural formation and education 7.7% 16.1% 16.4% 14.1% 4.7%  
Environment and mobility 6.1% 9.2% 4.1% 5.8% 6.2%  
Other social activities 6.5% 3.4% 5.3% 6.4% 6.7%  
Religious or philosophical orgs. 5.2% 1.1% 7.0% 3.2% 5.7%  
Professions and economy 3.5% 1.1% 4.1% 4.0% 3.5%  
Political action or movement (others) 2.3% 0.0% 2.9% 1.8% 2.5%  
Roles of CSOs (mean scores, 1–5) All Rural Residential Semi-urban Cities n 
Social capital 3.71 3.50 4.00 3.79 3.67 413 
Service delivery 2.84 2.38 2.65 2.81 2.89 413 
Political advocacy 2.57 2.50 2.43 2.44 2.63 413 
Pillarised CSOs in population All Rural Residential Semi-urban Cities 2581 
No 72% 39% 45% 53% 82%  
Yes 28% 61% 55% 47% 18%  
Pillarised CSOs: Survey self-assessment All Rural Residential Semi-urban Cities 413 
Not at all 52% 31% 32% 38% 59%  
A little 7% 15% 4% 11% 5%  
Somewhat 12% 8% 25% 7% 13%  
Quite a lot 7% 15% 18% 10% 4%  
Very much 17% 23% 11% 24% 16%  
Don’t know 5% 8% 11% 10% 3%  
Proportion of income from local government All Non-metropolitan municipalities Cities 269 
None 20.10% 10.80% 24.20%  
Low (<40%) 51.70% 72.30% 42.50%  
About half (40–59%) 8.20% 7.80% 9.70%  
Large (>60%) 20.10% 12.00% 23.70%  
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  Municipal clusters n 
Governmental monitoring (mean scores, 1–5) All Rural Residential Semi-urban Cities  
govt. monitors your activities 2.42 1.92 1.75 2.51 2.48 395 
govt. monitors whether your finances are in order 2.41 1.27 1.68 2.13 2.59 393 
govt. monitors performance of your organisation 2.60 2.03 2.06 2.55 2.69 397 
govt. asks about your social impact 2.72 2.32 2.57 2.36 2.86 397 
Government as partner (mean scores, 1–5) All Rural Residential Semi-urban Cities  
govt. is a partner (collaborates substantively) 3.03 2.58 2.78 2.90 3.10 398 
Organisational autonomy (mean scores, 1–5) All Rural Residential Semi-urban Cities  
govt. does not intervene substantively 3.69 3.83 3.28 3.66 3.72 400 
govt. leaves CSO to pursue its goals autonomously 4.30 4.50 4.45 4.26 4.29 395 
Local Advisory Councils All Rural Residential Semi-urban Cities  
% of CSOs that are members of a local council 81.80% 92.30% 88.90% 87.70% 79.10% 413 
Attendance of confirmed members All Non-metropolitan municipalities Cities 338 
Not or only once 24.9% 21.5% 26.4%  
Several times 31.7% 39.3% 28.1%  
(very) often 32.3% 29.9% 33.3%  
don't know 11.2% 9.3% 12.1%  
Personal contacts (administrators/politicians)  
(since 2015) All Non-metropolitan municipalities Cities 364 
Never 15.40% 17.80% 14.40%  
Once / several times 50.00% 46.70% 51.40%  
(very) often 34.60% 35.50% 34.20%  
Citizen initiative All Rural Residential Semi-urban Cities 2581 
% of CSOs categorised as such 9.9% 6.9% 0.6% 7.4% 11.6%  
Self-reported assessment All Non-metropolitan municipalities Cities 413 
Not at all 37.3% 34.2% 38.6%  
A little 17.2% 19.2% 16.4%  
Somewhat 12.6% 15.8% 11.3%  
Quite a lot 9.7% 10.0% 9.6%  
Very much 16.9% 12.5% 18.8%  




5.5.1 Field of activity and target groups 
In the total population, the density of CSOs per 1000 inhabitants is larger for rural (avg. 4.4) 
and semi-urban municipalities (4.3) compared to residential municipalities (3.3) and the four 
larger cities (2.8). While cities thus seem to have fewer organisations per 1000 inhabitants 
than other clusters in our population database, we find that the diversity of CSOs in cities in 
terms of field of activity and target groups is larger, as can be seen in Table 18. A large majority 
of these local CSOs are part of a larger umbrella organisation (62.0%). In general, we see that 
most CSOs (>10%) are youth organisations (17.5%), organisations focused on their 
neighbourhood, village or city (15.1%), sickness and health organisations (10.4%) and houses 
of faith (10.4%). The least represented (<5%) are professional associations (3.5%), 
associations focused on political activities (2.3%) and LGBTQ associations (0.06%). By 
combining the non-metropolitan clusters into one category, we were able to correlate both 
fields of activity (0/1) and target groups (0/1) with this new variable (binary municipal type: 
city/non-city). We found some significant differences, although the correlations were all very 
weak, as can be seen from Table 19 below.  
 
Table 19: Correlation between activity and target groups with municipal type 
Variables City a 
1 Sociocultural formation and education -.173** 
2 Neighbourhood or city-focused .153** 
3 Poverty and social integration .124** 
4 Ethnic-cultural organisations .105** 
5 Senior citizens -.084** 
6 Youth .057** 
a Municipal type (city = 1, non-city = 0),  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
n=2581 
5.5.2 Multifunctional and post-pillarised? 
There are three roles of CSOs that can be distinguished from our survey results: social capital, 
service delivery and political advocacy (factor loadings and reliability can be found in the 
appendix of the chapter). We calculated mean scales (ranging from 1 to 5) for each of these 
roles. Overall, social capital receives the highest score (3.71), followed by service delivery 
(2.84) and political advocacy (2.60). We see this trend occurring in every cluster, as presented 
in Table 20. These roles seem to be consistent across the set of municipalities: even when 
clustering the municipalities in two groups (cities and non-metropolitan municipalities), no 
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significant differences between the two groups are found. We find that the more organisations 
are oriented towards one goal, the more they are oriented towards the other two roles, as can 
be seen in Table 20. This indicates that, at least in the perception of our respondents, these 
local CSOs combine different roles.  
 
Table 20: Correlation between roles of CSOs 
Variables a 1 2 3 
1 Social capital -   
2 Political advocacy .276** -  
3 Service delivery .311** .368** - 
a All variables are mean scales ranging from 1 to 5 
** Spearman correlations, p<.01 
n=419 (>413 because of weighted correction) 
 
We also measured to what extent certain roles were more associated with particular types of 
CSOs. In Table 21 we provide Spearman correlations for each of the roles with the fields of 
activity and target groups of the CSOs in our survey. First of all, we see that the organisations 
whose primary target groups are youth, senior citizens and women are negatively correlated 
with service delivery. And for youth organisations, this is also the case for political advocacy. 
Next, we see that ethnic-cultural associations report higher positive correlations with all three 
roles. The same for organisations on social inclusion, although the relations with service 
delivery is stronger. Other organisations that are positively correlated with political advocacy 
are political associations and professional associations. Surprisingly, neighbourhood 
associations are not more positively correlated with social capital. However, it must be 
emphasised that all correlations are (very) weak.  
 
In order to assess to what extent pillarised organisations still make up local civil society, we 
use both the assessment of the researchers (in constructing the database) and the self-
assessment by the respondents in the survey. The results can be found in Table 18. In total, 
28% of all CSOs can be considered part of the traditional pillars (catholic, socialist, liberal). 
Respondents in the survey report a higher number: 43% consider themselves to some degree 
part of a traditional pillar (all answers that are not ‘not at all’ or ‘don’t know’). This percentage 
is much higher for non-metropolitan municipalities than for semi-urban municipalities and 
cities. The percentages range from 61% in rural municipalities (61% self-reported) to 47% in 
semi-urban municipalities (52% self-reported). In the larger cities, the number drops rapidly: 
18% are pillarised (although still 38% self-reported). This difference is statistically significant, 
with a moderate effect size: using a binary variable for municipal types (non-metropolitan vs. 
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city), we find that cities are negatively correlated with the presence of pillarised organisations 
(r=-.326, p<.01).  
 
Table 21: Correlation between roles of CSOs and field of activity 





1 Youth .031 -.126** -.149** 
2 Senior citizens -.034 -.096* -.038 
3 Women .012 -.175** -.079 
4 Ethnic-cultural organisations .172** .117* .167** 
5 Neighbourhood or city-focused -.066 -.030 .020 
6 Sickness and health -.046 .138** -.045 
7 Houses of faith .060 .027 -.102* 
8 International solidarity -.175** .031 .122* 
9 Social inclusion and poverty .097* .215** .099* 
10 Sociocultural formation and education .038 -.02 .041 
11 Environment and mobility -.076 .022 .077 
12 Other social activities .057 .070 -.035 
13 Religious or philosophical orgs. .135** .091 -.036 
14 Professions and economy -.077 .061 .116* 
15 Political action or movement (others) -.072 -.090 .196** 
a All variables are mean scales ranging from 1 to 5 
b All types of activity and target groups are binary variables (1/0) 
** Spearman correlations, p<.01 
* Spearman correlations, p<.05 
n=419 (>413 because of weighted correction) 
 
The question remains how we should interpret these numbers. Do these numbers mean that 
in smaller and semi-urban municipalities, pillars still form the bedrock of civil society and as 
such an institutional connection between local government and civil society? Historically, 
pillars indeed formed a structural connection between individuals, organisations, political 
parties and the government. However, from our focus groups, we learn clearly that the 
numbers in our survey should not be interpreted that way. This structural dimension of 
pillarisation seems to be largely absent from the daily practices in local communities, although 
some effects remain. In our focus groups, almost all participants agreed that pillarisation does 
not determine the life choices for their members even though the organisations might in name 
still be recognisable as part of a pillar. As one participant expressed her view: “Oh, but that 
has nothing to do with it anymore!” Other participants in different groups expressed similar 
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views: “Pillarisation is over, all types of people come, it has nothing to do with the C [Christian] 
or Christian merchants”; “Half of our members are not socialist. They are even members of 
the CM [Christian mutual fund]. We are open for others”; “There are many participants of a 
different ‘ideological background’. People make choices now, regardless of pillars, they shop. 
That ‘stamp’ has passed”; “Pillarisation? No, we have people that are members of the ABVV 
[socialist union]. Which is good, because it results in discussion, and offers dynamics.” 
However, the discussion on the impact of pillars can still stir up discussion among some older 
members in the focus groups. In one municipality, we had several members of older age who 
remember their town as defined by pillarisation: “[the town] was run by the pillars. Now there 
is more cooperation. It used to be the case that if one got one thing, the other should get the 
same. With our members, that is still part of their thinking.” In reaction to this, others who are 
also part of local pillarised CSOs stated that this is really just the case for the eldest members.  
 
With regard to the connection between pillarised CSOs and political parties, even though most 
participants seem to think it is mostly gone, some doubts remain over some remaining effects. 
In the focus group in the smallest municipality, one member doubted that pillars have lost their 
local power. This town has the largest share of pillarised organisations in our database (63.5% 
of all CSOs, of which all but one are from the catholic pillar). Himself a member of the catholic 
pillar, he expressed his doubts over the loss of influence of local pillarised political 
connections, as he wondered why members of the local parish were part of a specific local 
advisory council. Still, besides this participant and the earlier-mentioned older participants in 
another group, there was a general feeling that pillars no longer enjoyed a privileged 
relationship with local governments. Our survey reflects this as well. We measured the 
frequency of direct personal contact with local administrators and politicians and found no 
significant correlation between pillars and the frequency of personal access.  
 
These organisations are then no longer pillars in the traditional sense. Our population 
database also shows that they are significantly more active for specific target groups: women 
(r=.237, p<.01), youth (r=.120, p<.01) and the elderly (r=.166, p<.01). They are significantly 
less active for ethnic-cultural organisations (r=-132, p<.01) and in the domain of social 
integration and poverty reduction (r=-.171, p<.01), local neighbourhood organisations (r=-
.251, p<.01) and environment and mobility (r=-.134, p<.01). Although these correlations are 
weak, they show a tendency of these organisations to be active in more traditional domains 
and less active in domains that deal with so-called contemporary wicked issues (climate, 
mobility, poverty, migration). There are signs that some of the Flemish pillarised umbrella 
organisations are trying to renew themselves. One Flemish organisation, once a traditional 
Christian women’s movement that has many local groups, has initiated an internal 
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organisational reform as well as a public debate concerning work-life balance (Wouters & 
Oosterlynck, 2019). However, whether this centrally initiated reform translates to the local level 
remains to be seen. In two of our focus groups, members of this organisation were present, 
and they indicated that several members of the local groups did not feel connected to these 
national initiatives: “Our board member goes to the meetings [on the Flemish level], but this is 
not really picked up locally.” Another member expressed that she felt a generational 
disconnect between the professionals of the regional organisation and its local organisations: 
“One time, we received a visit of two young ladies of which we could be grandmothers.” Their 
local group is mostly occupied with organising leisurely activities like flower arranging and 
cooking demonstrations. Moreover, when in the same town another local group of the same 
organisations was started by new younger members, she did not feel the need to engage with 
them: “Those are younger people, but we don’t hear from them (...) They think we’re just old 
grannies... but, of course, we are!” 
5.5.3 Governmental funding, monitoring and partnerships 
As shown in the table with our main quantitative findings (Table 18), 71.8% of respondents 
report that their organisation receives less than 40% of its income from local government. 
About 8% of organisations receive between 40% and 59% of their income from local 
government, and about one in five (20.1%) receive over 60% of their income from local 
government funding. We find that in the larger cities the proportion of CSOs that do not receive 
any local funding is significantly higher, although interestingly, in cities, the proportion of 
organisations that receive the most funding from local government is also higher. A chi-square 
test shows that these differences between the two types of municipalities (non-metropolitan 
and cities) are statistically significant (X²[3, N=269]=20.477, p<.000), although the effect size 
is rather low (Cramer’s V=.276). Indeed, even with these differences, the general view 
remains: both in cities and non-metropolitan municipalities most respondents report that less 
than 40% of their income comes from local government funding.  
 
We do find that higher public funding comes with more governmental monitoring: we find a 
moderately strong positive correlation between higher levels of government income and the 
degree of governmental monitoring (of their activities) reported by the respondent (rs=0.417, 
p<.01). However, given the generally low level of local government funding for CSOs, it is not 
unexpected that most respondents (60.7%) report that there is no governmental monitoring of 
their activities, while 27.2% report some level of governmental monitoring, and 12.1% indicate 
an ‘in between’ level of monitoring. When looking at the more specific types of monitoring 
(finances, performance, social impact), the same overall view appears, as can be seen in  
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Table 18. CSOs that are more oriented towards service delivery appear to experience more 
monitoring of their activities by the local government, although this correlation is very weak 
(r=.102, p<.05). Furthermore, local CSOs consider themselves autonomous in their 
relationship with local government (confirmed by 81.7%), although almost one quarter (23.5%) 
report that local government intervenes with their activities at least to some degree (63.3% do 
not believe this to be applicable for them; 13.1% report it to be ‘in between’). We also looked 
at the extent to which respondents perceive local government to be a partner. With a mean 
score of 3.03 (meaning ‘in between’ on a scale from 1 to 5), the issue seems unclear. Looking 
at the numbers in more detail, we find that 40.3% of participants agree with this statement, 
and a group of almost equal size (36.8%) states the exact opposite (the remaining 23.0% 
pointing to the middle of the scale: ‘in between’).  
 
While we found that pillarised structures do no longer structure the institutionalised exchange 
between local government and civil society, other forms of exchange are also important. We 
looked at the local advisory councils and the extent of personal contacts with local politicians 
and administrators. Most of the respondents report that their organisation is a member of one 
of the local advisory councils (81.8%), as can be seen from Table 18. In cities, this proportion 
of CSOs is somewhat lower (79.1%) compared to the non-urban municipalities (88.4%), but 
the percentage is still high and the correlation is rather weak (r=-.112, p<.05). While local 
CSOs are in general members of these advisory councils, this does not automatically ensure 
participation in the actual gatherings. Indeed, as shown in Table 18, we see that, from those 
who are members, about one in four CSOs (24.9%) have not or only once attended a council 
gathering in the two years before filling out the survey, while 31.7% reportedly attended 
several times, and about a third (32.3%) participated often or very often. One in ten (11.2%) 
are not sure about their participation. Concerning this degree of participation, we found no 
significant differences between municipal clusters or between types of organisations (field of 
activity, target groups). Looking at personal contacts with local politicians or administrators, 
we found that 34.6% report having had contact often or very often, and half of all respondents 
(50.0%) reported having had contact once or several times, while 15.4% of respondents 
reported having had no contact. We found no significant difference between types of 
municipalities.  
 
In the focus groups, we looked deeper into this relationship with the government, discussing 
what interaction with local government entails. First of all, when asked about what local 
government could mean for them, respondents mostly answered in practical terms. The main 
concern was the availability of infrastructure for meetings and activities. Local governments 
usually provide some form of infrastructure through cultural or community centres. Here, 
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concerns were practical in nature: the rent or prices for food and drinks might be too high, or 
the type of infrastructure did not suit their needs.  
 
The topic of local advisory councils provided a wide variety of experiences. As described 
earlier, these advisory councils have been installed following central legislation, and cover a 
wide range of domains. Most of the organisations in our focus groups participated in the culture 
councils, and participation seemed to be motivated by practical concerns: participation gives 
CSOs access to some limited financial compensation and technical support by the local 
government for organising activities. Not all committees suffer from the same passive 
reception. In one town, several CSOs were able to use the local council for international 
solidarity to establish an interorganisational dynamic between them. A driving factor here 
seems to be that one person was able to mobilise her familial and personal network in setting 
up activities and gathering funds. In another town, the committee on environmental regulation 
is a space for political debate. This became clear in our focus groups because two members 
were present, both on somewhat opposite sides of the political debate: one member of an 
environmental organisation (that manages local nature reserves) and one member of a local 
organisation of farmers. In the focus groups with local government officials, these findings are 
confirmed, yet also qualified. In two municipalities, officials voiced the concern that the political 
or policy aspirations of most CSOs are rather limited: not everyone who comes to the local 
councils is actively pursuing political or policy work. In another municipality, officials also 
pointed out that local governments have gathered more professional knowledge and 
experience over the years, which might impact the way they work with the input from these 
advisory councils. Still, some officials also recognise that local government could take a more 
active role here. This takes time and effort, and one official points out that this also requires 
working with administrators that have the capabilities to manage such a policy process in these 
councils. One mayor recognised the need for local government to improve its efforts navigating 
complex issues: “As local government, we have to take the initiative to put mobility on the 
agenda and to create dialogue and support. But that takes time and effort. And sometimes a 
complex issue like mobility becomes reduced to a small symbolic component like parking 
tickets.” 
 
In almost all of our focus groups, cooperation with, or support from, local governments was 
framed in terms of practical support or (often limited) institutionalised policy advice. We found 
little evidence in these non-metropolitan municipalities of active political or policy cooperation 
between civil society and local government. In two focus groups, we found CSOs with more 
active interaction with local government. These examples are project-based, such as a project 
on organising local low traffic roads and one project in which local heritage archives were 
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made digitally accessible. Thus, when our survey results show that a large group of CSOs 
(40.3%) report that local government is a substantial partner, our focus groups translate this 
in far less encompassing terms than the survey item suggests.  
5.5.4 Innovation: citizen initiatives and new ways of doing things? 
Innovation in civil society is often linked to the motivation of citizens for dealing with wicked 
issues, often in response to government or market failure (Salamon & Toepler, 2015). We look 
at innovation from the perspective of new types of organisations or activities that follow from 
this social innovation, e.g., the emergence of ad-hoc groups or informal local initiatives, 
whereby cities are usually seen as fruitful breeding grounds of innovation (Brandsen et al., 
2015). In our classification of fields of activity of CSOs, we found little evidence that cities are 
significantly different from other municipalities. Our database also contains an indicator of 
whether these organisations can be considered citizen initiatives (in Dutch: burgerinitiatief). 
This particular term is often used to describe new types of organisation, and its connotation 
points to some degree of social innovation (Holemans et al., 2018; Hurenkamp, Tonkens, & 
Duyvendak, 2006). In our research group we used the definition of ‘citizen initiatives’ as 
proposed in a research report by Flemish researchers Holemans and Noy (2016): (1) it’s a 
collective structure set for the long-term (thus excluding one-time projects), (2) it is initiated by 
citizens, not by other existing CSOs, local governments or enterprises, (3) citizens have 
control of the organisations (thus it’s not government that controls the strategic decisions), (4) 
citizens are actively involved in the production of the services, goods or activities of the 
collective (thus excluding organisations that in which most citizens are mostly passive 
consumers). We also asked the respondents in the survey to indicate to what extent their 
organisation could be considered a citizen initiative. However, we did not provide a definition 
to the respondents. The term was part of a list of 15 types (including other types like enterprise, 
historical pillar or interest group).  
 
Based on our definition, we identified 9.9% of CSOs in our population as a citizen initiative 
(weighted observations) as shown in Table 18. Cities have a higher percentage of these types 
of CSOs (11.6%) compared to the non-metropolitan municipalities (5.8%), but the statistical 
difference is very small (r=.088, p<.01). The self-reporting by respondents in the survey results 
in a much higher percentage. If we consider the responses from ‘somewhat’ to ‘very much’, 
39.2% of respondents perceive their CSO to be a citizen initiative. Respondents that seem 
absolutely positive (‘very much’) make up 16.9%. When we look more closely at that top 16.9% 
of CSOs, we find that 35.9% of these CSOs are part of larger Flemish organisations, even 
some members of the traditionally pillarised organisations. This list also includes more 
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traditional nature organisations, traditional youth or elderly associations, local welfare 
associations and a social work organisation. By combining the three highest responses on the 
response scale, we constructed a binary variable (citizen initiative = 1), which we used to test 
for correlations with types of activity and target groups. This resulted in some low positive 
correlations: neighbourhood- and city-oriented CSOs (r=.218, p<.01), youth organisations 
(r=.133, p<.01), environment and mobility (r=.163, p<.01) and equally low negative 
correlations: sickness and health (r=-.142, p<.01) and pillarised CSOs (r=-.154, p<.01).  
 
These results show that a large part of respondents seems to recognise their organisations in 
this new term, while our classification of citizen initiatives as researchers was much lower. In 
our focus groups, we discussed the presence of new organisations or activities and asked the 
participants whether they found our assessment on the low number of new types of 
organisations or lower levels of activity on certain social issues (climate, mobility, poverty) 
correct. These discussions did not result in finding activities that remained under the radar of 
our research. All of the new organisations mentioned in the focus groups were already listed 
in our database. It was interesting to see why respondents referred to some initiatives as new 
forms of CSOs. In one group, a local member of a Flemish environmental organisation did not 
realise that the relatively recent car-sharing initiative (organised by his own umbrella 
organisations) could be seen as an example of such a new initiative by an existing CSO. 
Overall, the discussion on what ‘new’ or ‘innovation’ meant was the most difficult part of the 
focus groups. It usually started with silence, followed by some hesitant responses. Mostly, in 
each focus group, we found some minor indications of new activities in existing CSOs, such 
as the aforementioned digitisation project by a local heritage group as well as the car-sharing 
initiative (both active in Gooik). In this group, participants also mentioned a local cooperative 
promoting sustainable energy production. In one group (Diest), participants particularly liked 
a newly established organisation that creates leisure activities in creative ways but found it 
hard to find other forms of innovation—the only organisation mentioned was a small 
community-supported agriculture  farm. In Heusden-Zolder, the participants especially liked a 
local initiative in which arts were combined with some form of formation or education, including 
a ‘cheerful centre for language activation and arts education’. They also referred to a group of 
parents organising after-school activities for their children as a form of innovation. In Nevele, 
a local youth organisation worked actively with children and youth with disabilities, which 
participants say is considered to be a leading example for others by their Flemish umbrella 
organisation.  
 
These examples from the focus groups show the wide range of organisations that were 
considered to be innovating in some way. We organised these focus groups to investigate the 
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claims that new types of initiatives were emerging not only in larger urban areas but also in 
non-metropolitan municipalities. Yet, in general, these five focus groups provided little 
indication of this. Besides these few examples, the most common reaction from our 
participants was that it is unclear what innovation means. When talking about some new 
organisations, it is also not always clear whether participants were talking about ‘new’ in the 
sense of CSOs that were only recently established, CSOs that were working in different or 
new ways (e.g., more ad-hoc, informal, flexible, etc.) or CSOs that were engaging with 
complex social issues (so-called wicked issues). At times it was even unclear for some 
whether some initiative that was being discussed was organised by the local government or 
by a local association.  
5.6 Discussion 
This chapter set out to empirically explore the relationship between local governments and 
local CSOs in a neocorporatist setting. We set out to answer three research questions: (1) 
what type of CSOs make up local civil society across different types of municipalities; (2) what 
are the institutional relationships between civil society and local government; and (3) what (if 
any) is the impact of new forms of CSOs on the relationship between government and civil 
society in smaller municipalities?  
5.6.1 Contribution and limitations 
The empirical contribution of this chapter is the combination of a large database of CSOs 
across 14 municipalities, followed by a large online survey of 413 organisations and an in-
depth exploration of key issues in focus groups in five municipalities. This provides us with a 
rich dataset of local CSOs across various fields of activities in various settings, from rural 
municipalities to the largest Flemish cities. Our research has some important limitations. 
Firstly, we sampled 14 of the 300 municipalities in Flanders, which means that we cannot state 
that our research can be generalised for the whole of the local civil society in Flanders. 
Furthermore, we opted to include a diverse set of municipalities, which means that we have 
included 4 of the 13 largest cities in Flanders, while only including 10 of the 287 non-
metropolitan municipalities. However, given the variety of CSOs and municipalities, we are 
confident that our findings provide a robust set of data to explore the key issues identified in 
this chapter. While not representative for the whole of Flanders, within our sample framework 
we can identify key trends and differences that are important to the discussion on local civil 
society and local governance. Secondly, our survey data are self-reported and originate from 
one source (a leading individual of the CSO). This means that the perspectives expressed in 
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our survey might be limited since they do not include the perspectives of other important 
members of CSOs (other volunteers or professionals). We must be careful not to treat these 
perceptions as objective measurements—while they provide useful insights, they cannot 
express what is going on in practice. Thirdly, we used focus groups to gain more insight into 
our quantitative findings. The findings from these focus groups results must not be taken as 
being representative of CSOs, but they serve to illustrate the various interpretations of the 
general trends identified in our quantitative research. 
5.6.2 A post-pillarised landscape 
Concerning the first research question, our mapping reveals a wide variety of organisations 
within an already selective sample strategy (excluding leisure, sports and arts) in a limited set 
of municipalities and cities (14 out of 300). On the whole, urban areas have a larger diversity 
in types of organisation, although with a lower density of organisation (CSOs per 1000 
inhabitants). We find that respondents perceive their organisation to be mostly oriented 
towards social capital, and to a lesser extent towards service delivery and political advocacy, 
although each of the roles we identified is at least to some degree confirmed. These roles are 
consistent across municipalities: no significant differences between cities and non-
metropolitan municipalities are found in our dataset. Thus, judging from the perceptions of our 
respondents, local civil society is primarily focused on social capital, whereby the positive 
correlations with the other roles suggest that the more one role is considered important, the 
more the other roles are as well. Local civil society thus seems to be multi-purposeful (Bode, 
2011): they see themselves as combining different societal roles. When looking at the different 
types of activities, we find that only two types of organisations are positively correlated with all 
three roles: ethnic-cultural organisations and organisations working on social integration and 
poverty alleviation. We hypothesise that one of the reasons is that their specific members 
experience higher needs in all three societal roles.  
 
We also see that the landscape of local civil society outside of the larger cities in Flanders is 
still very much dominated by pillarised organisations, although it no longer holds its historical 
meaning. In cities, pillarised organisations are the minority (fewer than one in five), while 
outside the cities between 47% and 61% of CSOs are pillarised organisations. At its peak, 
pillarisation meant living in a compartmentalised society, whereby individual members’ lives 
were fully integrated into the pillar “from the cradle to the grave” (Hellemans, 1990: 26). This 
is certainly no longer the case. The political aspect of pillars have also (almost) disappeared—
people no longer live their social lives within the boundaries of ideological organisations that 
are tightly coupled to the political system. They are no longer the platform for institutionalised 
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exchange between civil society and local governments. However, it is unclear what has come 
in its place, which takes us to our next research questions: How can the relationship with the 
government be characterised in this post-pillarised landscape? And to what extent are new 
types of organisations emerging?  
5.6.3 Interaction with local government 
Our survey findings show that respondents perceive their organisations to be highly 
autonomous in relation to the local government, with mostly limited financial ties and low levels 
of governmental monitoring. Access to local government is no longer organised by pillarised 
structures, as these pillars have mostly lost their institutional meaning at the local level. 
Institutional access through local advisory councils is well established, with most CSOs being 
official members of (at least one of) these councils, yet only a minority seems to be actively 
involved (in the sense of frequent participation), with a quarter of CSOs showing no or very 
limited participation. Focus groups show that especially the culture councils hold little political 
importance, but are considered more as tools for CSOs to gain access to practical support by 
local government. Other councils seemed to provide more space for political action, although 
the personal characteristics of the members were important for this to occur. Flemish 
municipalities have many different local advisory councils, all according to different domains: 
youth, elderly, culture, sports, environment, agriculture, public planning, international 
solidarity, etc. Not all of these councils function in the same manner, and our findings suggest 
that interpersonal dynamics can inject them with a positive dynamic. In addition, the survey 
respondents report that they can personally contact local politicians and administrators, which 
suggest that some degree of individual interaction between CSOs and local government is 
certainly attainable.  
 
Our survey was not suited to explore if and how CSOs were collaborating with each other or 
with local governments in networks or partnerships. We have only some limited indicators in 
our survey concerning this issue, and while our focus groups provided little evidence of such 
partnerships, they were limited in their empirical scope. Indeed, it is certainly plausible that 
innovative practices are mostly taking place in these types of networks between organisations. 
The research in this chapter, however, finds that while local governments are considered as 
partners for some, our focus group analysis suggests that two meanings of ‘partnership’ are 
at play: a partner that provides practical support (infrastructure, communication tools, technical 
support) and a partner that provides institutionalised spaced for policy advice. Both of these 
dimensions show only little evidence of a lively relationship. 
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5.6.4 A new civil society 
Using the term ‘citizen initiative’, we identified 9.9% of CSOs that matched the criteria: a long-
term collective structure, initiated by citizens, in which citizens have complete control, and 
where they are actively involved in the productions of the services, goods or activities of the 
collective. When we tested this same term in the survey, without providing the criteria, almost 
40% of respondents identified themselves as a citizen initiative, among which a number of 
traditional and even pillarised organisations. One reason for this positive score might be the 
current interest for this particular topic in the grey literature, spurring an increased awareness 
of the concept. It might also be related to more strategic reasons: some organisations might 
want to distance themselves from the label of ‘traditional CSO’ and position themselves as 
part of a new type of civil society, even from within the traditional structures.  
 
Our focus groups allow us to discuss the topic of innovation in more general terms. One of the 
issues that we found is that the meaning of ‘new’ and ‘innovation’ is not always clear for those 
active in their local civil society. Sometimes ‘new’ mostly means ‘young’, and what is 
considered new and innovative (for example, by young CSO-professionals) is not always 
appreciated by local citizens that have been active in their community for many years.  
5.7 Conclusion: living apart together 
Our study is foremost an empirical contribution to the literature on the relationship between 
local government and local CSOs in a neocorporatist context. Overall, the view that emerges 
is that of a civil society that has its own mission and activities, and of local governments that 
pursue their own goals and policies. Sometimes they meet in specific projects, but mostly, 
each stays in their ‘own lane’. At the local level, neocorporatist institutions do not generate an 
active institutional exchange on political issues. Indeed, we also do not find evidence of the 
trend towards more governance as identified in the literature (Sørensen & Torfing, 2018). One 
of the issues that we did not explore in depth in our research is the link between the local 
CSOs and their umbrella organisations. Given that 62.0% is a local group of regional or 
national umbrella organisations, this issue is an important part of local civil society. From this 
perspective, the relationship between these CSOS and the central Flemish or national 
government can in turn affect how local groups operate. Furthermore, while there is a growing 
literature on citizen initiatives (Igalla et al., 2019), we do not find a widespread emergence of 
these new form of CSOs. This might be explained by the claim of De Moor (2015) that these 
types of initiatives have less incentive to organise themselves in countries with more widely 
supported public services.  
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These findings lead us to questions on the current state of local governance. If, as is claimed 
by many, contemporary wicked problems (Head, 2008) require a dynamic collaborative 
interaction between government and civil society (Brandsen et al., 2016; Dente, Bobbio, & 
Spada, 2005; Hartley, Sørensen, & Torfing, 2013), then many local communities are facing 
challenging times. As argued by Brandsen et al. (2015), a possible solution might be found in 
the “manufacturing of a new civil society by the state” (2015: 5). Yet, our research already 
points out two major hurdles in assigning local governments with such a mission. One, local 
CSOs seem to be primarily focused on social capital and less on political issues. When local 
governments are more willing than civil society to construct new forms of interactive 
governance, they could possibly end up “flogging a dead horse” (Bekkers & Tummers, 2018: 
211). Yet, our research also points to new possibilities as we found that those organisations 
of people at the margins of society (ethnic-cultural minorities and people experiencing poverty) 
seem to be more attuned to political issues. Two, local officials seem to be more focused on 
their own policy priorities, and those that are willing to integrate more collaborative approaches 
indicate their own limitations and need to improve their knowledge in this regard. Further 
research could focus not only on what is needed to make collaborative governance work but 
also on how to overcome these hurdles in local communities where government and civil 
society only marginally interact on challenging political issues.  
 
In the next chapter, we will present our research on one of these issues: the collaboration in 
local networks that are taking on a wicked issue (providing shelter and integration for 
refugees). Whereas the current chapter provided a broad quantitative overview across 
municipalities, the next chapter will use qualitative methods in three purposely selected urban 




5.8 Appendix to chapter 5 
5.8.1 Overview of municipalities sampled 
The four largest cities were partially mapped: 
● Kortrijk: the city centre, not the surrounding neighbourhoods. 
● Hasselt: the city centre, not the surrounding neighbourhoods. 
● Ghent: we used a random sample of the 25 local districts that are also used by the local 
government. In total, 11 districts were included (40% of the population). 
● Antwerp: three districts were randomly sampled (Borgerhout, Hoboken, city centre). 
In order to correct this partial mapping, analyses use weighted observations. The following table shows 
both the raw unweighted data and the weighted data.  
 
Table 22: Overview of the population and survey sample for chapter 5 
  
POPULATION SURVEY (*) 
Raw data Weighted data Raw data 
Weighted 
data 
Category City/Municipality Population n % n % n % n % 
Rural 
GOOIK (**) 9,238 52 2.96% 52 2.01% 19 4.60% 8 1.94% 
INGELMUNSTER 10,792 35 1.99% 35 1.36% 10 2.42% 5 1.21% 
Residential 
ZEMST 23,240 83 4.72% 83 3.22% 19 4.60% 12 2.91% 
NEVELE (**) 12,110 54 3.07% 54 2.09% 11 2.66% 11 2.66% 
SCHILDE 19,516 34 1.94% 34 1.32% 7 1.69% 4 0.97% 
Semi-urban 
HEUSDEN-ZOLDER (**) 33,156 129 7.34% 129 5.00% 32 7.75% 20 4.84% 
DIKSMUIDE 16,719 127 7.23% 127 4.92% 30 7.26% 19 4.60% 
DIEST (**) 23,612 118 6.72% 118 4.57% 36 8.72% 26 6.30% 
BORNEM (**) 21,129 74 4.21% 74 2.87% 15 3.63% 10 2.42% 
HAALTERT 18,262 49 2.79% 49 1.90% 9 2.18% 6 1.45% 
Cities 
ANTWERP 520,504 370 21.06% 666 25.80% 81 19.61% 109 26.39% 
GHENT 259,083 292 16.62% 584 22.63% 55 13.32% 66 15.98% 
HASSELT 77,124 181 10.30% 290 11.24% 44 10.65% 50 12.11% 
KORTRIJK 75,736 159 9.05% 286 11.08% 45 10.90% 67 16.22% 
  1757  2581  413  413  
(*) Invitations were sent to organisations for which contact details were available (1660 of 1757) 
(**) Municipalities in which focus groups were held 
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5.8.2 Roles of CSO: factor analysis and mean scales 
 








organising / promoting participation in politics 0.814   
(trying to) influence policymakers 0.812   
addressing policymakers on specific themes or problems 0.808   
making people (more) politically aware 0.790   
providing opportunities for citizens to express their opinions and views 0.737   
organising movement and action around social themes or problems 0.603   
participating in advisory boards and committees 0.585   
helping specific target groups with services they would not otherwise 
receive  0.847  
providing a service or product to relieve a specific social need or need  0.842  
offering services or products that would not otherwise be offered (by 
government or business)  0.792  
offering services to users/clients  0.744  
giving people the feeling that they belong   0.846 
offering people a place where they feel at home   0.815 
promoting a sense of community   0.789 
bringing together people from different social backgrounds   0.715 
engaging and mobilising volunteers   0.470 
Cronbach's alpha 0.878 0.853 0.803 
Mean (1–5) 2.575 2.844 3.712 
 
Respondents could score each item on a 5-point scale: 1 (‘totally not’), 2 (‘a little’), 3 (‘somewhat’), 4 (‘a 
lot’), and 5 (‘very much’). 
 
From an initial list of 17 items, one item (‘give voice to specific interests or social groups that would 
otherwise not be heard’) was dropped from the factor analysis because it had a significant factor loading  
(>.40) on two factors (political and community). After the removal of this item, factor analysis was 




6 Local governance networks and the challenge of 
the ‘refugee crisis’ 
Qualitative research of three urban governance networks 
providing shelter and integration for asylum seekers and 
refugees 
6.1 Introduction21 
In the previous chapter, we concluded that local governments and CSOs in Flanders were 
living next to each other and showing little interaction. While mostly based on quantitative 
exploration, our research suggests that government and CSOs mostly stay in their own lane. 
There does not seem to be a grand shift towards more governance in the towns and cities that 
were included in our research. This chapter moves beyond the question of whether traditional 
institutions have been replaced by more governance-type institutions. Instead, we now ask: If 
interactive or collaborative governance occurs, what would be its impact on local government 
and local civil society?  
 
In order to examine this question, the key is to identify local networks that can qualify for more 
in-depth research. We will use the term ‘local governance networks’ to describe those 
arrangements of interactive governance that have been broadly discussed in the literature. 
Two contextual criteria are important when selecting local governance networks for our 
research: their substantive and spatial dimensions. Substantively, local networks are often 
proposed as governance institutions that deal with wicked problems (Sørensen & Torfing, 
2019; Vermeiren, 2018), whereby the need for new or innovative types of governance are 
often linked to the inability of existing ‘traditional’ governance to deal with these complex social 
issues (Hartley et al., 2013; Head & Alford, 2015). Spatially, these innovations in governance 
are often linked to cities (Brandsen et al., 2016), driven by the fact that in a globalised and 
                                               
21 A draft of this chapter was presented at ARNOVA 2019:  Pauly, R., Hitchins, T., Verschuere, B., & 
De Rynck, F. (2019). “Innovation or business-as-usual?  Local governance dealing with the refugee 
crisis”. http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-8636844  
   
Corresponding CSI Flanders spotlightpaper: Pauly, R., Hitchins, T., Verschuere, B., & De Rynck, F. 
(2020). Lokale netwerken voor opvang en begeleiding van asielzoekers en vluchtelingen tijdens de 
‘opvangcrisis’. https://www.middenveldinnovatie.be/publicaties  
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functionally differentiated world, cities are the place where government and civil society 
interact closely (Castells, 2010a) and where there is more room for “institutional design 
experiments” (Sørensen & Torfing, 2019: 2). Cities in the modern world are “a theater of global 
transformation, including the ways of how people come together, define a common agenda 
and collectively act to achieve their goals” (Domaradzka, 2018: 608).  
 
In this chapter, we present empirical research on three local governance networks in urban 
areas in Flanders dealing with the wicked issue of providing shelter and integration for asylum 
seekers and refugees during the so-called refugee crisis of 2015–2016. We set out to answer 
the following research question: how do local governance networks take on wicked problems 
in European neocorporatist cities and how does this impact local CSOs and governments? In 
the following, we will first discuss how we understand local governance networks and the role 
of cities in migration and integration policies. Next, we present our case study and 
methodology. After presenting our main findings we discuss the impact of local governance 
networks on government and CSOs.  
6.2 The ‘refugee crisis’ in European cities 
When it comes to dealing with wicked problems, migration can certainly be counted as one. 
Our case study focuses on local governance networks that became active during the so-called 
refugee crisis that started in 2015–2016 across Europe. Given the rapid arrival of many new 
migrants during this period, many European cities had to organise refugee shelters and social 
services in a relatively short amount of time, either by extending existing or setting up new 
services and infrastructure. The number of asylum seekers in the European Union was already 
steadily rising in the years before 2015 (from 263,835 in 2009 to 626,960 in 2014), but in 2015, 
the inflow more than doubled and remained high in 2016 (1,322,845 in 2015; 1,260,910 in 
2016) (Eurostat, 2019). Due to the lack of a coherent EU strategy for the distribution of 
refugees coming to Europe (Haverkamp, 2018), the number of asylum seekers varies widely 
between countries, whereby Germany has seen far higher numbers than the UK, the 
Netherlands, France or Belgium. In Belgium, the number of asylum seekers also doubled 
between 2014 (22,710) and 2015 (44,660) and decreased again in 2016 (18,280) (Eurostat, 
2019). Across Europe, local governments and CSOs organised a wide array of services and 
infrastructure for the newly arrived immigrants (Mayblin & James, 2019; Mayer, 2018; Meyer 
& Simsa, 2018; Vandevoordt, 2019).  
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Migration is mostly associated with the authority and competence of national governments, 
and cities might be considered primarily as the places where national policies are implemented 
by state-led actors. This would be a short-sighted view, however, as many authors suggest 
(Doomernik & Ardon, 2018; Doomernik & Glorius, 2016; Hinger, Schäfer, & Pott, 2016). 
Migrants do not just live in nation-states; they live in cities, form their own social networks and 
are part of local communities (Borkert & Caponio, 2010). Based on her research in Germany, 
Margit Mayer states that local authorities often have to fill in the gaps left by the national 
government: “The recent scale of arrivals and the slow reaction of national authorities have 
often left cities at the forefront, forcing them to play a role without having either a legal mandate 
or any specific budget to do so” (Mayer, 2018: 234). This local role should not only be seen 
as the result of failed national policies or local ‘gap filling’. A distinct local politics concerning 
migration and integration can point to a certain decoupling (Peace & Meer, 2019) of local 
migration and integration policies. This difference can be the result of pragmatic choices made 
by local authorities in dealing with the consequences of international migration in their cities 
(Duyvendak & Scholten, 2011). Others have argued that cities can develop their own local 
policies not merely out of practical necessity, but also because of diverging politics or 
competing institutional logics (Jorgensen, 2012; Poppelaars & Scholten, 2008). This not only 
concerns how to provide shelter and support for migrants but extends to questions of 
citizenship as “cities have become important arenas for the enactment of urban citizenship 
through the social inclusion of non-citizens like the undocumented” (Lambert & Swerts, 2019: 
91). Cities can actively shape the rights of migrants (Agustín & Jørgensen, 2019; Fauser, 
2019; Oomen & Baumgärtel, 2018). For instance, sanctuary cities often develop local policies 
that oppose more exclusionary national policies (Bauder, 2017).  
 
Civil society plays a crucial role for newly arrived migrants. A recent literature review identified 
the many ways in which CSOs provide support for migrants (Garkisch, Heidingsfelder, & 
Beckmann, 2017). Leaving aside the domain of research, there are three main clusters of 
activities: providing (basic) services, developing capacities and giving voice. If we compare 
these roles to our research on the roles of local CSOs in chapter 5, we would have categorised 
the first two clusters as service delivery, while the last cluster would have been categorised 
as political advocacy. The relationship between CSOs and local government can be crucial 
for the development of the CSOs. Vandevoordt (2019) argues that the political discourse and 
policy regulations at the federal level both activate and restrict local CSOs. On the one hand, 
local CSOs respond to what they perceive to be crucial shortcomings of federal and/or Flemish 
policies and are thus activated by this government failure. On the other hand, shifting federal 
policies (i.e., closing refugee shelters in certain cities) made it impossible for these networks 
to institutionalise their presence as part of the local governance system. The development of 
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local initiatives can be severely limited by the national policy framework, yet still have 
substantial localised effects in their urban communities: “In this sense, eroding migrants’ rights 
and fostering civil solidarity appear as two sides of the same coin” (Vandevoordt, 2019: 115). 
Of course, there are different logics and strategies within civil society as well. For example, 
Lambert and Swerts (2019) show how the tension between professional and activist CSOs 
can have a significant impact on the public debate. They show how in their case study, 
cooperation with the local government led professional organisations to adopt a more 
depoliticised discourse. Local CSOs also engage in interorganisational cooperation or local 
governance networks (Strokosch & Osborne, 2017). However, empirical research on the 
interaction with local governments in governance networks remains scarce (Garkisch et al., 
2017).  
6.3 Local governance networks 
This dissertation understands local governance networks in an agnostic sense, as we have 
discussed in chapter 2, which means that we do not see networks as essentially trust bases 
that are innovative in and of themselves. Using a definition by Sørensen and Torfing, local 
governance networks in this chapter are understood as a set of relations formed by 
interdependent (public and private) and autonomous actors, who organise themselves non-
coercively (i.e., horizontally) in the pursuit of one or more public goals (Sørensen & Torfing, 
2007). Not all networks have the same ambitions; they range from short-term goals to long-
term systemic change. Keast and Brown (2007) propose to differentiate between three 
degrees of horizontal integration, from cooperation (short-term information exchange) through 
coordination (medium-term, actors remain separate but contribute to joint action with a specific 
goal) to collaboration (longer-term, high interdependency, working towards systemic change). 
How to form local collaborative governance networks can depend on different factors, as 
identified by Ansell and Gash (2008): suitable starting conditions, the characteristics of the 
collaborative process itself, the presence of leadership, the institutional design, and the 
outcome. In this chapter, we will explore three issues that impact the functioning of local 
governance networks: boundary spanning, the role of political leadership and the issue of 
depoliticisation. The first issue, boundary spanning, deals with the flow of information and 
resources that makes governance networks function (Van Meerkerk, 2014). The second issue, 
political leadership, has been found to be important not only for organisations but for 
governance networks as well (Ricard, Klijn, Lewis, & Ysa, 2016; Sørensen & Torfing, 2019). 
The third issue, depoliticisation, is of particular importance for governance networks as they 
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run the risk of prioritising consensus building over dealing with divisive political issues 
(Sørensen & Torfing, 2017).  
6.3.1 Boundary spanning  
Governance networks are about exchanging information and resources, which is not an 
abstract process but concerns concrete organisations and people who are making decisions 
about how to work in the network. Boundary spanning refers to the combination of the three 
related activities: linking people and processes of different organisations, finding relevant 
information for the organisation in the wider networks and translating information from outside 
the organisation for use inside the organisation (Van Meerkerk, 2014). In sum, boundary 
spanning means proactively crossing the boundaries between the organisations in the 
network. Boundary spanning can thus be seen as a function in the network, a role that is taken 
by the actors in the networks or a type of activity that shapes the network. From the perspective 
of the organisations in a governance network, boundary spanning can take place on different 
organisational levels: frontline professionals, managers and leaders (Williams, 2013). In the 
case of our research, this means that on three levels, boundary spanning can be attributed to 
administrators and politicians in local government, as well as volunteers, professionals and 
managers of CSOs.  
6.3.2 Political leadership 
A lot of research focuses on how new forms of leadership can contribute to governance 
networks by bringing the relevant actors together, managing varying expectations and 
different interests, dealing with conflict or building trust. In contrast to top-down leadership, 
this network-type leadership is often referred to as facilitative leadership (Ansell & Gash, 2008; 
Bussu & Bartels, 2014), political leadership (Denters, Steyvers, Klok & Cermak, 2018; 
Greasley & Stoker, 2008), political interactive leadership (Sørensen & Torfing, 2019) or 
adaptive and collaborative leadership (Head & Alford, 2015). However, Cepiku and 
Mastrodascio point out that the literature on leadership in networks “tends to assume that 
network leadership needs to be different, but with little empirical evidence to support this” 
(2019: 5), although their own research does suggest a difference between single-agency 
leadership and networks.  
 
Thus, while leadership is increasingly seen as an important element for analysing governance 
networks, it can be hard to offer a clear description of exactly what it is and how leadership 
works in a governance network. In this chapter, we will use a description by Ricard et al. (2016) 
who identified several leadership styles and summarised the main characteristics of the 
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network governance leadership as “one of facilitating, activating actors and necessary 
resources, and enhancing their collaboration” (2016: 7). As such, leaders “have to build trust 
and cooperation among actors with different perceptions of problems in question, different 
ideas about the most desirable solutions to them and different interests” (2016: 7).  
6.3.3 Depoliticisation 
In chapter 2 we have argued that governance runs the risk of becoming depoliticised, i.e., the 
pursuit of a shared consensus dominates the networks at the expense of more deliberate and 
potentially divisive political action (2.3.3c. , page 58). This issue is particularly salient in the 
context of migration and integration. As we have discussed in the previous paragraph, the 
politicisation of migrants in the city can vary from pragmatic concerns to decoupling policies 
that aim for more inclusionary politics in opposition to national regulation (e.g., Agustín & 
Jørgensen, 2019). In the cases of governance networks, both governmental actors and CSOs 
are engaging in dealing with issues that can be politically divisive, e.g., housing for refugees, 
labour rights or cultural diversity. Depoliticisation occurs when CSOs would no longer put this 
issue on the agenda of the network but instead would opt for a manageable consensus and 
less conflict (Lambert & Swerts, 2019). Whereas boundary spanning and political leadership 
can contribute to the functioning of the network, depoliticisation is usually seen as part of the 
outcome, in the sense that working in networks might result in depoliticising the issue at hand.  
6.4 Methodology 
6.4.1 Case selection 
We focus on the issue of refugee policies formed in the wake of the so-called recent refugee 
crisis through a comparative case study of local governance networks in three cities in 
Flanders. In the Belgian federal state, regulations concerning refugees and asylum seekers 
are divided across the federal (i.e., asylum applications and organising shelter), Flemish (i.e., 
integration services) and local (i.e., implementation of both federal and Flemish refugee 
policies) level. We chose cities within the same subnational system (Flanders) since this 
provides our cases with a similar supralocal regulatory framework. Furthermore, we opted to 
select cases in cities that are considered to be central cities by the Flemish government, which 
means that each city has a central role in their respective regional urban system. In each of 
these three cities, a refugee shelter was erected in the wake of the inflow of asylum seekers 
and refugees in 2015. In order to empirically examine our research questions, we needed to 
be able to identify cities in which at least some minimal form of governance networks were 
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active. In sum, we selected cases that are similar in environmental context but dissimilar in 
local institutional characteristics. This allowed us to examine the explanatory power of 
institutional characteristics regarding possible differences in how these local governance 
networks impact governments and CSOs. 
 
There are 13 ‘central cities’ in Flanders, and we used our criteria to discuss possible suitable 
cities with a representative of a Flemish umbrella organisation working with refugees and local 
CSOs. They have close contacts with CSOs in many Flemish cities, either as members or as 
partners. Together, we identified three possible locations: Ghent, Mechelen and Sint-Niklaas.  
 
6.4.2 Data collection 
We conducted 25 in-depth interviews with 34 key local actors in the three cities (see Table 24 
below). We started our selection by identifying local actors through desktop research for each 
city, using public lists available from local government and Flemish umbrella organisations. In 
each city, we asked respondents which other actors they deemed relevant for our research 
purposes, which we then invited for an interview. Data collection took place between March 
and August 2019. Due to practical considerations, we were not able to interview every involved 
actor (the Appendix provides a full list of all actors that are formally acknowledged as part of 
the local networks). Instead, we focused on those that were considered central or key actors 
by the network participants we spoke to. The interviews were semi-structured and followed a 
topic list which contained three main topics: the role of the respondent in the organisation and 
a history of the organisation, the relationship with local government or CSOs (depending on 
the respondent) and questions on the functioning of the network and their role and history in 
the network. The interviews focused on the formation of the network (2015–2016) and the 
evolution of the networks until early 2019. For each case, a timeline of events was 
reconstructed by the author (using desktop research) and used to discuss the history of the 
network, each time further fine-tuning and correcting the timeline. When information on the 
history of the organisation was available beforehand, we used a similar approach to discuss 
the evolution of the organisation. On the topic of the relationship with the government, we 
focused on identifying the relevant governmental actors and the perceptions of the 
respondents regarding their relationship. We also discussed their sources of income. 
Concerning the network, besides the history of the network, the interviews served to gather 
information on identifying the key actors of the network (both from government and CSOs), 
the role of the CSO in the network, the various arenas of the network (where were decisions 
made, where did exchange occur), as well as the role of formal rules and informal practices.  
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Table 24: Interviews conducted in each city 
 Ghent Sint-Niklaas Mechelen 
persons interviews persons interviews persons interviews 
Local government 5 4 5 3 6 3 
Other government - - - - 2 1 
CSO 4 3 7 6 5 5 
Total 9 7 12 9 13 9 
 
6.5 Brief overview of the cases 
6.5.1 Migration, shelter and integration policies in Belgium and Flanders 
In Belgium, the policies regarding migration, asylum and integration are diffused across 
different governments. We will highlight some key issues here. The Belgian federal 
government has authority over migration and the provision of shelter. The Flemish subnational 
government has authority over integration services and has also mandated that local 
authorities take up a governance role regarding the organisation of local integration services.  
 
Federal regulation on the provision of shelter is implemented by the federal agency Fedasil. 
Shelter in Belgium is provided in two forms: individual and collective shelter. Individual shelter 
is provided in a single housing unit, even if several housing units are situated in the same 
building. Collective shelter is provided in reception shelters for a larger number of people. By 
the end of 2018, most asylum seekers were housed in collective shelters (64% of 21,190 
available places, based on numbers from Fedasil) (Fedasil, n.d.). The available infrastructure 
for shelter has been the subject of volatile political decisions, leading to a reduction in 
permanent shelters between 2012 and 2015 that were steadily maintained in the years after, 
whereas in the wake of the crisis, temporary shelters filled in the gaps and were being closed 
down again from 2017 to 2019. In the meantime, places in individual shelters were being 
reduced in favour of a policy of housing asylum seekers in collective centres (Fedasil, 2019). 
Fedasil either manages these collective shelters itself or assigns contracts to private actors, 
usually the Red Cross (at the end of 2019, 37 of the 60 collective shelters were managed by 
private nonprofit actors). This policy of contracting out the organisation of shelters was also 
put to use in the wake of the crisis in order to be able to establish new centres more quickly. 
In all three cities in our case study, temporary shelters were installed. In Mechelen and Sint-
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Niklaas, the Red Cross managed the centre; in Ghent, centre management was assigned to 
G4S Care, a private for-profit corporation. 
 
The Flemish government had restructured the field of integration organisations in the years 
before the crisis, which resulted in a new legislative framework in 2013. Following this reform, 
the Flemish Agency for Integration was created in 2015 and became responsible for the 
implementation of the integration policies (as stated by the law in 2013). Historically, this field 
was the domain of many CSOs, often in cooperation with local or provincial governments. The 
Agency replaces these services, further centralising integration policies in a more restrictive 
framework (Van Puymbroeck, 2016). The Agency is active across Flanders, except for the 
cities of Ghent and Antwerp, which were given their own local administrative agencies 
responsible for the implementation of integration policies. For our case study, this means that 
in Ghent, the agency In-Gent is responsible for implementing integration policies; in Sint-
Niklaas and Mechelen, this role is assigned to the Flemish Agency for Integration.  
 
Furthermore, the Decree on Flemish Integration of 2013 assigned local authorities with a 
governance role, stating that local authorities have to coordinate the relevant actors needed 
for their integration policies. This role remains somewhat unclear for local authorities, however, 
as they are unsure about what it means and how to implement it in practice (Deprez, Platteau, 
& Hondeghem, 2018). Aside from this specific role, municipalities in Flanders have some level 
of discretionary authority for policies regarding the integration of migrants (e.g., material 
support, housing, shelter, education, wellbeing). From 2016 to the end of 2018, the Flemish 
government provided local governments with supplementary temporary funding in order to 
expand local services for migrants in light of the higher number of asylum seekers. 
6.5.2 Description of the three networks 
Each of the local networks was formed in response to the so-called refugee crisis of 2015-
2016 when in each of these cities a temporary shelter was constructed. Two networks, in 
Ghent and Mechelen, were disassembled in 2018 when these temporary shelters were closed. 
In Sint-Niklaas, the local network was never disassembled as the temporary shelter was not 
closed as planned and was later estimated to have remained open until sometime in 2020. 
Table 25 provides a first brief overview of the three networks. Below we will provide a brief 
description of the goals and structure of each network. In the Appendix, a full list of the 




Table 25: Overview of the three local governance networks (2015–2018) 
 Ghent Sint-Niklaas Mechelen 
Structure Vertically integrated: 
- Steering committee 
(government) 
- Plenary meetings 




















a.  Ghent: Refugee Taskforce 
By the end of 2015, local government initiated a taskforce to prepare for the arrival of asylum 
seekers and refugees. The mayor delegated his competence to the alderman presiding over 
the Public Centre for Social Welfare (PCSW), who initiated the idea of mobilising a network of 
public and private actors. Many residents already began collecting goods to bring to the 
migrant camps in Calais (e.g., the local associations Victoria Deluxe and vzw Humain), which 
was later also initiated by residents for migrants arriving in Ghent (e.g., by the initially ad-hoc-
organised Heart for Refugees). At the time, the city of Ghent knew that the federal government 
would organise some form of centre for sheltering asylum seekers, although the precise 
location and date were still unknown. Local authorities had some experience with organising 
a centre for shelter in its own City Shelter Initiative (SOI), which provided temporary housing 
for asylum seekers that lived in precarious conditions. In September 2015, the first gathering 
of the Refugee Taskforce took place, where the alderman appointed a civil servant to be the 
administrative coordinator for the Taskforce. This administrator already had experience in 
local governmental social services and had worked for several years for the federal 
organisation responsible for asylum applications (Commissariat for Refugees and Stateless 
People [CVGS]). The Taskforce was established to bring together actors from both local 
government and civil society. From the start it was set up to be organised in three main working 
groups, focusing on shelter, integration and volunteering and awareness. The working group 
‘integration’ was further divided into subgroups that focused on particular domains (e.g., work, 
leisure, education, language, ...). Appendix 1 provides a full list of the various groups. By the 
end of 2015, the federal agency Fedasil had contracted G4S Care, a private for-profit 
159 
corporation, to manage the centre for shelter in Ghent. G4S Care renovated an existing prison 
ship (the Reno) and started providing shelter in March 2016.  
 
In the first instance, the Taskforce was used to invite CSOs that already had a working 
relationship with the various departments of local governments. Yet, various new initiatives 
emerged, such as vzw Humain (material support for migrant camps in Calais), Dine with Us 
(an online platform for inviting migrants for a meal at home with residents in Ghent), Critical 
Mass Ghent (a newly formed action group striving for cycling infrastructure, now organising 
bike rides for newcomers). A local action group, Heart for Refugees, gathered material goods 
for refugees and quickly grew into a central hub for providing material and social assistance. 
Refu Interim grew out of a local cultural organisation (Cirq) and provided migrants with the 
opportunity to volunteer at cultural events. These initiatives did not grow out of the local 
network, but the local network did provide opportunities to connect with other organisations 
and exchange information during gatherings. The initiative Heart for Refugees quickly became 
subsided by local government, which further stimulated the organisation, allowing them to 
employ a professional (albeit half-time). Furthermore, the city rented infrastructure where 
goods could be stored and which served as the physical meeting place for its networks—now 
under the name the Olive Tree, which opened in May 2016. In exchange for this support, the 
organisation was asked to open its activities for all residents of Ghent who were in precarious 
living situations, and other social services in the city referred their clients to the new centre.  
 
In May 2016, the Flemish government provided supplementary, and temporary, financial 
support for cities and municipalities. While these financial means were directly given to the 
local government, the Taskforce was used to set priorities for distributing at least part of these 
means. They were used to pay for hiring the administrative coordinator, as well as some 
additional local administrators in social services and the local integration agency. Services by 
CSOs were also expanded (e.g., centres for general wellbeing, youth work, mental health 
services), as well as some new initiatives (such as the abovementioned Olive Tree). European 
project-based subsidies were also used for a local employment project (cooperation between 
local government, the local integration agency and the VDAB) and a project on youth wellbeing 
and mental health (by the local integration agency).  
 
Moreover, we found that the formal organisational operation of the Taskforce was adapted in 
practice in two areas, mainly because of the need for rapid decision-making. Firstly, the 
coordination of the Taskforce is carried out by both an administrative coordinator and a 
member of the political cabinet of the leading aldermen. This appears to be important at 
various times to give political weight to the Taskforce: the doors of the city services and 
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external organisations open more quickly if there is clear political weight. Secondly, in addition 
to the administrative steering committee, a separate political consultation committee was set 
up. In a normal context (i.e., outside the crisis network), administrative decisions are first 
discussed within a so-called political consultation group (consisting of the concerned 
aldermen) and then in the local council (i.e., the Council of Mayor and Aldermen). Due to the 
need for quick decision-making during the crisis, this political consultation was organised in a 
smaller form (one alderman per party), so that decisions from the working groups and steering 
committee could be discussed more quickly. This provided political backing for the decisions, 
which could then be formally acknowledged and discussed in the regular meetings of the local 
council.  
 
In March 2017, the Reno was closed after sheltering about four hundred asylum seekers, 
although it was recently confirmed that it would be reopened in 2020, this time no longer 
outsourced to third parties but instead under management of the federal agency (Fedasil) 
itself. Following the closure of the shelter and the expiration of the Flemish crisis subsidies, 
the local network was dismantled. However, in September 2018, the local government decided 
on forming a new network—a migration forum—to bring together local actors with the goal of 
forming more long-term policy goals and cooperation. Local government also decided, at least 
temporarily, to continue subsidising certain initiatives that were initially subsidised by the 
Flemish resources (among others, the Olive Tree).  
b.  Mechelen: M-Power 
In Mechelen, a local network was formed at the initiative of the local government. In November 
2015, the mayor communicated that the city would take responsibility in light of the never-
before-seen asylum crisis. The local government set out a local programme, consisting of 
providing shelter and the expansion of social services (i.e., the M-Power plan). The city 
proposed to the federal government to organise a temporary shelter in Mechelen, for which 
they proposed a location. The expansion of social services was focused on housing (e.g., 
rental agencies), language (providing easy and faster access to courses), psychological 
counselling (e.g., expanding existing specialised counselling for migrants) and a digital 
platform to exchange information. A coordination group was formed to manage the process, 
consisting mostly of local administrators and some key actors from local civil society. Initially, 
three CSOs were represented: the local Centre for General Wellbeing (CAW), a health-and-
wellbeing CSO (Emmaüs) and the Local Support Centre for Asylum and Migrations (a local 
CSO specialising in supporting newly arrived migrants) (see Appendix 3 for the list of 
members). The coordination group holds monthly gatherings, and the lead administrator also 
reports back to the local Council of Aldermen every month.  
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In March 2016, a temporary shelter (until mid-December 2016) was inaugurated, whereby the 
city also hired a new civil servant to act as operational coordinator for refugee shelter, who 
was to coordinate between the city council and the Red Cross. This coordinator could also 
address other organisations and services on an ad-hoc basis, based on questions and needs. 
The arrival of the shelter inspired a number of citizens under the name 'Welcome in Mechelen', 
to welcome asylum seekers and help them integrate. Soon, the voluntary work of ‘Welcome’ 
was discussed with the Red Cross and the operational coordinator of the city. After a few 
months (from June 2017), Welcome also participated in the monthly consultation of the 
coordination group, as did the Red Cross (from October 2016). An important actor in local civil 
society is the Local Support Centre for Asylum Seekers (Steunpunt Asiel & Migratie vzw). This 
nonprofit organisation already has a long history in Mechelen: it was founded at the end of the 
1980s at the initiative of the local government (as part of the Public Centre for Social Welfare 
but established as an independent nonprofit) but has become more autonomous over the 
years, although it has remained an important partner of the local administration over the years.  
 
In 2016, we also see the impact of the additional Flemish subsidies in Mechelen. These 
resources were used by the local administration to strengthen the functioning of the Local 
Support Centre CSO, which had a contract with another CSO (Solentra vzw) for specialised 
mental health services for migrants and refugees. Other organisations also reported to the 
town council to offer their services. Emmaüs (health and wellbeing) proposed to provide its 
services for unaccompanied minors, for which additional Flemish project resources are sought 
together with the local government. Other organisations in Mechelen which worked on behalf 
of asylum seekers and refugees also took initiative, but they were not involved in the structural 
monthly consultations: a new CSO Voice, founded by people who arrived as refugees 
themselves, focused on sociocultural activities by and for newcomers in Mechelen;  a local 
humanistic association makes its building available as a meeting place for other organisations; 
De Keeting collected and distributed material support; community health centre Wel en Wee 
took in migrants as clients.  
 
The administrative coordination group was dismantled in 2017, following the closure of the 
temporary reception centre. In March 2019, however, a temporary reception centre was 
reopened in another location, and was expected to remain open until December 2020. With 
this new start-up, the coordination group was also re-established. 
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c.  Sint-Niklaas: refugee coordination 
In 2015, a platform for refugee coordination was set up in Sint-Niklaas, involving mainly local 
civil servants and politicians, together with some key actors from the civil society (CAW, VLOS 
vzw, Red Cross) (see the appendix at the end of this chapter for the full list of members). Not 
every CSO that organises services for refugees was included in this platform, but the actors 
that are included are recognised as having a broad reach across the local community. The 
specificity of Sint-Niklaas is that a shelter for asylum seekers has already existed in the city 
centre since 2001, with room for 150 people at a time. Moreover, the city has had a refugee 
coordination group since 2008, although this was initially formed as a first-line network. It was 
set up at the initiative of a civil servant (the refugee worker) in response to demands from other 
frontline workers (including CSOs) for more consultation and mutual coordination between 
both civil servants and the local civil society. With the arrival of the additional temporary shelter 
for asylum seekers (with room for 500 people) in September 2015, this existing consultation 
platform was transformed into a monthly meeting for policy coordination, and from then 
included the mayor, the relevant aldermen as well as the heads of administrative departments. 
Unlike in Mechelen, which has an administrative coordination group, here we see a 
consultation structure in which politicians are directly involved. 
 
In 2016, just like Mechelen and Ghent, Sint-Niklaas received additional Flemish funding, and 
Sint-Niklaas also received an increased federal grant (meant for municipalities with existing 
shelters). Using these additional resources the city strengthened its own services as well as 
allocated resources to CSOs. In the case of its own services, this concerned extra staff (e.g., 
administrative and social workers and a language coach) in the departments of wellbeing 
(integration, social activation and education teams), services (team of foreigners) and 
environment (team of residents). Using the coordination platform, additional resources were 
also deployed for CSOs. The city set up a programme with CAW for a ‘buddy project’ (i.e., 
individual support using volunteers), and a local mental health CSO (CGG) received additional 
resources for the recruitment of a trauma psychologist. The Centre for Pupil Counselling (CLB) 
also received financial support. Two social grocery stores (De Springplank and VLOS) also 
temporarily received an increased subsidy (each approx. 25,000 euros). Other CSOs 
(Bonangana, VormingPlus and De Regenboog) received funds for language activities. In Sint-
Niklaas, too, a new CSO emerged: in 2017, Like a Rolling Stone vzw was set up, establishing 
a transit house for young and unaccompanied minor refugees. This initiative was set up in 
collaboration with the local authorities (the  PCSW): they rent infrastructure to the PCSW which 
guides young asylum seekers, while Like a Rolling Stone provides guidance with volunteers. 
During the interviews, it was striking that the VLOS, in particular, is seen as an important actor 
in the local midfield. Other local actors invariably refer to their activities, and even people 
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outside Sint-Niklaas are aware of their operation. VLOS has been active in Sint-Niklaas since 
1997 and started as a local service for newly arrived asylum seekers and refugees. 
Throughout the years it has been increasingly focused on undocumented migrants. VLOS 
provides a wide range of services: a social grocer (reach of approximately 120 persons per 
week), a Bazaar and Warehouse (material assistance), social and cultural activities, medical 
services (three days per week) and individual administrative and legal guidance (mainly in 
function of the asylum procedure). VLOS also has a number of houses for people in a 
precarious situation that it rents out or uses as emergency shelter. It is almost entirely funded 
by private donations, except for some subsidies from the local government for its social grocer.  
 
Contrary to Mechelen and Ghent, the temporary shelter in Sint-Niklaas was not closed during 
the period of our research, although this was uncertain for some time. In 2018 there was still 
talk of closing this shelter, but with the increasing need for reception increasing again towards 
the end of that year, it was decided to keep the centre open for an indefinite period of time. 
Consequently, the refugee consultations remained active during this period, although the 
Flemish crisis resources were not extended.  
6.6 Findings 
6.6.1 The ambitions of the network 
The networks that we have discussed in this chapter seem to be rather exceptional cases in 
Flanders—we stated this at the start of this chapter. Using the typology by Keast and Brown 
(2007) of the different degrees of cooperation for horizontal integration, we argue that even 
within this niche of networking, collaborative networking seems to be a niche itself. Indeed, all 
of these networks are primarily concerned with establishing coordination mechanisms for a 
short-term period. Table 26 below provides an overview of the elements of the three networks 
according to their different dimensions of horizontal integration. It shows how each of these 
networks is mostly focused on a mix of cooperation and coordination. The main reason is, of 
course, that these networks were established for dealing with a crisis, and they were formed 
in response to federal policies (providing additional temporary shelters) and Flemish policies 
(coordination of integration services). In Sint-Niklaas we see that in response to the temporary 
shelter remaining open, the local network has remained in place, which points to the impact 
of national decision-making on the local context. In Mechelen, the network was dismantled 
after the temporary shelter was closed. However, in 2019, a new temporary shelter was 
opened, and the network was reinstalled. Only in Ghent do we find that local actors have the 
intention of restructuring the local network on a longer term, with the aim of developing local 
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policies. While the Taskforce has been dismantled, a new initiative (Migration Forum) intends 
to bring key local actors together in a governance network with a longer-term perspective (this 
initiative was only started during our data collection). Another initiative in Ghent, Taskforce 
Housing, seems to be inspired by what the initiators in local government consider the success 
of the Refugee Taskforce, and it intends to become a longer-term local governance network. 
 
The organisations within each of these local networks retain their autonomy, although there is 
extensive fine-tuning in terms of concrete services or target audience. There are few examples 
of local actors going beyond their normal territory because of the network dynamics. Of course, 
the fact that the actors remain active within their respective domain also has to do with the 
specific objectives of this network for a specific target group: everyone starts from the activities 
they already do. We do see the emergence of new organisations, yet these seem to have 
emerged even without the network. For example, the new CSO ‘Refu Interim’ (Ghent) was 
formed by the members of a cultural association (Cirq) after a successful one-time initiative of 
working with asylum seekers as volunteers; in Mechelen, citizens formed the integration 
initiative ‘Welcome in Mechelen’ without input from the network, although they did eventually 
become a key actor in the local network (which we will discuss later). 
6.6.2 Federal refugee shelters 
In every city, the arrival of refugees in the temporary shelter was the event that triggered the 
formation of the governance networks. In the first instance, these shelters were a policy issue 
that needed to be managed. It concerned questions of infrastructure, material support, 
psychosocial counselling and social services. Local officials started preparing and 
communicating to the public what their intentions were, and CSOs and citizens reacted to the 
arrival of refugees by initially offering material support. In a sense, the refugee crisis was a 
depoliticised issue, masked by managing a crisis and driven for many by humanitarian 
concerns of immediate assistance. In some cases (Ghent and Sint-Niklaas), local protest 
groups gathered in front of the refugee shelter. Our finding echoes research by Vanhellemont 
(2016) on urban planning, who states that “triggering events” are especially strong when they 
can be linked to a specific place (2016: 304). While we do not have a counterfactual to consider 
what would have happened if all newly arrived asylum seekers would have been housed 
throughout the city, respondents related their motivations to partake in the network with the 
housing of migrants in these specific shelters. Importantly, while the temporary shelters had a 
mobilising effect, they were a necessary but not sufficient factor in establishing local networks. 
The decision to form local networks was linked to a local political vision and forms of political 
leadership, which we discuss in the following.  
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Table 26: Dimensions of cooperation (a), coordination (b), collaboration (c) 
 Ghent Mechelen Sint-Niklaas 
Time taken to establish 
a 
Short-term networks started quickly as a form of crisis management 
b 
Medium-term ————— 
ability to re-install 





continuation in two new 
networks?  
————— 
built on existing frontline 
network 
Goals/Perspective 
a Dialogue, information 
sharing, remain 
autonomous 
through workgroups and 
plenary meetings 
monthly meetings as exchange of information 
b Align Resources, some 
joint planning 
- allocation of funds from the central govt.  
- project-based 
c Synergise to create 
something new, highly 
interdependent 







working groups are 
open 
Ad-hoc or project-based cooperation with actors that 
are not formal members 
b 
Some stability 
vertical integration of 
network 
core group of (mainly) local govt. and key CSOs 









Informal contact between local actors,  
part of building trust with new actors 
b
c 
Formal Networks have formal administrative structure  




6.6.3 Political leadership 
In each of these three cases, local politicians (mayors or aldermen) were the initiators of the 
network: they set the initial guidelines and invited others to join the network. In Ghent, the 
mayor delegated his authority to a local alderman, who became the leading political actor in 
the network and who emphasised the local policy of providing broad social services for the 
newly arriving migrants. In Mechelen, the initiative to establish a federal centre was taken by 
local government, where the mayor publicly communicated that the city had to take its 
responsibility. In Sint-Niklaas, both the mayor and a local alderwoman took part in the monthly 
coordination meetings and transformed the existing local network of frontline practitioners into 
a platform for exchange at the policy level. These political leaders gave the local networks the 
necessary political capital; because local policymakers were actively engaged, the network 
was taken seriously by the participants. We found that two other characteristics of political 
leadership were important for the network: communicating a clear vision and remaining 
accessible for other actors.  
 
When we look at the vision that was propagated, we notice in Mechelen and Ghent the 
importance of individual personification of the local policy vision. In Mechelen, the mayor 
announced the M-Power plan with which the city expanded services for integration and which 
was meant for all the citizens of Mechelen. In talks with actors from Mechelen, regular 
reference was made to the vision of diversity and integration that the mayor promoted. In 
Ghent, the leading alderman promoted the BBB+B policy (Bed, Bath, Bread + Beyond); he is 
recognised by the other actors for his proactive approach in setting up the broad cooperation 
between civil society and the government. In Sint-Niklaas we did not find such a personification 
of a local vision, which is not to say that there is no personal commitment of aldermen or 
mayor. After all, we see how the presence of mayor and aldermen gives the reformed local 
network the necessary political weight. Furthermore, we found that the presence of a longer-
established refugee shelter (since 2001) was an important part of the local context in which 
the establishment of the new temporary shelter was considered mostly a pragmatic issue.   
 
What contributes to the impact of local administrators on the network is that these leading 
politicians could also be reached directly by other local actors to discuss ideas and proposals 
in depth. We can see how that created a relationship of trust with new organisations (e.g., 
Welcome in Mechelen or Heart for Refugees) but also how, in the case of strong political 
antagonisms (e.g., VLOS in Sint-Niklaas), this accessibility ensures that an open line is 
maintained, although this open line does not mean that both actors come to a solution for the 
antagonism. What is striking is that the party-political colour does not seem to play a direct 
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role as far as this political leadership is concerned. After all, these three local governments 
are led by different coalitions with different parties providing the mayors (socialist, liberal and 
Flemish nationalist). Part of the explanation will in any case have to do with our selection bias: 
we searched specifically for cases where we knew in advance that there was at least a minimal 
degree of collaboration in networks. Another explanation seems to lie in the fact that these 
local networks are working from a certain pragmatism. That does not mean that there is no 
politics. After all, many CSOs work from a clear vision of social change: they work on the social 
integration of newcomers or stand up for the rights of people they feel are not sufficiently 
supported by the government. This is a form of politicisation—a striving for social change. In 
this area, tension can indeed arise between the actors involved. We will discuss this in more 
detail in the next sections. 
6.6.4 Institutionalisation of new organisations 
In these networks, the actors involved mostly expand their activities or start new projects that 
build on their existing expertise. However, we did find new organisations or initiatives 
emerging, and even though these started mostly outside of the governance network, some 
quickly became part of the local network.  
 
In the first instance, local governments turned to the organisations with which they already 
have a certain relationship. We see this both in the creation of the networks and somewhat 
later, in the allocation of the additional Flemish subsidies. These supplementary resources 
were aimed both at expanding governmental services as well as those of the established 
organisations (such as the CAW local wellbeing centres). In itself, this should not come as a 
surprise; these are services that are well known from a local government perspective. 
Interestingly, we saw that VLOS in Sint-Niklaas was not so much supported for its services to 
undocumented migrants, but it did receive a small subsidy for its social grocer. VLOS has 
been active for a long time in Sint-Niklaas, and its work with undocumented migrants can 
create some tensions with the local government. However, because of their expertise and 
local reach, they are nevertheless involved in the core group of the network. 
 
In the case of newer organisations, we see that seeking access to the network does not always 
mean that they want to participate in a structural consultation. Refu Interim in Ghent was 
mainly looking for financial support to further develop their successful start-up and looked at 
the Taskforce mainly as a useful way to get to know other organisations or occasionally 
exchange information about the volunteer work they provided. Voice, a CSO in Mechelen, 
gained its access to the local network when it needed to, mainly through informal personal 
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contacts both with local politicians and local CSOs. For organisations that join the network in 
a more structural way, it is also important that they establish contacts with politicians and civil 
servants in order to get to know each other. We see that well-known organisations can mediate 
here (which we discuss below, under ‘boundary spanning’). The issue is that a certain amount 
of trust has to be established.  
 
Occasionally there also seem to be tensions between the old and new civil society. Some 
citizens see their initiatives as flexible and enterprising but come up against what they see as 
bureaucratic organisations. These old CSOs in turn see many good intentions but also many 
pitfalls. It is on these points that we noticed how important the mediation of a civil servant can 
be. A good example is the mediation between Welcome in Mechelen and the Red Cross, who 
managed the shelter to which Welcome in Mechelen wanted to have access (in order to 
establish contact with the newly arrived migrants). Other tension between new and older 
organisations concerns different perspectives on their respective expertise. In Mechelen, 
Solentra vzw, a new organisation, offers services in a domain where many other traditional 
organisations are active and thus offer a competing service. For local administrators and 
politicians, the distinction between the different organisations is not always clear, precisely 
because they do not have the expertise. The initiative of Solentra in Mechelen was supported 
by a well-known local CSO with close ties to local government who bridged this knowledge 
gap: firstly, as a trusted actor, they acted as a mediator, pointing out the needs for this specific 
service in the city to the local administrators; secondly, an experimental start-up phase was 
implemented by finding supralocal funding, which reduced the initial start-up costs on the part 
of the local government. Finally, confidence in the new actor could develop on the basis of the 
concrete realisations of this start-up phase, and if necessary, could be continued with more 
direct local involvement (which did indeed occur). 
6.6.5 Politicisation in and of the networks 
One of the issues that came to the foreground in our research was the local policies concerning 
undocumented migrants. It is regarding this issue that the aspect of politicisation comes to the 
fore most sharply in our cases. After all, through its social services in the Public Centre for 
Social Welfare (OCMW), the local government comes into direct contact with people in this 
situation. In addition, there are CSOs in the civil society that work on behalf of these people 
by offering shelter and material aid such as clothing or food, support for integrating into social 
networks or organising administrative, legal or psychological counselling. In each of our cases, 
we have found organisations that work for undocumented migrants. Within the local networks, 
we see that local governments deal with this reality with different strategies. Nowhere did we 
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find that government and civil society turn against each other, or turn away from each other, 
even though political tensions exist.  
 
From our cases we derive two ideal-typical strategies with which local governments position 
themselves: a strategy of pragmatic understanding and a strategy of joint policy development. 
The first strategy consists of maintaining a pragmatic relationship between local government 
and civil society. By this we mean that the local government focuses on its own services for 
this target group and that certain CSOs also provide their own, often more comprehensive 
services. There is no joint local politics for people without legal residence within the network, 
which does not mean that there is an adversarial relationship. Organisations that focus on 
undocumented migrants are left in their autonomy and are not excluded from further 
cooperation with other target groups (refugees and asylum seekers—thus, migrants that have 
some form of legal residence). Moreover, the lack of an overarching local framework does not 
prevent local actors from informally reaching out to each other, for instance, in the form of 
referrals to each other’s services or exchanging information about specific individual cases. In 
fact, we found several instances of CSOs testifying that civil servants informally refer clients 
to the CSOs in order to get material or social support that local governments could not provide. 
The second strategy consists of the development of a joint policy by local governments and 
CSOs. This strategy arises because the local government is confronted with a complex local 
reality on the basis of its own services, but also because it is in a network where it is confronted 
with questions from organisations. Such a strategy is built on both pragmatic concerns and 
conscious political choices. Nowhere do we see this second strategy fully developed, but we 
believe that there is a certain impetus for further development of this strategy in Ghent.  
 
In Sint-Niklaas, we find the first pragmatic strategy—especially in the relationship between the 
local government and VLOS, a local organisation with a history of working with 
(undocumented) migrants for more than 20 years. The differing vision between the two actors 
does, however, create ever-present friction. For example, VLOS is asking the local authorities 
to set up a local shelter for undocumented migrants, asking the city to provide the 
infrastructure while VLOS proposed organising individual guidance and support services. For 
the time being, the local government has not taken up this proposal, which does not mean, 
however, that it does not have a working relationship with the VLOS: it provides limited 
financial support for its social grocer, VLOS is a permanent member of the local network on 
refugee policies, and at the administrative level, there is a lot of informal contact with VLOS 
volunteers regarding concrete cases or specific questions (e.g., what to do with the weekly 
municipal garbage pickup for undocumented migrants). This first strategy also sets the tone 
in Mechelen. The local specificity of the semi-governmental CSO Support Centre probably 
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plays a role in this: they have been involved in the implementation of local policies for this 
target group for a long time. For instance, a lot of emphasis is placed on material emergency 
aid (food, clothing), psychosocial counselling and acute emergency shelter in the context of 
voluntary return. At the same time, both local administrators and the Support Centre 
emphasise the set 'realistic expectations' for this target group, a vision that guides their 
pragmatic approach. Where necessary, services of other organisations are also called in via 
separate agreements (e.g., the CAW provides short-term emergency shelter) or by contracting 
out services of other CSOs (e.g., the project on psychological counselling by Solentra). In 
Ghent, the first strategy is combined with the second strategy. In addition to the consultations 
within the framework of the Taskforce, a separate steering group was formed to explore the 
feasibility of specific local politics concerning undocumented migrants. This is still an early 
phase of the second strategy, because there is no formally acknowledged political decision 
yet and because the steering group consists mostly of politicians and civil servants (including 
from the agency In-Ghent), with the CAW as the only CSO involved. To develop their position, 
the actors use the experience of their own services (such as the ‘learning network of 
undocumented migrants’ of the agency In-Gent and the local shelter of the urban shelter 
initiative’), but they could also learn from their partnership with the CAW in the context of 
providing emergency shelters and health-and-wellbeing services. This strategy of developing 
a local political framework is also guided by the concern to set realistic expectations for people 
without legal residence. So far, respondents have been working on a joint strategy for 
providing shelter and social services and on extending participation in public services (e.g., 
participation in holiday activities provided by local government).  
 
The abovementioned strategies operate at the level of the network, but politicisation also takes 
place at the level of the interaction between individual organisations and local government. 
CSOs working with migrants operate in an ever-changing environment, which impacts their 
position and their strategies. An illustration of this is the organisations VLOS (Sint-Niklaas) 
and Support Centre (Mechelen), who both have experienced changing relationships with the 
local government. Both organisations were initially formed in some kind of partnership with the 
local government at the end of the 1990s, a time with fewer specific local services for migrants 
and refugees. VLOS started from a network of local actors in civil society that had close ties 
with local government, who agreed to lend infrastructure for providing shelter and offered 
political support for VLOS to establish working interactions with local social services. The 
Support Centre was initiated by the local government, from the council of the OCMW, although 
it was formally registered as an autonomous nonprofit. Both actors, VLOS and Support Centre, 
were local pioneers who helped to shape the local field, offering a generalist service for 
migrants. Nowadays, both actors have evolved to a more autonomous position from local 
171 
government, especially VLOS (which receives little local funding). The Support Centre still has 
an active working relationship with local government, but its board consists of actors from local 
civil society, and it has to renew its contract with local government every five years. Nowadays, 
both these actors offer a more specialised service for people without legal residence (VLOS 
almost exclusively works with undocumented migrants), which creates a certain distance from 
local government. One of the contributing factors for this evolution might be the arrival of other 
actors in the local field (including governmental actors) who work with refugees and migrants 
and who contribute to both VLOS and SA&M gradually becoming more focused on a target 
group that in their view is not or not sufficiently supported by the various authorities.  
6.6.6 Boundary spanning 
Boundary spanning refers to how actors in the network proactively transcend the boundaries 
between the organisations in the network. It can involve actors from the local government or 
civil society. Our cases confirm the importance of boundary spanning in making these 
networks work—even more so, at crucial points boundary spanners bring movement into the 
network. Here we will provide three illustrations, each of which describes a particular type of 
boundary spanning in their own way.  
a.  The coordinator 
This form of boundary spanning is the most obvious, given the nature of these networks 
(coordinating services). In Mechelen, it is mainly administrative coordination, with monthly 
feedback to the College of Aldermen. In Ghent and Sint-Niklaas, politicians are also involved, 
either directly or through their political cabinets. These structures provide a clear arena where 
government and civil society meet: in Ghent, they are working groups and plenary meetings; 
in Sint-Niklaas and Mechelen they are steering groups with the core actors.  
 
In Ghent, we saw shared coordination between an official administrative coordinator and a 
political representative from the cabinet of the aldermen. These coordinators were not only 
active within their arenas (attending, preparing, following up), but they were also filling gaps 
or providing linkages where they considered it necessary. For instance, the administrative 
coordinator took on the request of a newly formed CSO (Refu Interim) in search of financial 
support by searching for support with other departments (i.e., the Alderman of Culture).  
b.  The translator 
It is not always easy for new organisations to gain access to local government. This access 
does not necessarily involve financial support; sometimes it is about getting to know each 
other in a phase prior to that. We saw two cases of how new initiatives found access to local 
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government thanks to well-known actors from the local civil society. In one case—Heart for 
Refugees—contact with local government was facilitated by an actor from CSO who had 
already established a relationship of trust with local government. In Mechelen, we saw how 
the Asylum & Migration Support Centre presented the services of another CSO—Solentra—
that was little-known to the local government at the time. In the case of Hart voor Vluchtelingen 
(Heart for Refugees), it is rather a matter of a translation between the language of policy and 
the motivations of the newcomers. In the case of Solentra, the translation occurred between 
the needs of the local policy in terms of the specific services provided by Solentra and the at 
the time not yet established particular expertise of Solentra.  
c.  The multitalented wanderer 
This is a type of boundary spanner in which a local actor actively alternates between positions 
in civil society and local government. In one of our cases, we saw the remarkable trajectory of 
such a local actor: arriving as a refugee, quickly becoming active in the local civil society 
(established a cultural organisation for newcomers), this actor was later hired by the local 
government as a civil servant for refugee work. Years later, this actor is now active again in 
civil society, this time at a regional level, setting up and supervising specific projects for asylum 
seekers and refugees. This type of boundary spanning is important because, in every position, 
new connections between civil society and government can arise. A good example of this is 
how this specific actor, as a civil servant, took the initiative to form a local network of frontline 
workers which served as a structural exchange between frontline workers in both government 
and civil society. 
6.6.7 Networks as temporary institutional layers 
Each local network functions within a context of existing interactions between CSOs and local 
government. In fact, as we have seen, these networks started mostly by local governments 
engaging with CSOs that were already known. Theoretically, trust is a typical characteristic of 
networks, and we see this also in our cases. Relationships of trust certainly work at a micro-
level (between people in the network), but also in a more structural way: in each of these 
networks we see the local governments in the first instance bringing together organisations 
with whom they already have a working relationship. New organisations only join at a later 
stage, often actively working on mutual acquaintance with informal contacts. Given the sense 
of urgency in the specific problem of refugee work, this entry of new organisations could be 
relatively quick (see e.g., Welcome in Mechelen or Olive Tree in Ghent). 
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Our case study shows that the networks do not replace the normal operations of local 
government. Instead, network strategies are used to temporarily bridge compartmentalisation 
of services and departments: coordinators connect services, consultative platforms are set up, 
and political decisions are made quicker. A key role is played by the boundary spanners who 
bridge these boundaries between services and organisations. Formal agreements remain 
important for these networks: when CSOs engage in providing subsidised services, this is 
formalised in a contract. In purely theoretical terms, these are NPM-style instruments: the local 
government outsources services to civil society, which have to provide certain services. Yet, 
the reality is more nuanced: often, these are agreements that formalise the trust that has been 
built up and not contracts with strict performance criteria. This does not mean that these 
contracts have no meaning; despite a certain level of trust, there exists some level of anxiety 
when negotiating the possible renewal of the contract—even with established partners.  
 
In addition, we see how supralocal actors have an impact on the local context, adding to the 
institutional complexity. The federal policy for providing shelter is to a large extent built on 
NPM-style third-party contracting, managed by a governmental agency, yet it most often relies 
on the same partner (the Red Cross). Local authorities then engage in their own interaction 
with these shelters: we saw in each of these networks how the Red Cross (Mechelen, Sint-
Niklaas) and even the for-profit G4S Care (Ghent) were key actors in the local networks. For 
its part, the Flemish government has also established its own governmental agency (Agency 
on Integration), which has incorporated a large part of the regional and local civil society. In 
practice, this has led to a Flemish government agency that is experienced as disconnected 
from the local needs and concerns. At the same time, we see that In-Ghent, the integration 
agency of the city of Ghent (which is equally NPM-style), is involved in many areas in the local 
civil society and active in the local network.  
6.7 Discussion and conclusion 
In this chapter we have presented a case study of local governance networks, asking how 
these networks take on wicked problems in the context of neocorporatist institutions. We 
started from the observation in the previous chapter that the relations between local 
government and local civil society seem to be characterised by mutual distance: a civil society 
that has its own mission and activities, and local governments that pursue their own goals and 
policies. This chapter follows up on that conclusion by explicitly focusing on instances of 
collaboration between local government and CSOs, thereby not focusing on whether there 
has been a general shift towards more governance but instead asking how governance 
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networks work in those cases where they can be identified. To find examples of such networks, 
we focused on how three Flemish cities dealt with the wicked problem of the so-called asylum 
crisis of 2015–2016. The case study in this chapter identifies three local networks where local 
government and civil society engaged in local networks. Using these three cases, we 
examined some of the key issues of local governance networks, focusing on issues of 
boundary spanning, political leadership and the impact of networks on the political dimension 
of migration. This means that our case study is limited in its empirical scope, and is instead 
meant to be an exploration of the connection between the network paradigm and the traditional 
institutions of governance identified in this dissertation.  
 
How can we understand these networks in terms of the questions regarding governance that 
we posed in the second chapter of this dissertation? There, we stated that analysis of network 
governance has to deal with three issues: acknowledge the connection of networks with the 
historical positions and interactions of government and civil society; observe the linkages 
between networks and issues of marketisation; and the possible depoliticising impact of 
networks on social issues. Our case study gives us the chance to look at some more nuanced 
theoretical arguments. We will discuss our results in light of these issues.  
6.7.1 Local networks and the institutional mix 
This first issue concerns the connection of networks and the institutional linkages between 
government and civil society. A key question asked regarding our cases corresponds to other 
research on the position of local networks in the context of traditional neocorporatist exchange: 
“(…) can platforms and networks become sustainable in the face of established, traditional 
forms of corporatist mediation and trends towards privatization of public tasks handed over to 
agencies and subcontractors?” (Schmid, Evers, & Mildenberger, 2019: 173). We have seen 
how the networks in our cases were all initiated by building on existing interactions between 
local government and civil society. The networks were in the first place new platforms of 
coordination, bundling and sometimes expanding existing public services. Secondly, they 
consisted of arenas in which information was shared, possible ideas for local policies were 
collected, and services and initiatives were coordinated. Thirdly, we saw how new 
organisations in two networks were quickly integrated within the network and their services 
incorporated in the traditional negotiation-based institutions, including some form of policy 
negotiations and political exchange, both formal and informal. Our case study shows how local 
networks function as additional layers on top of the existing operations of local government 
and civil society.  
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Because of the relatively short term of the networks in our case study, a longer-term historical 
analysis of the network is not possible. However,  separate from the active local networks, we 
have found how some organisations have shifted position over the last 20 years. Indeed, 
although we have only discussed this in more depth for two specific CSOs, the shift from close 
interaction with local government to a more distanced and even almost mutually disconnected 
approach illustrates how these networks build on historically established relations between 
government and CSOs. 
 
These conclusions should, however, not be understood as saying that the new is only an 
iteration of the old. In fact, we would argue that the perceived crisis served as a triggering 
event (Vanhellemont, 2016) to set up patterns of interactions, layered on top of existing 
interactions, which might have their own specific effect on local governance. In fact, in one 
case, the local government has been carefully examining the possibility of developing a 
network-based local politics for people without legal residence, as well as starting to 
experiment with new longer-term local networks for dealing with the issues of migration and 
affordable housing. In another city, a local network of frontline workers served as inspiration 
for the current crisis networks, although it is unclear whether this frontline network will be 
reinstated after the crisis. The third city has learned to quickly re-assemble the local network 
with the opening of a new shelter for asylum seekers. In all instances, a crucial contribution to 
these local networks is the work of boundary spanners in both local government and civil 
society: we argue how politicians, administrators as well as local actors in CSOs cross their 
organisational boundaries. Furthermore, the relationship between politicians and civil servants 
is important for the dynamics of these local networks. The case study shows how a mutually 
stimulating relationship can arise between politicians and civil servants. We see in each case 
that public officials (aldermen, mayor) take the initiative, involving civil society or other 
services. If politicians inspire and give room to act, civil servants can work creatively. Sint-
Niklaas is certainly illustrative here, as we saw how a refugee consultation was created in this 
way, which years later formed the basis for the current consultation platform. In Ghent, we 
saw how coordination was shared between a local administrator and a member of the political 
cabinet. Indeed, civil servants actively form the network, which in turn can create a political 
dynamic in the network. Moreover, in our cases, we see how CSOs are also important here, 
how they confront local governments with an outspoken political vision and concrete complex 
questions, how they bring civil servants and politicians into direct contact with new 
organisations in the field, how these new organisations, in turn, challenge the existing thought 
processes. This means that we cannot understand political-administrative relations without 
taking the relationship with civil society into account. 
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6.7.2 Local networks and New Public Management 
Second, while we have not found these networks to spur the marketisation of the public 
services for refugees and asylum seekers, NPM is not absent entirely. The clearest examples 
are found on the impact of the supralocal level, where the federal and Flemish government 
have established autonomous agencies to implement policies on shelter and integration. 
Moreover, the federal agency responsible for providing shelters works with NPM-style 
contracting out of services, including to the for-profit G4S Care. At the local level, we also 
found many examples of (sub)contracting of services, as well as the frequent occurrence of 
project-based services that are tied to temporary funding sources. However, following what 
we have found in other chapters of this dissertation, this NPM-style governance is layered on 
top of the existing institutional frameworks, creating a mix of institutions with their own internal 
tensions. The local governance networks are hybrid constructions where traditional institutions 
are intertwined with these NPM-style elements, connecting both local and supralocal 
institutions in a localised mix. 
6.7.3 Local networks and (de)politicisation 
The political position of migrants is a complex issue concerning many dimensions, ranging 
from residence status to language, culture and leisure, access to decent affordable housing 
and sustainable employment. The position of undocumented migrants is the most politicised 
element we encountered in our case studies and offers a good insight into how local 
governance networks deal with politicised issues. Our findings show how a pragmatic 
approach dominates the approach in the local networks. We also saw that the relationship 
between organisations and governments evolves and with it, how CSOs behave in a 
politicising or non-politicising way. Moreover, we see that many organisations, including new 
initiatives, become to some extent institutionalised in the network: their activities become part 
of the local policy institutions. One issue at play here could be the overarching concern of 
humanist ideals in pursuit of emergency aid, without specific longer-term or structural 
concerns. Moreover, the question is whether this institutionalisation leads to organisations 
adopting depoliticised strategies. Unfortunately, based on our research, and partly due to the 
pragmatic attitude and the short term within which these networks were active, we cannot add 
much to the theoretical argument. However, we do believe that the case in Ghent illustrates 
how distinct local politics could possibly form, starting from pragmatic concerns. Here, local 
actors who have established a long working relationship, are exploring how to move from an 
aid perspective for undocumented migrants to an integrated local approach.  
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6.7.4 The (meta)governance of local governance networks? 
The question arises whether it is possible to stimulate these types of local governance 
networks and whether the formation of local governance networks should be pursued as a 
political strategy. This last issue is hard to assess from our research since it was never meant 
as an evaluation of the success or performance of the network outcomes. In fact, during our 
interviews, we found that most, yet not all, respondents (especially not those working with 
migrants in the most precarious positions, e.g., undocumented migrants) were genuinely 
positive about the initiative. For some, these networks do not offer solutions for some of the 
most pressing issues: the rights of undocumented migrants, the condition of the housing 
market for migrants and refugees, or the discrimination in the labour market. Without structural 
local and supralocal changes in these conditions, these local networks might only be working 
in the margins, despite their contribution to the local services available to newly arrived 
migrants. Moreover, at times, the argument was made that these networks in some way shift 
responsibility towards civil society that, while highly motivated, can become overwhelmed. 
Thus, while the inclusion in the political process is appreciated by most, a more cautious 
undertone is certainly present, one that is aware of the local limitations, the political dissensus 
and the position of CSOs.  
 
We then, finally, come to the question of metagovernance, as in the governance of local 
governance networks. From this chapter, it is clear that the wicked complexity of these local 
networks is quite vast: a range of actors and institutions at the local, (sub)national and 
international level as well as a range of structural conditions impacting the lives of migrants 
and refugees. If the formation of local governance networks were to be incentivised, a careful 
balance must be sought between the need for structured coordination and constructing a 
space to act politically, as well as a balance between the needs of migrants with the services 
provided by governments, established CSOs and newly emerging citizens’ initiatives. Where 
should such a metagovernor exist, and what should be its object of concern? As we have 
discussed in chapter 2, metagovernance literature emphasises that the default governance 
modes of metagovernance are coordination, persuasion, and—as Davies (2014a) added—
coercion. Our case study has shown that at the local level, distinct policies can be formed, and 
steps towards a distinct local political space are possible. Yet, local governance can only to a 
limited extent persuade or influence the impact of supralocal actors and institutions active in 
the cities. In the federal Belgian state, while not the object of our research, it seems that the 
governance of migration governance includes some shared principles (e.g., the use of NPM-
style agencies and contracting). Yet, linking these institutions to the local networks seems to 
be poorly conceived (e.g., the role of the integration agency). Metagovernance would have to 
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coordinate these (sub)national institutions with the specific local institutions and needs, which 
in turn can generate new effects, see how local actors shifted their activities from refugees 
(legal residence) towards undocumented migrants (without legal residence) following changed 
regulations and arrival of governmental actors. In our case studies, we have observed the 
mechanism of using networks to establish new (even if temporary) links between existing 
institutions. While we are unclear about how such a network approach would work on the 
(sub)national level, we argue that using supralocal networks to link existing institutions can 
inspire the step towards metagovernance: providing a representative structure to include key 
actors, while remaining open to quickly include new actors and initiatives. Of course, such a 
reform would require a public debate on the needs of improving the living conditions of 






6.8 Appendix to chapter 6 
6.8.1 Members of the Ghent network 
STEERING COMMITTEE: LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
Administrative steering committee (department heads) 
- Department of Living Together, Wellbeing and Health 
▪ including the administrative coordinator of the network (administrator of the 
(sub)department of Wellbeing and Equal Opportunities) 
- Department of Education, Upbringing and Youth 
- Social Services - Department of General Social Services 
 
WORKING GROUP ‘SHELTER’ 
Local Government Civil Society 
City Asylum Services 
Public Centre for Social Welfare 
Facility Management 
City Shelter Initiative (SOI) 
In-Ghent (govt. agency) 
SeSo vzw (Socialist Solidarity) 
Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen (partially) 
Association of Ghent Mosques (at the start) 
Diocese Ghent (at the beginning) 
Other government Private actor (for-profit) 
Fedasil (federal agency) G4S Care (temporary shelter Reno) 
 
WORKING GROUP ‘VOLUNTEERING AND AWARENESS’ 
Local Government 
Solidarity Ghent (public platform for volunteering) 
Volunteering Platform city of Ghent 
Health-and-Wellbeing Consultation Platform 
 
WORKING GROUP ‘INTEGRATION’ 
Integration: Group Housing 
Local Government Civil Society 
City Shelter Initiative (SOI) 
Department of Housing 
Public Centre for Social Welfare 
In-Ghent (agency) 
SeSO vzw 
Centre for General Wellbeing (CAW) 
Renters’ Association 
Heart for Refugees 
Caritas International 
Private actor (for-profit) 







Integration: Group Work: Workplace Refugees Ghent (ESF project) 
 
Local Government 
City of Ghent: City at Work vzw 
Public Centre for Social Welfare 
In-Ghent (agency) 
Other Government 
Flemish Labour Market Agency 
 
Integration: Group Leisure 
Local Government Civil Society 
Dept. of Culture 
Dept. of Sports 
Volunteering platform 
Volunteering platform city of Ghent 
VZW Jong: project NIEMO, Mind-Spring Junior 
NTGent → Time-Out 
Critical Mass Gent 
JES vzw 
Dine With Us  
Netwerk Planeet Gent (platform youth organisations) 
Cirq vzw → Refu Interim 
 
Integration: Group Social Relations 
Local Government Civil Society 
In-Ghent 
Volunteers for support in search for 
housing 
CAW 
Vormingplus (adult formation and education) 
Heart for Refugees: The Olive Tree 
 
Integration: Group Education 
Local Government 
Education Centre city of Ghent 
 
Integration: Group Health 
Local Government Civil Society 
In-Ghent: AMIF-project  
Public Centre for Social Welfare 
In-Ghent: Mind-Spring Junior 
Centre for Mental Health Eclipse 
 
Local Health Consultation Platform for Asylum Seekers and Other Precarious Groups 
(part of the local advisory council for health) 
 
Integration: Group Language 
Local Government Civil Society 
In-Ghent Vormingplus, Perspectief (adult education) 








o Councillor of Wellbeing, Education, Integration 
o Chairman of Public Centre for Social Welfare (PCSW) 
- Administrators  
o Joint Cluster of Wellbeing in City and PCSW (= PCSW, team integration and 
refugee worker, team diversity, team society and prevention, municipal primary 
education, rent and housing support services)  
o Department Population (team foreigners) 
o Department of Housing 
o Department for Accompanying Education Policy 
Civil Society 
- Red Cross (manages shelter by order of Fedasil) 
- Centre for General Wellbeing (CAW) 
- Refugee Reception Sint-Niklaas vzw (VLOS) 
Flemish Government (agencies) 
- Flemish Agency for Integration (AGII) 
- Flemish Labour Market Agency (VDAB) 
6.8.3 Members of the Mechelen network 
Local Government 
- Administrators  
o Social House (PCSW): manager, social services 
o Dept. of Society 
o Dept. of Housing 
o Dept. of Implementation Services / Emergency Planning 
o Dept. of Marketing and Communication 
o Operational coordinator refugee shelter (from Oct. 3rd, 2016) 
- Police (from Oct. 3rd, 2016) 
- Monthly reporting to Council of Mayors and City Councillors and to the Special 
Committee on General Policy (operational management of PSCW) 
Civil Society 
- Centre for General Wellbeing (CAW) 
- Emmaüs vzw (health-and-wellbeing services) 
- Local Support Centre for Asylum and Migrations (Steunpunt Asiel & Migratie vzw) 
- Red Cross (manages shelter by order of Fedasil) (from Oct. 3rd, 2016) 
- Welcome in Mechelen (from June 12th, 2017) 
Flemish Government (agencies) 
- Flemish Agency for Integration (AGII) 
- Child and Family (when needed) 
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7 Governance as cumulative change: conclusion & 
reflections  
This dissertation started from the insight proposed in academic literature that a decline of 
traditional structures and increased functional differentiation have impacted the relationship 
between government and civil society. This fundamental societal change has contributed to 
the growing importance of alternative governance paradigms, such as New Public 
Management and New Public Governance. We identified the relationship between 
government and civil society in Flanders as one that has been shaped by the neocorporatist 
institutional exchange. From this observation follows the leading research question of this 
dissertation: to what extent have evolutions in governance impacted (or destabilised) the 
traditional institutional exchange between government and civil society organisations? The 
answer to this question can, as we have done throughout the preceding chapters, be framed 
in broad terms as a process of institutional layering: we can identify some forms of institutional 
change, where new institutional elements seem to operate ‘on top of’ or ‘next to’ the existing 
neocorporatist institutional framework. We have examined the theoretical underpinning of the 
literature on governance in the second chapter, and pursued an empirical research agenda 
across four chapters which focused on Flanders.  
 
This chapter has three goals. One, to briefly summarize the main arguments of the four 
empirical chapters. Two, to present some implications for policy makers and professionals. 
Three, to reflect back on our research and think through some of the implications of our 
findings.  
7.1 Synopsis of the empirical research 
7.1.1 Empirical scope and limitations 
Our research is built on both quantitative and qualitative data. Thanks to the joint efforts of the 
researchers in the CSI Flanders research consortium, we were able to do survey research 
using self-constructed databases of CSOs: the first of CSOs active at the regional level in 
Flanders, the second of local CSOs in 14 municipalities across Flanders. Both sets have their 
limitations, as we have discussed in chapters 3 and 5. The analyses on these datasets and 
survey results were focused on comparing sectors (chapter 3) or groups (chapter 5) according 
to several key characteristics. Given the limitations discussed in both chapters, we believe 
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these datasets to be robust and present a wide view on a broad set of CSOs in Flanders at 
different levels.  
 
For the chapter on WISE and local governance networks, we have combined data from this 
survey with qualitative data in the form of documents and interviews. Here, we used an 
interpretative approach. However, these qualitative chapters are limited in their presentation: 
they devote a lot of space to the results of the interpretative process (the description of the 
cases, findings and conclusions), without giving the actual interview passages the space 
needed to illustrate the interpretative process itself. Therefore, we thought it useful to include 
some reflections on that process here. In chapter four, we focused on the impact of several 
aspects of recent legislative reform. Our interviews were structured around these topics, as 
well as our analysis in which we grouped the relevant passages together. In order to grasp 
the various organisational strategies, we assigned these to the various categories proposed 
in Table 14. The descriptions the reader finds in chapter 4 is built on this structure, thus using 
two interpretative dimensions: what is the pre-defined topic at hand, what type of response 
strategy is at play here? The first dimension is more directly clear (does the passage speak of 
‘competition’ or ‘reintegration’, for example). The second dimension required us to decide 
whether the strategies being discussed could be classified as ‘goals’ or ‘means’, and under 
which category of response strategies they should be included. In chapter six, we used a 
similar method of data gathering and analyses, but with different structures. First, a timeline 
served as a tool to structure the case study and its construction was always part of the 
interview: each respondent had the opportunity to contribute to the timeline. Second, a list of 
topics was used, as indicated in the chapters, which again was used to categorise passages. 
Thus, again, interpretative choices had to be made. A good example concerns the 
interpretation of contractual agreements or competitively funded projects for CSOs. 
Theoretically, these are NPM-style instruments: a local or regional government is outsourcing 
services. However, it important how these instruments are at work in their context: in certain 
cases we found that often these instruments ‘formalise’ a previously constructed relationship. 
Sometimes there was a long-standing trust between actors, while in other case trust was made 
possible through the action of already trusted mediators. Contracts or formal agreements, in 
these cases, are ‘mixed’: they still contain elements of competition (e.g. competing for regional 
funds), yet are built on a mutual understanding and exchange of ideas (e.g. both actors 
cooperate to compete for funding).   
 
We acknowledge the limited presentation of our qualitative data in this sense. We have done 
our best to ensure that these choices are reflected in the description of our findings, and hope 
that despite these limitations the reader can follow our reasoning. 
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7.1.2 The marginal and non-trivial position of NPM in Flanders.  
Chapter 3 presents the findings of our survey research in three sectors of civil society in 
Flanders (sociocultural associations, health and wellbeing, and the social economy), dealing 
with the relationship between CSOs and the Flemish government. Here our main focus was 
to empirically explore to what extent the neo-corporatist relationship between government and 
CSOs has been impacted by NPM-style reforms.  
 
In sum, this chapter does not find a destabilization of the neo-corporatist institutions, 
understood here as the stabilised exchange between government and CSOs. We argue that 
our findings show how NPM enters the neocorporatist framework through institutional layering, 
in which some ‘new’ elements are added to the institutional framework. Negotiation-based 
agreements still form the core of the institutional framework, while market-type elements can 
be found in specific instances (such as the nature of public funding). These NPM-style 
elements can be considered marginal (since they do not necessarily displace negotiation-
based exchange), but not trivial. For instance, public funding remains a crucial part of the 
income sources for CSOs, thus not changing its position, yet the importance of competitive 
public funding shows the NPM-type nature of a large share of the public funding. Furthermore, 
we argue that this institutional layering might lead to lower institutional coherence (old logics 
conflicting with new logics), which could affect the stability of the institutional exchange.  
 
Importantly, the scope in this chapter was intentionally broad: we included a wide range of 
organisations in a broad population of organisations. Even within this broad scope we have 
identified important differences between three domains of CSOs. Indeed, we must emphasize 
that in order to understand the impact of institutional layering, research should not only 
contextualize NPM-style reforms between countries or regions, but should also focus on the 
differences between sectors of CSOs within countries. Additionally, the marginal impact of 
NPM-style institutions in this overall view does not exclude more deeply layered changes in 
specific policy sectors or sectoral clusters.  
7.1.3 Institutional layering: organisational strategies 
Chapter 4 builds on the findings of the previous chapter, and presents a case study on Work 
Integration Social Enterprises (WISEs) to focus on a sector with the most likely case of New 
Public Management. WISEs are hybrid organisations that operate with more market-like 
characteristics compared to the other two sectors in our research. The research question in 
this chapter is what organizational strategies are used by WISEs to navigate NPM-style 
reforms in the Flemish neo-corporatist context? Additionally, we looked at how the current 
185 
legislative framework was formed through the exchange between government and peak 
associations. 
 
Our case study is an illustration of institutional layering. By looking at both the negotiated 
policy process as well as the organisational manoeuvring by the WISEs, we showed how 
elements of NPM are inserted into the neocorporatist exchange that still forms the core of the 
institutional framework. Here, some of the key NPM-style changes (such as the emphasis on 
‘reintegration’ and the standardised eligibility processes) directly impact how these WISEs 
manage the very disadvantaged individuals they are supporting. At the same time, we showed 
the wide range of active strategies pursued by these organisations in dealing with the impact 
of these reforms.  
 
Crucially, we have also shown how not all of the NPM-style institutional changes are being 
‘imposed’ on civil society by governmental decisions. Some of the changes are built on shared 
beliefs in certain policy goals and management strategies (e.g. ‘objective’ indicators for 
eligibility, the use of management tools). Furthermore, this chapter also highlights the 
importance of  strategic networks in the sector, enabling organisations to handle the political 
and economic expectations in their environment.  
 
Overall, this chapter illustrates the institutional layering at work through a hybrid coexistence 
of tight coupling in the policy process, strategic interorganisational networks,  administrative 
oversight and market-type management and market-based competitive coping strategies. 
What is less clear, is whether this means that there has been a qualitative shift in market-type 
governance (towards ‘more’ market). We see possibilities in the future for both internal and 
external changes. Internally, there is the widely shared self-observation as ‘entrepreneurs’ that 
rely on ‘management tools’ to best pursue their social goals. Externally, in terms of 
governmental expectations, the foundation has been laid to strengthen the ‘active labour 
market’ policies. 
7.1.4 The local level: each in their own lane?  
Chapter 5 turns to CSOs across 14 cities and municipalities in Flanders, using a combination 
of quantitative data and focus groups. The goal here is to empirically describe the institutional 
relationships between local CSOs and their local governments, as well as explore to what 
extent new forms of CSOs might be active in smaller, non-metropolitan municipalities. While 
not representative for the whole of Flanders, this chapter identifies key trends and differences 
that are important to the discussion on local civil society and local governance within our 
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sample framework. Overall, we found little evidence of active political exchange between local 
CSOs and local governments. 
 
Our findings contribute to the debate on some key issues concerning local governance. Some 
authors have argued that local civil society has an important role to play in dealing with ‘wicked 
problems’. Brandsen et al. (2015) have argued that local governments can play a role in 
activating civil society, even “manufacturing (...) a new civil society” (2015: 5). Our research 
points out two important obstacles for such a strategy. First, if local civil society is indeed more 
concerned with social capital than wicked issues, local governments that take initiative might 
end up ‘flogging a dead horse’ (Bekkers & Tummers, 2018: 211). At the same time, our 
findings show that some associations that work with people at the margins of society (ethnic-
cultural minorities and people experiencing poverty) seem to be more attuned to political 
issues. The other obstacle concerns the possible limitations in governmental capacity. During 
our focus groups, some local administrators and politicians who were looking to initiate a more 
dynamic relationship with civil society were well aware of their own limitations and lack of 
knowledge.  
7.1.5 Local Governance Networks at work 
Chapter 6 complements the previous chapter on local governance by asking the question that 
if governance networks occur in Flemish cities, how do they function and what is their impact 
on CSOs and local government. It presents a case study of three local governance networks 
in three cities, providing shelter and integration services for asylum seekers and refugees in 
light of the so-called refugee crisis of 2015-2016. International literature suggests that local 
actors can take up an active role in this domain, despite the authority and policies of the central 
government regulating migration and integration. Our case study is limited in its empirical 
scope, and is instead meant as an exploration of the connection between the network 
paradigm and the traditional institutions of governance identified in this dissertation.  
 
Our case study shows how local networks function as additional layers on top of the existing 
operations of local government and civil society. The networks in our cases were all initiated 
by building on existing interactions between local government and civil society. They were first 
and foremost new platforms of coordination, bundling and sometimes expanding existing 
public services. In some cases, new organisations were quickly integrated in the network, and 
their services incorporated in the traditional negotiation-based institutions.  
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As for the impact of NPM in these cases, while we have not found these networks to spur the 
marketization of the public services for refugees and asylum seekers, NPM is not absent 
entirely — specifically in the form of contracting, the presence of governmental agencies, as 
well as many project-based services. Again, following what we have found in other chapters, 
this NPM-style governance is layered on top of the existing institutional frameworks, creating 
a mix of institutions with its own internal tensions.  
7.2 Implications for policy makers and professionals 
Our research contains several insights into the various relationships between governments 
and civil society organisations. From these insights, we propose the following proposals for 
policy makers and CSO professionals.  
 
7.2.1 Adapt public funding structures to the envisioned relationship (and not 
vice versa) 
Policy makers should use competitive project-based funding for experimental project-based 
activities, not as a means of replacing structural funding. The large share of increased project-
funding, identified in chapter 3, contains the risk of undermining long-term work for many 
CSOs. Our research has shown how civil society organisations often combine various roles, 
providing (semi)public services, striving for social change, advocating for certain (public) 
interests, as well as supporting communities and social networks. This multifunctional nature 
of CSOs comes under pressure when public funding shifts towards competitive funding types. 
At the end of chapter 3 we wrote that it is difficult to determine, within the limits of our 
methodology and data, whether competitive public funding is indeed replacing the more 
partnership-based structural funding between CSOs and governments in Flanders. Yet, we 
also argued how this marginal increase in competitive funding can be understood as signs of 
an institutional shift, which can result in far reaching changes: competition at the expense of 
socially oriented goals, loss of organisational autonomy due to increased market orientation, 
or increased formalization and professionalization at the expense of voluntary engagement.  
 
7.2.2 Local governance networks means more government, not less 
Local policy makers, especially in the field of integration (as identified in chapter 6) are 
increasingly regarded as ‘directors’ (regisseurs) of local governance networks. What this 
entails is often unclear, many times it involved improvisation by local actors within vague and 
188 
complex supra-local regulatory frameworks (regional, federal and European). These types of 
networks are often regarded as a way of organising local services that local government alone 
cannot provide. We discussed in chapter 2 how this idea is one of the driving forces behind 
the idea of governance. On the local level this might be misunderstood as a way of local 
governmental retreat: resources and capacities are provided by civil society and market 
actors, and local governments should only provide administrative and regulatory support. 
However, as chapter 6 shows, building these local networks requires specific capacities, 
funding and support, for both governmental and non-governmental actors. We identified 
several aspects with which local governments need to engage: political leadership, boundary 
spanning, integration of institutional processes (e.g. bureaucracy and networks), as well as 
handling (highly) politicised issues with a diverse set of actors and organisations in civil 
society.  
7.2.3 Stimulating new form of civil society 
We concluded chapter 5 by stating that many local CSOs seem concerned with issues of 
social capital, much less with political issues. We also suggested that local governments who 
are willing to engage with politicised issues might encounter an unmotivated local civil society: 
“they could possibly end up ‘flogging a dead horse’” (see p. 140). Luckily, we also found how 
CSOs that work with people in precarious situations (e.g. people in poverty, migrants) value 
political action as high as their social roles. Maybe there much to learn from these 
organisations on how to construct a dynamic local governance arrangement. Moreover, in 
chapter 6 we identified local networks in which CSOs not only worked together with local 
government but also energised local activities and policies. More work should be done to 
identify under what conditions these types of networks can contribute to vibrant local 
governance arrangements. 
7.2.4 Civil society networking 
Yes, another research that stresses the importance of working in networks. It must be one of 
the most used ‘insights’ shared in the world of CSOs, yet we cannot ignore it. However 
tiresome it can be to hear this over and over again, the importance of both organisational and 
interpersonal networks is clear. Especially in chapter 4 and 6 we have identified the crucial 
role of networking in the way CSOs can navigate their increasingly complex environments. In 
chapter 4, organisational networks were instrumental in creating impact on political 
regulations, buffering the impact of increased competition and exchanging institutional 
resources. In chapter 6, local networks provided access to local policy makers for newly 
formed citizens’ initiatives, and formed a means for CSOs to coordinate the implementation of 
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scarce public resources. Additionally, both these chapters highlighted the importance of 
personal and (semi)formal networks between key actors in governance networks. We saw 
how such connections can help to establish trust in a situation of high pressure (‘refugee 
crisis’), or deal with regulatory uncertainty (e.g in the case of WISE’s reform of eligibility and 
reintegration). Thus, while it might seem time-consuming to set up meetings, invite actors, 
organise events, discuss regulations, etc., these very specific activities provide a crucial link 
in the way a CSO can manage its environment.  
7.3 Putting governance in its place 
Governance literature, fundamentally, is a collection of various attempts to rethink the 
possibilities of steering society, either by government through is wide variety of instruments 
(from persuasion to coercion) or by linking multiple institutional actors (government, firms, 
CSOs, universities, ...) across different social spheres (politics, economy, civil society, 
science, education...). Functional differentiation puts considerable strain on the possibilities of 
social steering: how to steer a society in which various complex social spheres all interact 
autonomously in each other's environment?  
 
Neocorporatism (temporarily) ‘solved’ this issue through hierarchically organized  peak 
associations which operate as mediators between the different social spheres, linking various 
social functions in ordered structures. Government remains a crucial component in this 
arrangement, being a key arena for organising institutional exchange. While most typically 
associated with the connection between the political and economic sphere, this stable 
exchange system can thus also be understood in a wider sense of dealing with functional 
differentiation through a stabilised exchange system between government and other social 
actors. From the 1970s onwards, with the so-called crisis of the welfare state, the qualities of 
governmental steering capacity have been increasingly criticized, and with it the 
neocorporatist system as well. They have been challenged by new governance paradigms. 
The umbrella term New Public Management captures a widely shared belief in the logic of the 
market as a unifying principle of societal steering. Other strains of theory offer different 
analyses, seeing social steering in the form of network governance, as well as other more 
hybrid models of governance, in which government becomes a still crucial yet no longer central 
institutional actor in the process of steering society.  
 
It is from this position that our research question should be understood when we ask to what 
extent evolutions in governance have impacted or destabilised the neocorporatist institutional 
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exchange between government and civil society organisations. The brief answer, as stated at 
the start of this chapter, is that we can identify some forms of institutional change, most notably 
some element of NPM as well as different forms of network-type steering — yet these new 
institutions seem to be layered on top of or next to the existing neocorporatist institutional 
framework. Crucially, while these emerge from within already existing social structures they 
have the potential to undermine the existing framework. Is this what we are seeing in our 
research? And what does this mean for the role of government and civil society? 
 
Researchers have to make choices. For instance, we have not examined the privatisation of 
public services in some parts of the Flemish health and wellbeing sector. We have also not 
examined what could drive a government to overtake services once offered by CSOs and turn 
them into government-led public services, which happens on both the local level (e.g. some 
youth services) and central level (e.g. with the Vlaamse Agentschap voor Integratie en 
Inburgering, a governmental agency established to incorporate the then-existing CSO-led 
integration services for migrants and refugees). Thus, the scope of the research in this 
dissertation is at once wide and limited. It is wide, because we were able to include a diverse 
range of CSOs, and have analysed the relationship between governments and CSOs from 
different perspectives and through different methodologies. At the same time, our scope is 
limited, in that we have selected specific sectors and organisations, and could only focus on 
specific topics and dynamics. Therefore, this would be our first call for further research: to 
continue the research on how alternative governance paradigms are impacting the 
neocorporatist exchange. One interesting research topic would be to examine to what extent 
these dynamics of privatization and agencification are indications of a shift towards more 
neoliberal governance of public services? Some might argue that in both instances 
governmental control over the shift towards more market and more government are examples 
of using market-based instruments to create new forms of control and exclusion.  
 
Coming back to our own findings, are we then seeing the emergence of alternative institutions 
from within the neocorporatist framework? The core of the problem is that both governance 
and neocorporatism are responses to a functionally differentiated society that cannot be 
hierarchically organised: there is no leading logic under which the whole of society can 
function. The merit of neocorporatism was that it briefly succeeded in providing an institutional 
framework to link different parts of society. The instances of institutional layering that we have 
pointed out in our research are, according to some authors, unavoidable: it seems that the 
train has left the station. More precisely, we were already on this train when the neocorporatist 
frameworks was at its heyday. Or as Poul F. Kjaer put it: “the immediate dissolution of the 
state-centric society in the moment of its realisation might be considered to be the tragic fate 
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of modern statehood” (2015: 21). The formation of localised nation-based neocorporatist 
frameworks occurred in the same period of increased economic, political and cultural 
expansion, and the hybridisation of CSOs and governments are integral parts of this process.  
The findings on NPM in this dissertation, seen from this perspective, can be interpreted as a 
step in the ongoing creeping marketisation (Bode, 2011). We see ongoing negotiation-based 
collaboration as well as competitively organised public funding and services, leading to a 
‘mixed’ landscape. What appears to be network-style governance or some form of localised 
neocorporatism, could also be understood as the groundwork on which the further expansion 
of market-logic in civil society and public services is built. There is more to be said here on the 
role of how beliefs and knowledge structure these governance arrangements. The shared 
belief in the role of markets and competition play an important role in this situation. We were 
not able to examine this in depth in our research, although we touched upon this subject in 
the chapter on WISEs: these are nonprofit CSOs in which managers see themselves as 
entrepreneurs and where there is widely shared belief in using business-like management 
practices. The fact that governmental expectations in this sector are centred around 
reintegration and competition point to the powerful position of these ideas in the institutional 
landscape. More insights can be gathered from future research through the framework of 
governmentality in understanding how beliefs and knowledge function in this context. 
Following the insights from our research, it is interesting to analyse how these types of 
knowledge are formed in the interaction between government and civil society, thus 
abandoning the binary perspective of government vs. civil society.  
 
At the same time, we have found how networks do not merely function within an expanding 
market-logic. Indeed, the governance networks at the local level are in the first place a coping 
mechanism to expand local services by including more actors. Even though there is a danger 
of overburdening local CSOs (given the perceived ‘crisis’), there seemed to be a shared belief 
in the purpose of cooperating and coordinating. At the regional level we have also argued how 
sector-based networks (in the case of WISEs) adapt to market-based competition as well as 
governmental expectations. Maybe these networks are localised instances of “invited spaces” 
(Cornwall, 2004) establish by governmental actors? This could in turn reflect the imbalance in 
power between governments and CSOs. For instance, in the case of the local governance 
networks, networks are open in terms of cooperation (exchanging information between a wide 
range of actors) but less so in terms of who is selected to participate in different coordination 
committees and groups (negotiation on sharing resources and local policy decision making). 
Furthermore, it can be argued that when local or regional governmental support for these 
networks inevitably ends (because of their project-based funding), the interactions between 
local actors is taken up within the existing institutional framework. The openness of the initial 
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network formation disappears in favour of returning to ‘business as usual’, although we did 
see that, on an individual level, some local citizen initiatives succeed in entering the network 
for institutional exchange.  
 
Also missing from our research is the experience of those who are affected by all these actions 
and strategies, for instance the employees of WISE and the migrants and refugees arriving in 
our cities. There is some research that points to the increased management pressures on 
WISE-employees, and the growing exclusion of migrants from integration services in Flanders. 
The question here is whether these networks are capable of countering the impact of 
individualisation and marketization within their respective sectors? Could network-strategies 
provide an answer to these pressures, or are they merely reinforcing them? There is a danger 
in seeing networks as always ‘a good thing’, and dismissing other governance forms as 
outdated or inefficient. For example, in the case of local networks, strategies focused on the 
individual (e.g. ‘buddy systems’ to assist in the search for housing) seem to gather more 
support than more collective strategies (e.g. expanding the right to housing). While the 
successes of local networks (and its volunteers) should be recognised, we must not lose sight 
of their limitations.  
 
Civil society organisations do not only engage in negotiations with public authorities to secure 
access to public funding, but also to establish the rules by which their actions and services 
are regulated. This is a core characteristic of neocorporatism. CSOs are important political 
actors in the neocorporatist framework, and our research does not suggest that this position 
has been undermined. At least not to such an extent that they are being replaced or pushed 
out. Government still plays a crucial role in the governance arrangements in modern society. 
All the institutional processes and structures that we have discussed in our research are 
affected by various governmental actors, regulations and practices. Each of the networks we 
saw were embedded in some form of hierarchy, where governmental decisions have a 
significant impact on large parts of both public services as well as the space for action.  
 
More importantly, the distinction between civil society and government cannot be easily drawn, 
especially when examining the practices by which the institutional exchange between both 
spheres are shaped. Boundary spanners cross these lines continuously, actively blurring the 
distinction ; regulations imposed by government can be the expression of shared beliefs 
exchanged in negotiations ; local initiatives are sometimes founded on the willingness of 
administrators, politicians and citizens to take action and deal with important issues. The 
question becomes, in a Gramscian turn, how both spheres actively shape each other, how 
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institutions and organisations are established and how they reflect the continuous struggle 
between social groups in society.   
7.3.1 What’s next for neocorporatism? 
This dissertation has added to the debate on the evolution of governance in relation to the 
existing institutional exchange between government and civil society. We provided a nuanced 
answer on the impact of new governance paradigms through a combination of different 
research cases and methodologies. How do we look at the big question that follows from our 
research: what’s next for neocorporatism? 
 
Answers to this question should not merely end by adding the prefix “post” and calling it a day. 
One could easily look at the current situation and consider the observed institutional mix a 
form of ‘postcorporatism’ where competition, market logic and new network-type interactions 
have become part of the institutional landscape. Neocorporatism should not be confused with 
the traditional ‘pillarized’ landscape which we discussed in this dissertation, although they 
have been closely intertwined. The core function of neocorporatism is that it provides a stable 
institutional exchange between the spheres or systems in society. Part of the ongoing 
evolution of governance arrangements will be to see what can be considered the equivalents 
for this integrative function that neocorporatism provided. We have our doubts that the 
principles of competition and efficiency can provide this function. Indeed, how could the 
functional differentiation of society be managed by orienting public governance towards only 
one of its function systems? Equally impossible would be to dream of a normative integration 
of society, for the same reasons. Indeed, the integration provided by neocorporatism was not 
a normative one but one built around competing value frameworks. There is a risk that with 
the rise of ‘new’ political parties the neocorporatist linkages between governments and civil 
society become strained. For on what grounds could there still be a neocorporatist integration 
of society? New parties that take control of government might steer it towards more 
government-led bureaucratic public services or towards governmental steering through 
market incentives and ‘regulated’ privatisation, thereby avoiding the tenuous negotiations with 
a civil society in which they do not recognize their own values and experiences.  
 
At the same time, neocorporatism isn’t going anywhere soon (although we should not ignore 
the pressures it experiences): governments, both local and central, are in many ways 
dependent on the information and services provided to them by CSOs as well as CSOs’ 
capacity to inform public debate. CSOs, as we have seen, still depend on the government for 
access to the policy process as well as financial and professional support. In this fundamental 
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exchange, governments have outsourced many public services to civil society which are not 
easily turned over to the market or governmental agencies and departments. Any systemic 
change will have to take into consideration this limited governmental capacity to provide public 
services, while acknowledging its still powerful control of rules and regulations. 
 
The future of governance is not a question of whether one system (‘neocorporatism’) is 
replaced by another (‘post-X’), but which collective decisions will inform the incremental 
institutional changes? Will we witness an ongoing neoliberal hegemonic belief in the values of 
competition and individual choice, or will we continue to valiantly muddle our way forward by 
attempting to provide inclusionary spaces for collective decision-making? While we may hope 
for the latter, the future of public governance cannot be designed through blueprints and 
abstract schematics, only through the continuous efforts of actors seeking to establish 
inclusionary linkages between government and civil society. 
7.3.2 Networks and metagovernance 
Governance literature has spent a lot of attention on the notion that networks have become 
the leading institution in modern society. Networks are supposed to be flexible and open forms 
of governance which are particularly adapted to the demands and circumstances of the 
reflexive modern society and therefore well suited to help deal with wicked issues. The 
problem with many of these network-type analyses is that they contain flawed analytical and 
normative arguments. Analytically, networks are considered to be trust-based institutions and 
are often contrasted with hierarchies (coercion based) and markets (exchange based). Yet, 
as we have argued in chapter 2, it is naive to consider networks to be free of coercion or 
immune to monetary exchanges (and vice versa: to consider trust as less important in 
hierarchies and markets). Normatively, networks are ideally considered to be institutions 
through which actors can collectively work towards shared goals, based on the pooling of 
resources and information. The principle sounds nice, but in practice things can go very 
differently. Firstly, cooperation in networks can lead to difficult questions being avoided. It is 
precisely in order to achieve good cooperation that consensus is sought and conflicts avoided. 
This could lead to civil society organisations becoming depoliticised: they adopt a less critical 
stance in order to keep 'the good peace'. The difficult political issues are then no longer 
tackled, but the network focuses on what can be achieved without too much friction. Second, 
networks can be a disguised form of privatisation or marketing. This criticism is mainly voiced 
in the context of research on urban development, where networks lead to forms of soft 
regulation that mainly give economic actors more influence. Networks, so the criticism goes, 
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are particularly suitable for so-called entrepreneurial actors who feel comfortable in an 
environment where constantly changing relationships are important. 
 
There is thus a wide gap between networks as ideal typical governance institutions and the 
reality in which networks take place. Networks can indeed offer flexibility, and bring together 
a wider range of actors, but they should not be misunderstood. We agree with Davies and 
Spicer that governance analysis should be done through “(...) a cautious, circumspect, and 
agnostic approach” (2015: 235). This approach has informed us from the start, focussing on 
the institutional mix through which governance arrangements are constructed. Here, we would 
like to consider some final thoughts on the analysis of governance.  
 
Let’s start with an interesting character from the literature on network studies and which we 
have encountered in chapter six: the boundary spanner. What makes this character interesting 
is that it is often presented as a typical network role. However, more broadly it can be argued 
that boundary spanners thrive in the context of mixed governance arrangements, regardless 
whether these can be categorised as networks. In chapter six we have discussed boundary 
spanning in the context of local governance networks, but we also concluded that these 
networks were embedded on top of the existing institutional arrangement. Looking back, we 
argue here that what is at stake is not so much the need for linking organisations in the context 
of expanding networks. What is more fundamentally at stake is the function of linking 
organisations and actors from within the complexity of policy making in a functionally 
differentiated society with specialised organisations and administrations, and growing 
interdependency between organisations and policy domains. In this institutional mix, boundary 
spanners can play a vital role for organisations to adapt to this complex environment by 
proactively transcending the boundaries between organisations.  
 
A particular concern is to safeguard the difference between the role of boundary spanning and 
the role of gatekeeping. Where boundary spanning is concerned with bridging the gap 
between organisations in both directions, gatekeepers are more unidirectional: they use 
information to close off access to their organisation, and manage the flow of information 
accordingly. This difference is a crucial point to keep in mind if organisations want to 
encourage boundary spanning among their workers. Boundary spanners will be, by definition, 
placed in a position where they can turn into gatekeepers. This could result in, for instance, 
restricted access for new actors and self-serving selection of information.  
 
A second concern with the concept of boundary spanners, is that it is closely related to the 
‘connectionist’ ideology of neoliberalism in which the establishing partnerships, consensus 
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and trust are encouraged while ignoring the power asymmetries between the actors and 
organisations. For example, the boundary spanning which we identified in chapter six occurs 
in a specific context which fundamentally deals with the lives and rights of refugees and 
migrants. The act of boundary spanning should not be uncritically regarded as a ‘celebration 
of the network’. As someone said in one of our CSI Flanders discussion groups: in the end, 
local and central governments refused to take their responsibility and passed the work on to 
local CSOs. However, at the same time the work done by the boundary spanners in these 
networks have brought together new actors and established new relations through shared 
experiences. They have enabled other actors to ‘re-politicise’ the plight of refugees and 
migrants and advocate for more fundamental changes, both from within local civil society and 
local government.  
 
Finally, let’s talk about metagovernance. There are three moments in our research where the 
issue of metagovernance comes to mind. The first moment comes when examining our 
empirical chapters together. When considering this complexity of actors, practices and 
institutions, how can one imagine metagovernance from which the whole can be observed — 
or even more: steered. Here, metagovernance provides what we earlier called the integration 
of different function systems. While we cannot provide full answers here, we do have questions 
that guide us. Should we think of this as one ‘metagovernor’ or of multiple ‘metagovernors’? 
Who would this metagovernor be? Can this complexity be overseen from a single point of 
view? If one follows the perspective of functional differentiation in systems theory, it is difficult 
to see how such a position could even exist. For most authors on metagovernance, the state 
here remains the most logical place. If one were to accept the possibility of metagovernance, 
different issues come to mind. Firstly, metagovernance would require an overarching narrative 
or imaginary according to which the roles of social actors would be understood. For this first 
step, some would argue that the leading imaginary in contemporary society is that of 
competition and entrepreneurship, the ideology of neoliberalism (Dardot & Laval, 2013). What 
imaginary could come in its place, with the same strength and vigour? And would indeed the 
state be the best place for this new imaginary to take form? Second, metagovernance would 
require the building of institutions based on the leading principles that are (re)produced from 
these overarching narratives. Third, this would have to be achieved without setting in motion 
a process of functional de-differentiation, or eliminating the autonomous initiative of other 
social actors. The differentiation between state and civil society in Flanders was for instance 
historically built on the principle of active subsidiarity. This refers to a system in which civil 
society organised a wide range of social functions (education, culture, health care, ...) and the 
government provided legal frameworks, financial support and administrative support. This 
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principle can be informative of the role metagovernance can play in seeking a new balance 
between government and civil society.  
 
The second moment occurs at the end of our chapter on local CSOs, where we concluded 
that many municipalities are missing an active exchange between local CSOs and local 
policymakers. Of course, local civil society differs from place to place and certainly between 
larger cities and smaller municipalities; and our empirical scope was limited. Within these 
limitations, we argue that in smaller or mid-sized municipalities local civil society is rapidly 
ageing and CSOs are often unsure about their future. If one were to invest in (re)activating the 
relationship between these local CSOs and their local governments, a good start would be to 
establish a higher-order view on what local CSOs need, what organisations are new and which 
have disappeared (and why), what their concerns are, and in what domains or neighbourhoods 
there are fewer CSOs then perhaps expected or needed. A local government that would take 
up this task, would of course also have to re-invent itself as a small-scale metagovernor in its 
own city, and grow away from the more traditional model of providing funding and support for 
small-scale. In our conversations with local officials we found that most of these local 
governments have a good view on the CSOs that are active in their community, but that their 
capacity to meaningfully engage with them might be very limited. Here, the task would be to 
invest in these specific capacities for local government.  
 
A last moment where we encounter metagovernance is by taking up a normative point of view. 
Here, of course, we refer to Kooiman’s view on metagovernance as a third-order observation 
from which one can reflect upon the “whole governance experience”. For instance, in chapter 
four on can normatively ask to what extent this governance arrangement imposes a restrictive 
view on labour relations and the position of workers with disabilities within these relations? 
Should ‘work integration social enterprises’ indeed be focused on reintegration into a labour 
market in which those with low education are often thrown into precarious working conditions? 
To what extent does the governance arrangement contribute to the reproduction of this norm, 
and what does this mean for the workers involved? Such normative questions are a crucial 
part of evaluating governance arrangements and the policies which they produce.  
 
From all of the above this much is clear: the death of government is greatly exaggerated. 
Throughout our dissertation we have encountered many instances where government is 
actively shaping its environment in many ways and on different levels: governmental laws and 
regulations, administrative procedures, governmental actors making day-to-day decisions, 
and even governmental values and discourse. Our research is a witness to the continuing 
importance of government as well as the reality that it would be impossible to speak about 
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government without also taking into account the contribution of civil society. On the level of 
public discourse and hegemonic ideologies, on the institutional level as well as in the day-to-
day practices: the interplay between government and civil society is crucial in understanding 
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